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Abstract 
I 
 
Abstract 
After events 9/11 the unpredictable changes have affected the global container 
flows in international affairs. In order to define and explore the trade-off between 
international security requirements and reasonably practicable measures for busi-
ness, the analysis of one of the application of e-seal technology, promising to im-
prove container transportation processes, have been evaluated in this doctoral re-
search. The intent of this research is to investigate the impact of container detec-
tion intrusion technology on dynamics of container logistics processes at container 
terminals and on the complete network. In this study a model for container tran-
shipment between two continents through several see ports consisting of several 
maritime terminals and customs gates is developed. In this scenario we compare 
transhipment processes for three different types of container seals. One type is 
when containers are equipped with conventional mechanical seals, the next one is 
an e-seal without decision making, and the last one is an e-seal with a possibility to 
make routing decisions. These three cases are compared and the difference in dy-
namics of the transport processes is investigated. First we apply the methods of 
queuing theory as a most suitable mathematical tool for the analysis of the dynam-
ics. We show that this theory works effectively in case of small number of nodes. 
However it turns out that we arrive at its limitations when the number of nodes be-
comes large. For this reason we continue our investigations with help of simulation 
technique by means of MATLAB that has been applied to a generic container lo-
gistic network. Further we also have estimated the economical effectiveness of in-
vestments in new container secure devices. It is evaluated whether the electronic 
seals bring more security for container flows. As well we have investigated their 
influence on the business efficiency for private sector. The evaluation and analysis 
of modifications in dynamics of physical container flows have been accomplished 
through the global container supply network in the first part of the thesis. In the 
second main part of the doctoral research the cost-benefit analysis shows the pos-
sible costs and benefits through the implementation and use of secure container 
electronic seals in global container network. 
In this work we have determined the most feasible advantages of application of e-
seals technology and the framework of its application. The influence of different 
types of e-seals on the dynamics of container logistics flows has been investigated, 
simulated and modelled analytically in the global network; various scenarios have 
been developed and considered to include the most happened situations in the prac-
tical cases. An evaluation model based on the cost-benefit analysis has been pro-
posed and approved by different business cases for adoption of different types of e-
seals in container system. The returns on investment index have been calculated to 
compare the investments in security electronic devices under different initial con-
ditions.
 II 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die bekannten Ereignisse 9/11 haben die internationalen Angelegenheiten im 
weltweiten Containerverkehr drastisch verändert. Um die Balance zwischen inter-
nationalen Sicherheitsanforderungen und für den Handel zumutbaren Maßnahmen 
zu bestimmen und zu erforschen, wird hier eine neue auf e-Seal basierte Technolo-
gie analysiert. E-Seal-Technologie kann die Prozesse im Containertransport ver-
bessern. Deswegen wurden diese Prozesse in der Doktorarbeit betrachtet und aus-
gewertet mit dem Ziel, die Auswirkungen der Containererkennungstechnologie auf 
die Dynamik der Container-Logistik-Prozesse zu untersuchen. Als ein repräsenta-
tives Szenario betrachten wir ein Transportnetzwerk zwischen zwei Kontinenten, 
was aus mehreren Häfen und Lagern besteht. Drei Typen der Containerversiege-
lung wurden in diesem Szenario implementiert: Einerseits ist es die konventionelle 
mechanische Versiegelung, andererseits betrachten wir elektronische Versiegelung 
mit / ohne der Möglichkeit, Entscheidungen unterwegs zu treffen. Der Einfluss 
solcher Versiegelungen auf die Dynamik der Containerflüsse wurde analysiert und 
miteinander verglichen. Zunächst haben wir die Warteschlangenmethode für diese 
Analyse verwendet. Wir haben gezeigt, dass die Methode für kleine Netzwerke 
sehr effektiv ist, allerdings ist sie für große dynamische Netzwerke kaum anwend-
bar. Deswegen haben wir ein Simulationsprogramm in MATLAB entwickelt, um 
die Containerflüsse im oben genannten Szenario zu simulieren. In der Dissertation 
wurde auch die wirtschaftliche Effizienz untersucht, um zu bestimmen, ob es sich 
lohnt, in die neue sichere Technologie für Container zu investieren. Im ersten Teil 
der Arbeit geht es um Auswertung und Analyse der Veränderungen in der Dyna-
mik des physischen Containerumladens durch das globale Container-Netzwerk. Im 
zweiten Hauptteil der Doktorarbeit ist die Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse aufgezeigt. Die 
Analyse beurteilt die möglichen Kosten und Gewinne durch die Einführung und 
Nutzung von sicheren elektronischen Siegeln in das globale Container-Netzwerk. 
In dieser Studie wurden die möglichen Vorteile der neuen Container-Sicherheits-
Technologien (E-Seal) und die Rahmen ihrer Anwendung bestimmt. Der Einfluss 
verschiedener Arten von E-Seals auf die Dynamik des Container-Logistik-
Verkehrs wurde simuliert und analytisch modelliert. Es wurden verschiedene Sze-
narien entwickelt und analysiert. Das vorgeschlagene Bewertungsmodell basiert 
auf der Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse und wurde benutzt um den Einsatz verschiedener 
E-Seal-Typen zu untersuchen. Der Return-on-Investment-Index wurde berechnet. 
Investitionen in verschiedene Typen von E-Seals wurden unter verschiedenen An-
fangsbedingungen verglichen. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 “When the first container ship docked in 
Bremen on 6 May 1966, it caused, as 
does any novelty, a great deal of ex-
citement. But back then, nobody could 
imagine the extent of the revolution that 
had been set in motion.” 
(Gesamtverband der Deutschen 
Versicherungswirtschaft e. V., 2009)  
Logistics is one of the most important functions in business today. For many com-
panies, 10 percent to 35 percent of gross sales are logistics cost, depending on 
business, geography and weight/value ratio. Logistics is a comparatively new term, 
but not the operation. It has existed since the beginning of civilization. Raw mate-
rial and finished products had always to be moved, though on a small scale. Things 
began changing with the advance in transportation. In 1930s last century Malcolm 
P. McLean, the "Father of Containerization", came to idea of rationalizing goods 
transport by avoiding the constant loading and unloading from ships. Since that the 
oversea transportation has acquired its new form – the business scene of container 
cargo trade has changed from local market towards global. 
By enabling a greater degree of freight distribution velocity, global containerisa-
tion has made it possible to connect markets and sources through both export and 
import flows. Thereby, all around the globe, 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, dur-
ing 52 weeks a year, that logistics is concerned with getting the right products and 
services in the right quantity at the right time at the right point for the right price 
and in the right conditions to the right customer (Bowersox, Closs & Cooper, 
2007). By-turn, the globalization, the free market, and the competition contribute 
to the increasing the dynamics of efficient and low-cost movement of containers 
over the world. In view of growing complexity due to increasing dynamics, size, 
congestions and different disturbances the global container system is faced with a 
problem of optimization of all the operations involved in the container flow in or-
der to achieve the maximal global productivity that is expressed in terms of turna-
round time, throughput or hourly containers handled. One has to take into account 
that the expected economic benefits come with large external costs: traffic conges-
tions, air pollution, noise, and other impacts on local quality of life. For example 
the port as the most overloaded transport node in the container system is faced with 
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a problem of optimization of all the operations involved in the container flow in 
order to achieve the maximal global productivity that is expressed in terms of turn-
around time, throughput or hourly containers handled. The congestion in mega-
ports is the everyday occurrence that many ports cannot avoid. About 40% of all 
container transactions in the port terminals have been estimated with more than 2 
hours waiting time (Giuliano & O'Brien, 2007); other research shows that the most 
working day time the truck drivers spend in the port area (Monaco & Grobar, 
2004). Therefore, the shippers, port operators, logistics service providers, transpor-
tation companies (ship, truck, train) are focused now on the problem of finding a 
trade-off to achieve the greater efficiency level of container transport flows – with-
out, at the same time overloading the international transport system with additional 
operational costs. 
Contrariwise, as maritime containers are very popular transport units in the system 
of global trade, more and more international organizations, and shippers/container 
service providers/ports authorities/transport provider companies/customers are 
concerned about the safety and security of container flows. Events of September 
11th changed the view on the security of container transportation. Since 2001, a va-
riety of different unilateral and multilateral security measures, regulations and leg-
islative initiatives has been developed or are under consideration. Given that world 
trade is largely dependent on maritime transport, much of the focus has been di-
rected at enhancing maritime transport security and at addressing the particular 
challenges posed by containerised transport (UNCTAD, 2004). Transport authori-
ties identify several criminal and terrorist-related challenges in container transport 
system. These illegal activities include theft of goods and vehicles, fraud, illegal 
immigration, drug and contraband smuggling, potential targeting dangerous goods 
and terrorist activities. Changes in security have also created new opportunities to 
strengthen import/export control of any type of containers along the supply chain 
of the maritime transport sector. Import/export control is strengthened through ne-
gotiations in the new organizational field of maritime transport security. 
Active RFID electronic seals or e-seals have the potential for improving logistics 
operations at maritime transhipment terminals. With the various types of e-seals 
combined with RFID it is possible to enhance container security as well as to im-
prove container visibility and transportation efficiency throughout the whole sup-
ply chain. In the last years the benefits of the RFID technology in supply chains 
have been made apparent. However, there is still a lack of research about ad-
vantages from application of electronic seals on containers in logistics networks 
and their influence on container logistics. Application of RFID e-seals in container 
supply chains is now considered only for security purposes of customs authorities. 
However this new technology has a large potential for use in such areas as control 
of container flows and more efficient storing, processing and monitoring of con-
tainers. Potential profits of these advantages and their influence on the dynamics of 
container flows are investigated in this thesis. 
1.2  Aims and research concept 
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Our investigations show that the implementation of e-seals is effective not only in 
security but can accelerate the container turnover in global transport chain up to 
30-32 % annually, decrease the level of transport congestion and therefore reduce 
air pollution, influence positively the storage places in transport nodes and distri-
bution centres, reduce cargo theft, make the global container system more sustain-
able and transparent. 
1.2 Aims and research concept 
 “Container security is not just a nation-
al issue for a single country, but rather 
an international issue and it should be 
implemented on a global scale for all 
modes of transport in order to work sat-
isfactorily” (Dahlman, Mackby & Sitt, 
2005). 
The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE) requires 100 percent 
of US-bound cargo containers to be scanned using nonintrusive imaging equipment 
and radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports “as soon as feasible. The Im-
plementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) requires 100 
percent scanning by 2012. However, the CBP (US Customs and Border Protection) 
Pilot Report concluded: “physically inspecting every single container … would be 
impractical and detrimental to our own economy… and the global economy” 
(Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots, 2009). 
Participation in the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) pro-
gram and 3-Tiers statuses will give companies an opportunity to avoid the addi-
tional expenses on containers waiting for customs formalities, to save costs of 
manual customs inspections itself and to accelerate the container turnover through 
the whole supply chain, namely, by implementing “GreenLane”. In port security, 
such an approach has taken the form of cooperative arrangements between private 
operators and public regulators in developing, financing and implementation of 
various security programs and initiatives. One of the essential parts of this multi-
layered international security system is container electronic seal that is able to pro-
tect against theft, smuggling and terrorism as well as to improve the container visi-
bility and transportation efficiency in container networks. 
The thesis aims to discover possible impacts of container securing technology on 
container logistics, especially on its dynamics. The research presents the impact of 
container detection intrusion technology, namely, electronic seals, on the dynamics 
of container logistics processes at container terminals, and the evaluation of chang-
es in dynamics of physical container flows through the global container supply 
chain. In the thesis a model for container transhipment through a terminal consider-
ing new regulations for security and safety of container transport chains is de-
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scribed. Theoretical approach based on queuing theory and simulation technique 
by means of MATLAB tool has been applied to the designed container logistics 
network. 
The aim of the dissertation is also to show the economic effectiveness to invest in 
new container secure devices; i.e. to evaluate whether the higher level of security 
in container flows will increase the business efficiency in private sector. The dis-
sertation provides the cost-benefit analysis which is intended to estimate possible 
costs and benefits through the implementation and use of RFID container electron-
ic seals in global secure container network. We include only direct benefits from e-
seals in container systems. The cost-benefit analyses was applied to different busi-
ness cases in order to evaluate an appropriate cost-benefit ratio values. The thesis 
approaches to develop a model for measurement of the effect of the container se-
cure devices (active RFID e-seals) on the logistics container network. 
As the first step in the dissertation we determine, what the direct and indirect im-
pacts of container intrusion detection technology (e-seals) on container logistics in 
global transport networks are. Then we provide a model for a secure network and 
develop an economic model to measure the effectiveness of investments in new 
technology. 
To this end we propose a transportation scenario typical for the oversee tranship-
ment of containers. In particular we consider a network that consists of 10 ports 
and 10 distribution centres spread over two continents. Moreover each port con-
sists of 5 terminals and two customs gates. As an analytic approach we apply the 
queuing theory to investigate the dynamics of the involved processes. We show 
that this theory works effectively in case of small number of nodes, however we 
demonstrate that this approach fails to handle large networks as for example the 
network in our scenario. For this reason we use simulations in our further analysis. 
A simulation program was written in MATLAB for the scenario mentioned above. 
All questions stated above were then investigated with help of simulations using 
this program. Since our scenario is close to a real network that can be considered 
as a representative part of the global container network, we expect that the ob-
tained results are representative and hold true at least qualitatively for similar net-
works. Moreover our program can be easily expanded for larger and more complex 
networks to model and predict their behaviour. 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
The first chapter gives a brief illustration of the real world container logistics is-
sues. It describes the roots of the problem considered in this work, namely global 
containerization and security issue in container system. The statement of the prob-
lem and main goals are described as well as structure of the dissertation is intro-
duced. 
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The second chapter gives an overview of major scientific contributions in the con-
tainer logistics and security. E-seals is a relatively new technology which becomes 
increasingly implemented in container logistics. However not much research was 
devoted to explore its influence on the dynamics of container flows and to system-
atically analyse all the benefits it provides. Literature review of scientific and prac-
tical papers is divided in two parts: Information and security technology applica-
tion in logistics and container logistics processes and state of the art of e-seal tech-
nology. 
The third chapter concentrates on the detailed investigation of the existing pro-
cesses in container logistics. The dynamics of global container trade demonstrated 
by the growth in the amount of containers shipped in the world during last years 
have been considered as a significant factor in future global trade development. 
This chapter explores the structure of container networks and complexity of con-
tainer flows inside of them. As well the container logistics in port terminals has 
been analysed comprehensively. The initial connection between security issue in 
container transport system and transportation process itself is shown. 
The fourth chapter approaches the exhaustive survey about international security 
initiatives and programs concerning container transportation system. Furthermore, 
the main container security strategies related to the prospect of electronic seals im-
plementation in container processes have been discussed and analysed in this part. 
One of the sub-chapters describes different types of container seals - mechanical 
and electronic seals – and electronic seals’ system structure. In this chapter we 
identify the major challenges and benefits of electronic seals in global container 
system. RFID is the most popular Hi-Tech for container security devices. It is an 
automated data-capture technology that can be used to electronically identify, 
track, and store information about groups of products, individual items, or product 
components. The efficiency and productivity of global container system can be 
achieved when electronic seals are part of a harmonized and standardized interna-
tional transportation process. In this chapter we determine the main areas of logis-
tics applications of e-seals such as automation of containers passes to the territory 
of distribution centres, control of access to the containers contents, minimization of 
container loss, tampering, theft or cargo pilferage etc. This was done by analysis of 
two scenarios for container shipping through the ports. The scenario without e-
seals presents the current inspection costs for containers. For the scenario with e-
seals we have analysed how effective investments in container “security” by means 
of e-seals can be. The direct impact of “secure” container trade comes from avoid-
ing of customs inspections. As our calculations show, this advantage can bring 
monetary benefits for shippers in less than one year. The obtained results show the 
positive tendency of investment in security devices like e-seal on efficiency of con-
tainer business. 
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The challenges of e-seals implementation in global container system such as unde-
fined electronic seal’s status on the world market and manipulations with interna-
tional standards have been also discussed in chapter 3. 
The fifth chapter elaborates on the modelling and simulation of container network. 
Firstly, an analytic approach based on queuing theory has been applied to a simple 
container network. Two types of queuing systems (with and without e-seals on 
containers) were analysed. However, this approach arrives very fast to its limita-
tions in case the size of the network increases, i.e., the complexity of the network 
did not allow to provide a satisfied analysis of the whole container system analyti-
cally. Hence to handle larger networks the discrete-event simulation technique has 
been employed in this chapter. 
In one of the sub-chapters the description of simulation scenarios and its goals is 
described. The initial data for simulation model have been taken from different 
online sources and based on author’s estimations. The analysis of simulation re-
sults provides the comparison of container turnover in the designed network for 
containers equipped with different types of container seals. Moreover, the obtained 
results enable the evaluation of e-seals influence on container delivery time under 
the customs inspections.  
Finally, the cost-benefit analysis which is intended to estimate possible costs and 
benefits through the implementation and use of RFID container electronic seals in 
global secure container network have been developed. It is based only on direct 
benefits from e-seals in container systems. The cost-benefit analysis has been ef-
fectively applied to eight different business cases and appropriate cost-benefit ratio 
values were calculated. 
The sixth chapter presents the main results and authors contributions to the field of 
container security research. The author proposes further directions for research in 
the investigation of various influences of security concept on global container sys-
tem.
  1.3  Outline of the thesis 
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The structure of the thesis and connections between its chapters is summarized and 
visualized on the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Structure of the thesis 
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2 Literature review 
E-seals is a relatively new technology which becomes increasingly implemented in 
container logistics. However not much research was devoted to explore its influ-
ence on the dynamics of container flows and to systematically analyse all the bene-
fits it provides. In particular there are only a few research papers published in this 
area. For this reason the literature review is divided into following parts: infor-
mation and security technology application in supply chains, security measures in 
container logistics processes and state of the art of e-seal technology. 
2.1 Information and security technology application in supply chains  
New informational and security technologies provide opportunities for increasing 
the overall security and safety of shipments by introduction of powerful security 
solutions. Concept development methods, risk management tools and technology 
expertise can be combined to a process that resulted in effective business solutions 
for enhancing supply chain security. 
P. Barnes and R. Oloruntoba (Barnes & Oloruntoba, 2005) suggest that the com-
plexity of interaction between ports, maritime operations and supply chains create 
vulnerabilities that require analysis that extends beyond the structured require-
ments of international security initiatives and creates significant management chal-
lenges. Also the paper highlights the need for enhanced crisis management capabil-
ities within ports as part of a standard management repertoire and suggests a new 
classification scheme for mapping vulnerability within ports and across supply 
networks. It examines the goodness-of-fit of these security initiatives against busi-
ness efficiency and competitiveness. It considers also the training needs for crisis 
management capabilities that will allow private and public sector groups involved 
in global trade to effectively mitigate the threat of maritime terrorism and loss of 
competitiveness. 
K. Bichou (Bichou, 2004) discusses in his paper that the subject of port security 
must shift from the current agenda of port-facility security to the wider context of 
port supply chain security, with a view to ensuring superior security standards and 
practices in ports and across their supply chain networks. Based on the rationale of 
logistics integration and supply chain partnership, a conceptual framework to port 
security is proposed through integration and optimization in three initial models re-
lated, respectively, to channel design and process mapping, risk assessment and 
management, and cost control and performance monitoring. 
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The other author (Hellström, 2009) explores and describes in his paper the costs 
and process of implementation of radio frequency identification technology to 
manage and to control the rotation of returnable transport items. Owing to the nov-
elty of using RFID in logistics and supply chain management, in-depth case studies 
were conducted at two global firms in the retail industry to investigate how and 
why organizations implement and assess RFID technology. 
While the benefits of radio frequency identification in supply chains have had ex-
tensive press, published cases showing poor returns on investment and a relative 
lack of research into its adoption has left organisations feeling uncertain about the 
challenges to be managed when assessing RFID adoption. Four new factors not 
previously mentioned in research were identified: related initiatives; the integrated 
structure of the industry; organisational dominance with the supply chain and the 
supply chain culture. An argument for their validity within the RFID adoption 
framework is presented (Seymour, Lambert-Porter & Willuweit, 2008). The re-
search reveals that cost, the absence of a universally-adopted standard and the sup-
ply chain culture are currently the major setbacks to RFID adoption in the South 
African port community. 
2.2 Security measures in container logistics processes 
The global container networks may be represented as a complex logistic/transport 
system where several components interact at different levels. These interactions 
have strategic impact on security and efficiency. In other words, container logistics 
network is a massive dynamic environment, where on the outer edges, millions of 
shippers depend on the services of thousands of intermediaries to organise and car-
ry their goods to hundreds of ports where they are shipped overseas by maritime 
carriers. There are some scientific works that show that the application of infor-
mation and secure technology results in more efficiency and a higher performance 
(Wan, Wah & Meng, 1992). 
In the next case study the author discuss the development of a prototype system in 
a container depot that uses radio frequency identification (RFID) features (Ngai, 
Cheng & Au, 2007). Benefits and advantages as well as problems of the RFID-
based approach are discussed. For example, the system supports tracking of the lo-
cations of stackers and containers. Furthermore, it improves the visibility of opera-
tions data as well as of control processes. In particular, mobile commerce activities 
in a container depot are supported by the system. Disadvantages of typical infor-
mation systems regarding storage data, such as misplaced containers or inefficient 
search for containers, are avoided in processing order requests.  
In the next other paper the author describes an approach for design and implemen-
tation of an RFID system for IT-based port logistics (Cho, Choi & Lee, 2006). The 
proposed solution is named Logistics Information Technology electronic Tag 
(LITeTag) and consists of three parts: a smart tag, a smart electronic container seal, 
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and a Real-Time Locating System (RTLS). A performance evaluation of the sys-
tem is also included in the paper. 
Some authors describe the RFID systems in different ports that improve the securi-
ty and efficiency of the processes surrounding cargo container shipments (Roberti, 
2005); enable shipments’ tracking (Swedberg, 2006); utilize RFID to track con-
tainers, thus, securing and speeding its business processes (Collins, 2005). 
(Collins, GE uses RFID to secure cargo, 2005) discuss some progress of General 
Electric (GE) on the new generation of containers; the great innovation of the GE 
method is that seals are affixed on the internal side of the containers to enhance se-
curity. 
Another author presents the direct benefits of RFID in ports: accurate and complete 
data collection and better utilization of employees’ time (Mullen, 2005). The paper 
also identifies the five major areas of potential RFID applications in a water ports 
mind-set: access control, container security, container identification and location, 
activity tracking and regulatory compliance. 
The paper of T. C. Chen describes an RFID and sensor based Container Content 
Visibility and Seaport Security Monitoring System under development that can ful-
fil this need (Chen, 2005). The System integrates the latest technologies in the 
fields of RFID, sensor, door tamper-proof device, and Wi-Fi communications to al-
low container contents to be identified and inspected automatically without open-
ing it. 
Another study discusses risk management tools and the mobile enterprise factory 
innovation process as a motor for security enhancement using new technological 
solutions (Salmela, Toivonen & Scholliers, 2010). As practical results, this study 
presents a new risk assessment model, the supply chain security and technology 
management model, and a case study of a solution for integrity monitoring of 
shipments. 
Container security can be enhanced by using RFID technology, especially electron-
ic seals consider the authors of this paper (Meyer-Larsen, Lyridis, Müller & 
Zacharioudakis, 2012). CHINOS project puts a special focus on the integration of 
these new technologies into the terminals' business processes and the demonstra-
tion of its success at several European locations.  
The following paper describes the pilot project of using e-seal in paperless system 
for e-customs in goods transportation process of e-free zone (Plangprasopchoke & 
Muttitanon, 2013). This pilot project used the new technology of RFID in customs 
process by using e-seal in the paperless system for control goods transportation. 
The results showed that the project was successful because government and the 
private sector were cooperating to design of the system together and all groups of 
workers were accepted in highest level for the three components of the system: the 
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organization policy, the effectiveness of the system and the working skills of the 
stakeholders. 
Automated container identification procedures are in the stage of research and de-
velopment, conducted collaboratively by the shipping operators. At present, mate-
rial handling systems are generally manually operated. The models developed in 
the paper (Kia, Shayan & Ghotb, 2000) deal only with the operational improve-
ments to compare a terminal without any electronic devices and a model of the 
terminal equipped with electronic devices. They consider activities within the ter-
minal, predominantly ship-to-shore operations, and the movement of containers 
from ship-to-stacking area. Their models do not cover activities beyond the termi-
nal gates (e.g. land transport). The advancement of information technology pro-
vides a wide range of options for the container terminal operator to automate its in-
formation system. Electronic devices employed in container terminals reduced the 
manual effort and paper flow, facilitated timely information flow and enhanced 
control and quality of service and decision made. 
2.3 State of the art of E-seal technology 
One technology application that potentially addresses both security and processing 
concerns is the use of RFID (radio frequency identification device) electronic seals 
(E-seals) to secure the doors of the containers. (Zhang, 2007; Müller, 2005; 
Tsilingiris, 2007a; Tsilingiris, RFID-enabled innovative solutions promote 
container security, 2007b; Moskal, 2009) 
Different E-seal designs have been developed over the last decade and include de-
vices that communicate by using RFID, infrared, direct contact, long-range cellu-
lar, or satellite transmissions. Each seal has its own characteristics. RFID E-seals, 
selected for the State of Washington test, were a relatively mature product that 
showed promise for both increasing container security and reducing processing de-
lays for cargo inspections (McCormack, Jensen & Hovde, 2010).  
The RFID E-seal design involved relatively simple technology that potentially 
could be mass-produced at a reasonable cost. The RFID E-seal is the most com-
mon type in use today because of its reliability and ease of integration with current 
infrastructure (Le-Pong & Wu, 2004; Wolfe, 2002). In the paper of C. Le-Pong and 
C.-L. Wu the basic technical features of RFID systems are described and linked to 
the practical applications (Le-Pong & Wu, 2004). In this paper the authors deter-
mine how the technologies perform in the real-world operational environments and 
evaluate the various trade-offs that exist with e-seal design and the potential impact 
of those trade-offs on functionality, reliability, utility, and cost. 
Another security system is a Security Event Management System which takes care 
of all security related events in the intermodal chain (Müller, 2008). The security 
system registers the schedule and transport information of a container and assigns a 
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corridor for its transport. During the transport the system receives events which 
will be used for computing a security risk factor for each container, by considering 
restrictions like position with respect to the assigned corridor, duration of standstill 
and others. 
The basic technical features of RFID systems are described and linked to the prac-
tical application in the paper of (Zhang, Liu, Yu & Zhang, 2008; Müller, 2005; 
Tsilingiris, Psaraftis & Lyrdis, 2007a; Moskal, 2009). This papers also determines 
how the technologies perform in the real-world operational environments and 
evaluates the various trade-offs that exist with e-seal design.  
More attention needs to be given to the security of electronic seals, that was high-
lighted by the authors in (Min & Park, 2007). For sure, the commercial availability 
of these devices and their readers, at reasonable and competitive prices, could be a 
significant factor to businessmen in their decision whether to use manual or elec-
tronic seals as an indicator of transit tampering. From one side, it is important to 
recognize that low cost e-seals are not necessarily a solution to containerized cargo 
security concerns (Johnston, 2003). From another side, by implementing electronic 
seals and sensors as agents, standardized communication protocols can be applied 
for the interaction. In addition, aspects of trust and encryption must be considered 
as not every communication partner is trustworthy. In order to save resources mul-
tiple components of one container security system as well as multiple systems may 
join forces by cooperating (Werner, Schuldt & Daschkovska, 2007). 
Next article explores the use of passive RFID electronic seal monitoring systems to 
supplement marine container transportation security (Huang, Lee & Gong, 2012). 
The authors describe the use of low-cost passive RFID e-seals devices to replace 
the manual escorts (which are used to identify, track, and monitor containers). The 
authors report that the system has also maintained normal operation 24 hours a 
day, year round. In addition to replacing escort operations, this system enhances 
customer clearance efficiency, ensures the safety of containers, and reduces costs. 
The authors conclude that this system has proven itself in the real world operations 
of large-scale logistics systems and can be introduced successfully in the container 
transport industry. 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have reviewed the literature concerning research about electron-
ic seals technology. We have divided the literature sources in three categories: in-
formation and security technology application in supply chains, security measures 
in container logistics processes and state of the art of e-seal technology. 
An increasing number of theoretically and practically oriented papers indicates a 
growing interest of scientific community to the development and implementation 
of e-seal technology. As the papers show, this technology can be used to optimize 
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logistics processes in transport and supply chains. From this literature we have 
seen that the majority of papers are devoted to single and local aspects as for ex-
ample to the port logistics or conceptual ideas in the field of supply chains. Some 
practical projects investigate major areas of potential RFID applications for e-seals 
in the ports have been done or currently in processing. The results were obtained 
always for particular cases in logistics or single situations. 
Consequently, this literature review makes it obvious, that there is no research ac-
tivities that investigate how the e-seals technology can influence the global dynam-
ics of container flows. As well there is only few research papers that analyse bene-
fits of implementation of the e-seals technology. In these research papers and pro-
ject reports only one or two benefits from the use of e-seals, like container moni-
toring, automation of container processing in the port or container tampering, have 
been analysed and investigated. No author proposes a complex and systematic 
analyses of the whole collection of benefits of the e-seals that can be achieved by 
implementation of these devises on all containers of global transport supply chain. 
As well from the literature review follows that there is the lack of investigations to 
understand the influence of the e-seals technology on the global dynamics of con-
tainer flows. The published papers show as well a relative lack of research on re-
turns on investment from the adoption of the e-seals technology in the global con-
tainer supply chain. 
Therefore, in the next chapter 3 we will analyse the global container networks as a 
basis for the e-seals implementation and show the initial connection between secu-
rity issues in container transportation system. In the chapter 4 different areas of lo-
gistics applications of e-seals will be determined. In the same chapter the complex 
analysis of challenges and benefits of the e-seals in global container system will be 
provided. 
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3 Container logistics  
In this chapter we will discover the structure of container transport chains and what 
kind of logistics process are in these chains involved. We will analyse the links in-
side intermodal container transport systems and determine the general structure of 
global container networks. Furthermore we will determine different layers of gen-
eral container system. The security issue in the container logistics will be also con-
cerned in this chapter. 
3.1 Introduction to container logistics 
In the last 50 years the vision of cargo transportation has been absolutely 
changed. One of the main driving factors in globalisation process became the 
adopting of the container technology. Containerisation, logistics integration and 
globalisation have reshaped the port and shipping industry. An accelerated compe-
tition across borders impels the pursuit of new and attractive markets as well as 
high-quality and low-cost sources. Marketing, production and sourcing fronts have 
indeed shaped material, information and value streams in more distant, dynamic 
and complex manners. The dynamics of global container trade is demonstrated by 
the growth in containers number shipped in the world last years. Approximately 90 
per cent of all cargo is moved in containers. Different types of containers with var-
ious types of goods are transported between thousands of origins and destinations. 
The dynamics of one single container can be represented by complex transport 
chain where approximately 25 different actors are interacting, generating 30-40 
documents, using 2-3 different modes and handling material at as many as 12-15 
physical locations (Christ, Crass & Miyake, 2005) with high level of coordination 
to ensure the flows of millions of containers. Increasingly, the responsibility of en-
suring the seamless, efficient and low-cost movement of containers is entrusted by 
cargo owners and transport providers to logistics operators, freight forwarders or 
third-party logistics providers, who are expected to optimize the chain for the bene-
fit of their customers (Sciomachen, Acciaro & Liu, 2009). 
Providing the reliable service to the interacting elements of transportation chain is 
the major objective of any container port. The complexity of the supply chain, with 
multiple participants, there is ample opportunity to increase efficiency and reduce 
costs by electronic commerce, which enables integration of the increasingly tighter 
links in the supply chain. 
Automated container identification procedures are in the stage of research and de-
velopment, conducted collaboratively by the shipping operators. At present, mate-
rial handling systems are generally manually operated. The models developed in 
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the paper (Kia, Shayan & Ghotb, 2000) deal only with the operational improve-
ments to compare the terminal without any electronic devices and model of the 
terminal equipped with electronic devices. They cover activities within the termi-
nal, predominantly ship-to-shore operations, and the movement of containers from 
ship-to-stacking area. The models do not cover activities beyond the terminal gates 
(e.g. land transport). The advancement of information technology provides a wide 
range of options for the container terminal operator to automate its information 
system. Electronic devices employed in container terminals reduced the manual ef-
fort and paper flow, facilitated timely information flow and enhanced control and 
quality of service and decision made. Nowadays, evolutions in supply chains and 
container logistics networks have forecast the function of ports and shipping lines 
in the logistics process as elements of value-driven supply chain networks 
(Robinson, 2002). The dynamic market forces demand that ports and container 
terminals – nodal points within global container networks – improve both their op-
erational and management efficiency to enhance competitiveness of a system (Le-
Griffin & Murphy, 2006). Different types of containers with various types of goods 
are transported between thousands of origins and destinations. Approximately 90 
per cent of all cargo is moved in standard steel or aluminium boxes (van de Voort, 
O'Brien & Rahman, 2003). Naturally, the dynamics of global container trade can 
be also demonstrated by the current growth in containers shipped in the world. 
Since last years China’s international trade became the major driving force for 
global trade as well as for container shipping (Fig. 2). In 2005, almost 65 per cent 
of container traffic was attributed to Asian ports, whereby the top 8 Chinese ports 
alone represented 26.5 per cent of total container traffic (Heideloff & Stockmann, 
2006). 
 
Fig. 2 Container turnover by continents, TEU (Christ, Crass & Miyake, 2005) 
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Massive flows of exporting/importing containers are the main physical connection 
behind today’s soaring trade circulation. In 2002, the Bureau International des 
Containers (Christ, Crass & Miyake, 2005) estimated that approximately 
15.000.000 containers were in global circulation. Containerisation Online (Christ, 
Crass & Miyake, 2005) indicate that over 264 million containers were moved 
through container ports in 2002. As an illustration, in 1980 total container through-
put in world container ports did not exceed 40 million TEUs (Twenty-foot Equiva-
lent Unit). In 1990, it reached 75 million TEUs (Fig. 3). Drewry Shipping Consult-
ants (The Drewry Shipping Consultants, 2006) estimates that worldwide container 
handling is expected to increase further to 628 million TEUs in 2010, of which 57 
per cent are port-to-port full containers, 14 per cent are port-to-port empty contain-
ers and 29 per cent are transhipment. 
 
Fig. 3 Global container turnovers, 1991-2007 (Kia, Shayan & Ghotb, 2000) 
Key factors for a container terminal are the efficiency of the stacking and the 
transport of this large number of containers to and from the ship’s side. Shipping 
companies ask for reliability regarding adherence to delivery dates and promised 
handling times (Tongzon & Heng, 2005). Thus, container nodes are forced to pro-
vide efficient and cost-effective services. They have to invest heavily to meet the 
stringent demands for faster service and higher quality. The competition between 
container transhipment nodes has increased due to large growth rates on major 
seaborne container routes. Transhipment terminals are faced with more and more 
containers to be handled in short time at low cost. Therefore, they are forced to en-
large handling capacities and strive to achieve gains in productivity. Different con-
cepts for meeting the current and future demand are utilized (Stahlbock & Voss, 
2008). 
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3.2 The container transport chain 
Container logistics as it called nowadays is the very important part of any transpor-
tation process. The complexity of container logistics system leads to the necessity 
of its optimization. Currently, the container transport chain does not begin or end 
at the maritime ports. An intermodal container transportation system links world-
wide ports to consumer markets, manufacturing and distribution centres, and agri-
cultural production and processing facilities via unique container box – Twenty-
Feet-Unit (TEU). That global network – comprised of waterways, railroads, high-
ways, distribution warehouses, container yards, and terminal facilities – is the Con-
tainer Transportation System. The logistics concept is attributed intermodal, eco-
nomic and organizational integration of transport modes and the evolving demands 
of end-customers to achieve logistics goals (Panayides, 2006). Maritime logistics 
term is largely applied to the containerized cargoes via liner shipping lines and the 
importance of containerization technology in the door-to-door concept of transpor-
tation and has an impact on the cost, efficiency, accessibility, service and reliability 
of logistics systems (Panayides, 2006). Logistics as a part of the supply chain pro-
cess therefore deals with the planning and control of material flows and related in-
formation flows in order to satisfy customers’ requirements in the public and pri-
vate sectors (Panayides, 2006) (Ghiani, Laporte & Musmanno, 2004). It consists of 
number of facilities like manufacturing centres, warehouses, distribution centres, 
transhipment points, port terminals, etc. (Fig. 4).  
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system links together the facilities and transportation services. By enabling a great-
er degree of freight distribution velocity, global containerisation has made possible 
to connect markets and sources through both export and import flows. This veloci-
ty becomes more a function of time than speed as containerisation mostly im-
proved the function of transhipment (Rodrigue, 1999). Communication and trans-
portation evolution have allowed organisations to reach new markets, and locate 
production and material sources in different countries. The internationalisation of 
trade has intensified the dynamic and complex nature of global material and infor-
mation flows. 
3.2.1 Container logistics networks 
Container logistics is one of the most important activities within global trade 
flows. Containers are uniform boxes whose contents do not have to be unpacked at 
each point of transfer. They have been designed for easy and fast handling of 
freight. The increasing number of container shipments causes higher demands on 
the seaport container terminals, container logistics, and management, as well as on 
technical equipment. An increased competition between seaports, especially be-
tween geographically close ones, is the result of this development (Steenken, Voß 
& Stahlbock, 2004). As the containers move from the point of origin to the point of 
destination as many as twenty different actors (e.g. transportation firms, logistic 
services firms, the shipping company, cargo-owners, the purchaser and banks) 
have to coordinate activities. Insensibly this process becomes more and more com-
plex and risks (e.g. security risks) grow. Thus, global container networks may be 
represented as a complex logistic/transport system where several components in-
teract in different levels. These interactions have strategic impact on security and 
efficiency. 
The worldwide network of container flows on land and at sea is becoming increas-
ingly meshed. Companies managing container terminals have the need of optimiz-
ing all the operations involved in the container flow in order to achieve the maxi-
mal global productivity that is expressed in terms of some opportune performance 
indices, such as turnaround time, throughput or hourly containers handled. 
The globalization has impacted various segments of international shipping and lo-
gistics, the port industry has lagged behind other infrastructure and logistics sectors 
in embracing global changes. The combination of the institutionally rigid structures 
and spatially conventional arrangements meant that neither cross-industry integra-
tion nor cross-border expansion was possible. With the process of port privatiza-
tion and deregulation being widely implemented, barriers to global port operations 
have started to be lifted gradually and new operating port structures have emerged. 
Global port operators can be defined as those actors who extend their activities to 
international port operations with a view of establishing globe-spanning network 
services (Bichou & Bell, Internationalisation and consolidation of the container 
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port industry: Assesment of channel structure and relationships, 2007). Several 
transportation systems can be used to transport containers from one destination to 
another. Transport over sea is carried out by ships. On the other hand, trucks or 
trains can be used to transport containers over land. To tranship containers from 
one mode of transportation to another, ports and terminals can be used. For exam-
ple, at a container terminal, a container can be taken off a train and be placed on a 
ship (Vis & de Koster, 2003). To ensure a fast transhipment process, at large ter-
minals, control for efficiency a high degree of coordination is necessary. These can 
be obtained by using among others an information technology and an automated 
control technology. 
Within container interfaces, as the ones represented by intermodal terminals or 
container transhipment nodes, the rational integration of material and information 
has a fundamental importance for planning and operating security, efficiency, ef-
fectivity and sustainable logistics. In such nodes, actors and stakeholders interact 
within a complex inter-organisational network. 
3.2.1.1 Container logistics networks 
Global container networks is a platform for global containerisation. It consists of 
the network of suppliers, manufacturing centres, warehouses, distribution centres, 
and retail outlets that transforms raw materials into finished products and delivers 
them to consumers (Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky & Simchi-Levi, 2007). Global con-
tainer networks may be also represented as a complex transport (Christ, Crass & 
Miyake, 2005) (Fig.5). 
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Fig. 5 Actors in the container logistics networks, adapted from (Christ, Crass & Miyake, 2005) 
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As a result, container networks link into global system a large number of produc-
tion, distribution and consumption logistics networks, connecting hundreds of na-
tions and each continent on the earth. 
3.2.1.2 Flows in container logistics networks 
The structure of general container system can be modelled (Fig. 6) in three layers: 
oversight, transactional and logistic. Consequently, the container network could be 
represent as three independent and interacting networks: a physical logistic system 
for transporting goods; a transaction system that is driven by information flows; 
and oversight system that regulates the subsystems through standards, fines and 
duties (Willis & Ortiz, 2004). 
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Fig. 6 The logistics, transaction, and oversight layers of the container supply chain, adapted from 
(Willis & Ortiz, 2004) 
On the logistics layer the container network is represented as a physical system of 
moving containers, operated by trucking companies, rail freight firms, ocean carri-
ers, freight forwarders and consolidators. All these actors add value and provide 
services to the producers and consumers of goods. The transaction-based layer 
connects participants (e.g. banks, non-vessel operating common carrier (NVOCC), 
retailers and suppliers) of each supply chain on informational, financial and physi-
cal levels. It can be represented as union of two interacting networks: informational 
and material networks.  
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Furthermore, each transaction or movement of goods is subject of some regime of 
international and domestic rules, regulations and enforcement mechanisms. These 
regimes regulate the structure and operations of the transaction and physical layers 
of the supply chain. The mechanisms and some institutions responsible for them 
are represented on the oversight layer, for instance: International Maritime Organi-
sation (IMO), World Customs Organisation (WCO), Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), US Coast Guard (USCG), International Standards Organisation (ISO), 
among others. 
These institutions are responsible for establishing an international framework and 
setting out different security-related requirements and measures for container trade. 
In these international frameworks special attention has been designated to interna-
tional security-related initiatives. Another relevant factor of global container logis-
tics is the growing restrictions imposed by the rules of US Homeland Security. 
The actors involved in the container transport chain can be broken down into five 
subgroups according to the roles they play (Christ, Crass & Miyake, 2005). 
Most containerized moves start as a commercial interaction between a seller and a 
buyer. In many cases (but not at all) the seller is also the shipper. Both shipper and 
buyer have detailed knowledge of the transaction leading to the shipment of the 
container but, in most cases, the shipper is the only actor in the chain with detailed 
first-hand knowledge of the goods placed into a container. This fact is of funda-
mental importance to efforts seeking to secure the container transport chain. 
Shippers are the most numerous actors in the container transport chain and are 
characterized by the presence of many small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
From a security perspective, the large participation of SMEs in containerized trade 
has repercussions on efforts to secure the container transport chain. Indeed, efforts 
to extend supply chain security to the originating shipper must take into account 
these actors’ relative lack of resources available, and/or motivation, to implement 
security measures. 
A significant portion of international container movements concern intra-firm trade 
or trade between affiliates or otherwise linked firms. In many respects, intra-firm 
trade presents potentially fewer security risks as the parties to the transaction are 
known to each other and trusted – provided that these firms have in place sufficient 
security measures. Freight forwarders have tremendous visibility over the entire 
container transport chain. They have sometimes hybrid role (e.g., where they act as 
“carriers” to their clients and as “shippers” to their carriers) that can serve to con-
centrate a data regarding originating shippers that are hard to access. Forwarders 
are also characterised by a significant number of SMEs that may not be in a posi-
tion to implement cumbersome or costly security measures. Just as with shippers, a 
significant number of transport operators in the container transport chain are 
SMEs. This is especially true in the road sector where most container voyages 
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begin and end. Globally, the “first mile” and “last mile” are the most vulnerable as 
carriage is often undertaken by small entrepreneurs unable and/or unwilling to im-
plement effective security measures. 
The oversight role for containerized transport is split between transport authorities 
that are responsible for vehicles, drivers and operators (and their facilities) and cus-
toms authorities, responsible for the contents of the container. Responsibility for 
the container itself is indefinite as customs typically have responsibility for ensur-
ing the integrity of the container once the containers and their contents are present-
ed to a customs office, whereas transport authorities typically have a role to play in 
ensuring that the interface between the container and the mode of carriage is safe. 
A secondary issue related to the previous one is the wide disparity in land-side li-
censing systems. Even among harmonized systems security is rarely a criteria used 
to deliver operating permits (with the notable exception of hazardous materials car-
riage). 
3.2.2 Container logistics in a port hub 
The physical and information cargo flows within the container terminal is influ-
enced by the sequence of processes, the relative capacity of each process, and the 
intervention of managers into the allocation of resources. Often analyses are con-
ducted using a sequential control approach. Under a sequential control approach, 
the progress of cargo through the various component processes is based solely on 
the conclusion of one operation signalling the start of the next operation. Such an 
analysis, however, ignores the intervention of managers into the situation in re-
sponse to disturbances and the plans generated from external inputs. These plans 
and interventions are influenced by information about the states in the yard, re-
sources, and the ship, as well as external information flows.  
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Fig. 7 Information flow in port hub (Higgins, Dessouky & Hall, 2000) 
As with many industrial operations, there is no single controlling manager; rather, 
the processes are managed by the interactions of several parties. Each of these 
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managers creates plans and directives based on incomplete knowledge of the state 
of the system and the full potential consequences of the action. For example, the 
ship rotation schedule is created without a complete understanding of the conse-
quences this will impose upon the terminal yard, the over-the-road truckers, and 
the customers using the steamship line. Furthermore, this information would most 
likely be considered to be of little or no use since methods and procedures are not 
available to vary the ship schedule based on these facts. 
In the port hub there are several interaction of operational plans, data obtained dur-
ing the check-in process, and the physical flow of a container. Certain data from 
the yard plan and the container itself must be available to the gate clerks perform-
ing the check-in process so that they may determine the appropriate disposition of 
a container. 
Delivering an empty container to a customer and then transporting the filled con-
tainer back to the terminal is a multi-step process that requires entering the termi-
nal twice: once to pick up the container and again to deliver the container for 
shipment. In each case the trucker must wait in a queue to check in at the gate. 
Container ships are nowadays unloaded and loaded at large container terminals. 
Container technology has many advantages. They are easy to load and empty. The 
same container can be reused many times over many years to carry many different 
types of cargo. Perhaps most significantly, a container can be transferred between 
different modes of transportation - vessel, truck, rail, and barge - without interme-
diate reloading. Over the last 30 years, the "intermodal" capabilities of containers 
have altered many aspects of maritime shipping and inland freight movement. The 
expanded use of containers has influenced vessel design as well as the most fun-
damental concepts of port operations and terminal development. 
Delays can occur for a variety of reasons, including lack of equipment, insufficient 
staffing, and missing, incomplete, or inaccurate information. For instance, if yard 
equipment is unavailable for rapid loading and unloading of the over-the-road 
trucks, congestion can appear within the terminal. This can, in turn, interfere with 
the bomb cart movements and other terminal activities. 
This entire process could be examined for procedures that would decrease the 
number of entries and exits made by the over-the-road trucks using the concepts of 
re-engineering. Both the congestion outside the terminal gate and the congestion in 
the yard could most likely be reduced by restructuring this process.  
Thereby, container terminals are very specific connecting nodes between other 
modes of container network: any bottlenecks in terminal operations may influence 
the outside-terminal traffic of containers. As a container port nodes consist of a 
number of different subsystems, the operating and business processes there need to 
be well harmonized as well as the resources to be efficiently allocated. Thus, in-
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formation technology likely RFID become an essential part of the rapid and accu-
rate transfer and processing of huge volumes of data processed in international 
transport companies and port organizations. The further increase in ship sizes and 
increasing security concern make a productivity, security, and efficiency of con-
tainer handling operations more important in order to achieve competitive terminal 
fares and increase therefore the attractiveness for new customers. 
3.3  Security issue in container logistics 
Since 2001, a variety of different unilateral and multilateral security measures reg-
ulations and legislative initiatives have been developed or are under consideration. 
Given that world trade is largely dependent on maritime transport, much of the fo-
cus has been directed at enhancing maritime transport security and at addressing 
the particular challenges posed by containerised transport (UNCTAD secretariat, 
2004). Transport authorities identify several criminal and terrorist-related chal-
lenges in container transport system. These illegal activities include theft of goods 
and vehicles, fraud, illegal immigration, drug and contraband smuggling, potential 
targeting dangerous goods and terrorist activities.  
The container industry has proved to be a remarkably efficient commercial system, 
designed to move goods through the international supply chain in the fastest way. 
The main drivers of the system are speed and low cost. The huge volume of con-
tainer traffic plus the normal controls over cargo packing and shipping provide op-
portunities to introduce weapons of mass destruction into a container at several 
stages of the supply chain. The amount of documentation, companies and institu-
tions involved certainly overwhelmed any inspection process (Binnendijk, Caraher, 
Coffey & Wynfield, 2002). 
Several International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) have been working on a wide range of measures to enhance 
maritime transport security. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) de-
veloped a new comprehensive security regime for international shipping, by adopt-
ing a number of amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) in 
2002. The Government of the U.S. has also promoted the main initiatives relevant 
to maritime transport security, which are: the Customs Trade Partnership against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the "24-Hour Rule" 
and recent regulations under the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 which amend U.S. cus-
toms regulations for obtaining and monitoring information on cargo. The Prolifera-
tion Security Initiative implemented by the US Department of State falls under the 
new security measures of the maritime transport sector as well. The U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection Service (CBP) is now the relevant government agency in 
charge of the administration and enforcement of these programs and regulations. 
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After 9/11 container and shipping industry have something else in common: the in-
ternational security perception that ships and containers could be used as weapons 
of mass destruction. Since 9/11, a new pattern of organizational field around the is-
sue of security has emerged. The institutions related to the maritime transport sec-
tor have negotiated and implemented new regulations oriented to enforce security 
in the logistics supply chain. Changes in security have also created new opportuni-
ties to strengthen import/export control of any type of containers along the supply 
chain of the maritime transport sector. Import/export control is strengthened 
through negotiations in the new organizational field of maritime transport security. 
As this issue continues to evolve, new institutional changes are expected to 
emerge. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have exposed the structure of container transport chains and 
what kind of logistics process are in these chains involved. We have analysed the 
links inside intermodal container transport system and determined the general 
structure of global container networks. As a result, container networks link into the 
global system, a large number of production, distribution and consumption logis-
tics networks, connecting hundreds of nations and each continent on the earth. Fur-
thermore we have determined different layers of general container system: over-
sight, transactional and logistic.  
Consequently, the container network could be represent as three independent and 
interacting networks: a physical logistic system for transporting goods; a transac-
tion system that is driven by information flows; and oversight system that regulates 
the subsystems through standards, fines and duties. The complexity of container 
supply chains, with multiple participants, requires from logistics providers to look 
for opportunities to increase efficiency and reduce costs, and enable the integration 
of the increasing strong links in the supply chain. Different concepts for meeting 
the current and future demand are utilized on the theoretical level and in close in-
terrelation with practices. 
In order to understand and realize the weak points in container logistics, the detail 
analysis of container logistics processes and structure of container networks have 
been done in chapter 3. The security problems in the container logistics have been 
also discussed in this chapter. The institutions related to the transport sector have 
negotiated and implemented new security regulations oriented to enforce security 
in the logistics supply chain. Changes in security have also created new opportuni-
ties for implementing new technologies to enhance visibility, security and safety of 
containers along the supply chain. In the next chapter we will introduce one of the 
technology that can be effectively integrated and is used on different stages of con-
tainer transportation process worldwide. 
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4 Electronic seals: overview and analysis 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there has been understandably increased 
attention paid to the issue of port security. Koch-Menard (Koch-Menard, 2009) re-
views in his paper the development of detection programs since 9/11 and identifies 
three emerging trends in the security environment in North America in the years to 
come. The first of them is a movement away from evidence-based detection to 
rule-based discovery; the second tendency to secure the transport system is a move 
away from the observation of actual behaviour to the analysis of electronic records; 
and the last up to nowadays trend is a move away from national discovery systems 
to multinational structures. The existing tendency demonstrates the importance of 
development and implementation of new security detecting technology, like RFID 
seals in container transportation; to achieve international secure and efficient glob-
al trade. The implemented measures can significantly change, for instance, port 
operations, as well as significantly influence the shipping cost and time over the 
whole container supply chain. With the purpose to determine and explore the trade-
offs between security and commerce sector, the analysis of one of the technologies 
– RFID e-seals – promising to improve container transportation processes, is pre-
pared in this chapter. 
4.1 International security initiatives 
Before September 11th the security of supply chain was focused mostly on reduc-
ing the loss of cargo shipments through theft or misrouting. As maritime containers 
are extremely popular and ubiquitous in the world trade system, they are the most 
vulnerable to criminals’ purposes. These daily problems have real influence on the 
container transport system’s ability to ensure the efficient flow of cargo within the 
national and international marketplace. Thus, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) created the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs Trade Partner-
ship against Terrorism (C-TPAT) voluntary programs as a specific security meas-
ure to protect the global container trading system and trade lanes between CSI 
ports and the U.S. (Fig. 8). To implement CSI, U.S. Customs have been entering 
into bilateral agreements or partnerships with foreign governments (UNCTAD, 
2005). 
It is clear, protection against terrorist risks will cost money; and developing coun-
tries that view these additional costs as undermining their competitiveness in ac-
cessing the US market may be compelled to direct their trade elsewhere, if that is 
an option (UNCTAD, 2003). Simple maintains to legal requirements while may fa-
cilitate transport crossing at international boundaries, it does not go far enough to 
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take advantage of the opportunity to refine inter-firm relationships and processes 
that can potentially produce efficiencies (Gould, 2008). 
 
                                                                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 International Container Logistics Chain: Scope of IMO and US Security Initiatives, 
adapted from (Crist, 2003) 
4.1.1 The Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is the first USA security program concern-
ing ocean going sea containers. It is based on the premise that the security of the 
world’s maritime trading system needs to be enhanced and it will be more secure if 
high risk cargo containers are targeted and screened before they have been loaded. 
The initiative aims the detection of potential problems at their earliest possible op-
portunity and to prevent the smuggling of terrorists or terrorist weapons in ocean-
going cargo containers. 
The Container Security Initiative is a four-part program, which involves 
(Hoffmann, 2006): 
1. Establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers based on ad-
vance information; 
2. Pre-screening those containers identified as high-risk before they arrive at 
U.S. ports; 
3. Using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers, including radiation de-
tectors and large-scale x-ray and gamma ray machines; 
4. Developing secure and ‘smart’ containers. 
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To implement CSI, and in particular its second aspect, U.S. Customs have been en-
tering into bilateral agreements or partnerships with foreign governments. The goal 
of CSI is to improve security without, however, slowing down the movement of 
container trade. Thus, if it is possible, container screenings are to be carried out 
during periods of down time, when containers sit on the docks waiting to be loaded 
on a vessel and screenings should not have to be carried out again in the United 
States. In the case a cargo container suspected for potential weapons of mass de-
struction is discovered, it will not be permitted to continue on its course to a U.S. 
port (U.S. Customs and Border Protection). The initial aim of U.S. authorities was 
to implement CSI at the (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2007) ports that 
send the largest volumes of cargo containers into the United States, in a way that 
facilitates detection of potential security concerns at the earliest possible oppor-
tunity. 
As regards to the costs of implementation of CSI, it should be noted that while 
U.S. Customs are paying to deploy their officers and computers in the foreign 
ports, host seaports need to obtain screening and detection equipment, which is not 
provided by or paid for by the United States. As for the costs of screening individ-
ual containers, it is for the host country to determine which party (i.e. exporter, im-
porter, or any other party) is to pay for the direct costs of screening and unloading 
containers. An important aspect of CSI, which still requires further clarification, is 
the question of effective identification of high-risk containers (Mikuriya, 2007).  
 
German Seaport Operators argues that scanning 100 percent of US-bound contain-
er cargo would require tremendous financial outlays and time (Special Report: 
Container security: Congress debates the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of US-
bound container cargo, 2008). The port of Hamburg ships 120,000 containers to 
the U.S. per year. The “Zentralverband der deutschen Seehafenbetriebe e. V.” 
(ZDS) estimates the incremental per-container cost to transport containers from the 
port terminal area to a scanning facility at 300€. 
 
Annually, that amounts to an extra 36 million €. Bremerhaven handles more than 1 
million US-bound containers, ca. 12% of overall US-bound container traffic. Here 
the annual cost – just to move containers from terminal to scanner– would amount 
to 300 million €. ZDS reports that image viewing can take 15 minutes for accurate 
assessment, and that with current technology “false positive” rates can reach 5%. If 
Hamburg and Bremerhaven ship 1.2 million containers to the U.S. per annum, per-
day container traffic is 3,287. If each port has 20 scanners processing images every 
15 minutes, non-stop 3,840 containers could “scan-reviewed”. Consider a false 
positive rate of 5%. If physical inspections would be required for every false posi-
tive, at a per-day rate of 3,287 containers, 165 would require laborious manual in-
spection. 
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4.1.2 Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is the second major se-
curity program. It poses to enhance security throughout the supply chain and en-
sure that its participants implement the policies, plans and procedures to ensure the 
integrity of their supply chains. The C-TPAT means for the trade community to 
collaborate with the CBP to ameliorate the security of international supply chains 
that flow through the United States. The C-TPAT is a certification that is awarded 
to companies which enables customs clearance more quickly and at a lower total 
cost. These are benefits that only the CBP can provide. The C-TPAT is a major 
federal initiative designed to make international shipping efficient and secure. 
The following are the benefits the CBP provides though C-TPAT certification 
(U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2004): 
1. A reduced number of inspections and reduced border wait times. 
2. A C-TPAT supply chain specialist to serve as the CBP liaison for valida-
tions, security issues, procedural updates, communication and training. 
3. Access to the C-TPAT members through the Status Verification Interface. 
4. Self-policing and self-monitoring of security activities. 
5. In the Automated Commercial System, C-TPAT certified importers receive 
reduced selection rate for Compliance Measurement Examinations and ex-
clusion from certain trade-related local and national criteria. 
6. C-TPAT certified importers receive targeting benefits by receiving a "credit" 
via the CBP targeting system. 
7. Certified C-TPAT importers are eligible for access to the FAST (Fast and 
Secure Trade) lanes on the Canadian and Mexican borders. 
8. Certified C-TPAT importers are eligible for the Office of Strategic Trade's 
(OST) Importer Self-Assessment Program (ISA) and have been given priori-
ty access to participate in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). 
9. C-TPAT certified highway carriers, on the Canadian and Mexican borders, 
benefit from their access to the expedited cargo processing at designated 
FAST lanes. These carriers are eligible to receive more favourable mitiga-
tion relief from monetary penalties. 
10. C-TPAT certified Mexican manufacturers benefit from their access to the 
expedited cargo processing at the designated FAST lanes. 
11. All certified C-TPAT companies are eligible to attend CBP sponsored C-
TPAT supply chain security training seminars. 
The C-TPAT certifications are industry specific. There are different certifications 
for importers, air carriers, foreign manufacturers, and air freight consolidators. Ini-
tially, the program gives companies a competitive edge by granting quicker, has-
sle-free movement of goods across the border as well as formal security training 
and other advantages. However, as a greater number of companies are awarded the 
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certification, the C-TPAT will in all probability become an industry standard, and 
companies that do not apply, or are denying the C-TPAT, will be at a competitive 
disadvantage. 
One of the greatest benefits of the C-TPAT is that with a faster and more reliable 
flow of goods through the border, companies can better forecast inventory needs 
and lower safety stock levels. If the program functions properly, one of the poten-
tial benefits of the C-TPAT is that companies will have a higher percentage of on-
time deliveries. 
This will allow them to lower safety stock, and should help companies get closer to 
just-in-time levels of inventory. 
A major problem companies are facing regarding C-TPAT certification is the cost. 
The largest costs are not in terms of filling forms or paying for inspections, they 
are the internal costs and investments in security and consulting. Firms often have 
to change legacy information technology systems in order to be capable of collect-
ing additional information, change processes, train employees on new processes, 
and hire consultants to actually define and design the processes. 
As the C-TPAT rules evolve, many of the initial all-voluntary guidelines have be-
come regulation. This demonstrates a shift in strategy. Obviously, as the C-TPAT 
voluntary rules increasingly become regulation, the C-TPAT essentially becomes 
mandatory. Either way, voluntary or not, companies will have to subscribe to the 
C- TPAT rules in order to be competitive or follow regulation - thus, it is in a 
company's best interest to become C-TPAT compliant and apply for certification 
as quickly as possible. Some of the major complaints industry has put forth are that 
shipments are not moving any quicker through the border, nor are they receiving 
the variety of training that was promised. The information regarding shipment has 
also been incomplete or missing. 
The C-TPAT program, once the U.S. CBP pulls out of this early stage of develop-
ment, in essence, should be a beneficial for the import industry players and the 
U.S. CBP. However, notwithstanding the fact that the program is in its early stages 
of implementation, the U.S. CBP must still work out some of the aforementioned 
issues if it is to win the support it requires for the program to be considered suc-
cessful. 
Whereas the C-TPAT and CSI are partnership-oriented programs, other security in-
itiatives focus on the collection of information, in particular cargo-related infor-
mation. A requirement for CSI and C-TPAT programs is the “24-Hour Rule” 
which means manifest information must be provided 24 hours prior to the contain-
er being loaded onto the vessel in the foreign port. It provides CBP with more time 
to identify high-risk containers. It is on the basis of the information provided in the 
manifest pursuant to this new rule that U.S. customs officers posted in CSI host are 
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to identify high risk containers prior to loading. Prior to December 2, 2002, the rel-
evant customs regulations simply required the master of every vessel arriving in 
the U.S. to have the manifest on board the vessel. Comprised in the vessel manifest 
had to be a cargo declaration listing all the inward foreign cargo on board the ves-
sel regardless of the intended U.S. port of discharge of the cargo.  
4.1.3 The 24-Hour Rule 
Following the events of September 11th, new regulations have been adopted with 
the aim of enabling U.S. Customs to evaluate the terrorist risk of cargo containers. 
The ‘24-Hour Rule,’ require ocean carriers to transmit cargo manifests for cargo 
being shipped on a container vessel to the United States 24 hours in advance of 
loading at foreign ports. For each container, the manifest must provide a large 
number of data elements (Prokop, 2004): 
1. Detailed and precise description of the cargo or the 10 digit Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States; 
2. Numbers and quantities of the lowest external packaging unit as per bill of 
lading; 
3. Container number and seal number; 
4. Accurate weight of the cargo; 
5. The foreign port where the cargo is loaded, the last foreign port before the 
vessel departs for the U.S. and the first foreign port where the carrier takes 
possession of the cargo; 
6. The full names and complete, accurate and valid addresses of the consignee 
and the shipper of the cargo; alternatively, a unique “identification number” 
for shipper and consignee to be “assigned by CBP upon completion of the 
Automated Commercial Environment”. 
It must be emphasized that “Customs, having analyzed the cargo information, do 
not send “permission to load” messages to carriers to authorize them to proceed 
with loading. Therefore, in order to avoid risking a penalty, carriers need to delay 
loading operations for 24 hours after the submission of the manifest to U.S. Cus-
toms to be sure that there is no problem with any particular container” (UNCTAD 
secretariat, 2004). Of course, this is, unless a “do not load” message has been sent 
by U.S. Customs. Upon arrival of a vessel at a U.S. port, in cases where complete 
advance manifests in accordance with the new requirements have not been re-
ceived in relation to part of the cargo, U.S. Customs may delay issuance of a per-
mit to unload that cargo; alternatively, unloading of the entire vessel may be de-
layed, until all required information is received. The application and enforcement 
of the new 24-Hour Rule requires the quick and efficient handling and analysis of 
very significant amounts of information on the part of U.S. Customs. In the longer 
term, the sustained ability of U.S. Customs to carry out its functions efficiently will 
be crucial to ensuring that costly delays and congestions will not arise and legiti-
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mate trade will not be unnecessarily slowed down. It is clear that security measures 
add to the transport and logistics costs of exports, which, in many developing na-
tions are already disproportionately high. 
4.1.4 “10+2" Rule 
The new rule on “Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements”, 
was published on 2 January 2008, and this is commonly referred to as the ‘10+2 
rule’ (Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2008). Essentially, the 10+2 rule 
is an extension of the 24 hour rule, requiring importers to declare ten additional da-
ta fields, and carriers an additional two data fields (Bergami, 2009). 
Mandatory is the filing of a container status messages (CSM) such as confirmation 
of a booking, container terminal gate inspection, loading or unloading of a contain-
er, gate-in or gate-out movements, container stuffing or unstuffy, and intra-
terminal movements. Given the majority of these events are routine with container-
ized traffic, as the consignment travels form origin to destination, it is no surprise 
that carriers/logistics providers are concerned with the “over-reporting” required 
by the CBP, as this increases operating costs. 
The data required by US Customs and Border Protection from importers are: 
1. Manufacturer (or supplier) name and address, 
2. Seller (or owner) name and address, 
3. Buyer (or owner) name and address, 
4. Ship-to name and address, 
5. Container stuffing location, 
6. Consolidator (stuffer) name and address, 
7. Importer of record number/foreign trade zone applicant identification num-
ber, 
8. Consignee number(s), 
9. Country of origin, 
10. Commodity harmonized tariff schedule number. 
As “10+2" is an extension of Custom’s strategy to use data in advance to identify 
high-risk shipments before they reach the United States” (Bergami, 2009). 
The “2” data files that the ocean carrier will transmit to CBP are: 
1. Vessel Stow Plan to indicate the location of each container on the ocean ves-
sel. 
2. CSM, which detail information on the movement and status changes of a 
container as it travels through certain parts of the supply chain (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008). 
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4.1.5 "GreenLane" Program 
Participation in the C-TAT program and 3-Tiers status will give companies an op-
portunity to avoid the additional expenses on containers waiting for inspection, to 
save costs of manual customs inspections itself and to accelerate the container 
turnover through the whole supply chain, namely, implementing “Green Lane”. In 
port security, such an approach has taken the form of cooperative arrangements be-
tween private operators and public regulators in developing, financing and imple-
menting the various security programs and initiatives. Such mechanisms do not, 
however, exist at the international maritime level and for developing countries in 
particular (UNCTAD, 2005). 
There are different levels of C-TPAT members’ validations in order to achieve 
supply chain security best practices or to get “GreenLane benefit” (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2008). 
First tier certified C-TPAT importers, who meet C-TPAT minimal security criteria, 
will receive the reduced the Automated Targeting System (ATS) scoring. It will re-
sult in fewer security inspections and fewer compliance inspections. But a second 
and third tier C-TPAT partners are validated as C-TPAT importers using Priority 
for cargo inspection. The “Tier Three” level reserved for members who exceed the 
agency’s published minimum security standards. Approximately 22% were award-
ed with Tier Three status (UNCTAD, 2005). At some U.S. ports, CBP has recently 
begun to allow C-TPAT members to reduce their handling costs by removing to 
their own location all containers not selected for inspection before CBP has com-
pleted its inspection of the entire shipment. Cargo of C-TPAT members arriving 
from Canada or Mexico by truck are eligible for quicker transit through Free and 
Secure Trade (“FAST”) lanes set up at border check points. In other words, the is a 
more secure supply chain that includes point of origin security, security at point of 
stuffing, ensured by C-TPAT validated partners who control their supply chain and 
assure point of origin security, who use a smart container, or see that their foreign 
vendors do, and who ship their goods through a CSI port to the United States. That 
shipment should get the green lane on arrival. A third tier status of C-TPAT offers 
additional benefits to validated C-TPAT participants that demonstrate a sustained 
commitment beyond the minimum requirements for participation in C-TPAT. 
The basic requirements for GreenLane participants should ensure that (S. 2459--
109th Congress: GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security, 2006): 
1. entry data is submitted on shipments before loading; 
2.  cargo is loaded at a port designated under CSI for transit to the United 
States; 
3. cargo is loaded on a vessel with a vessel security plan approved or accepted 
under United States Code; 
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4. cargo is made available for screening and examination before loading using 
technologies, processes or techniques; 
5. the supply chain visibility procedures are utilized; 
6. container security devices meeting the standards and procedures security 
regulations are utilized;  
7. cargo complies with additional security criteria beyond the minimum re-
quirements for C-TPAT participation, particularly in the area of access con-
trols; 
8. cargo complies with any other requirements determined by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. 
As a result more than 58 biggest ports take part in CSI program, and approximately 
8400 partners have applied to join C-TPAT, accounting for 85 percent of container 
traffic bound for the United States (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006): 
In the Americas: 
1. Montreal, Vancouver, and Halifax, Canada  
2. Santos, Brazil  
3. Buenos Aires, Argentina  
4. Puerto Cortes, Honduras  
5. Caucedo, Dominican Republic  
6. Kingston, Jamaica  
7. Freeport, The Bahamas  
8. Balboa, Colon, and Manzanillo, Panama  
9. Cartagena, Colombia  
 
In Europe: 
1. Rotterdam, The Netherlands  
2. Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany  
3. Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium  
4. Le Havre and Marseille, France  
5. Gothenburg, Sweden  
6. La Spezia, Genoa, Naples, GioiaTauro, and Livorno, Italy  
7. Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury, and Southampton, United 
Kingdom (U.K.)  
8. Piraeus, Greece  
9. Algeciras, Barcelona, and Valencia, Spain  
10. Lisbon, Portugal  
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In Asia and the Middle East: 
1. Singapore*  
2. Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe, Japan  
3. Hong Kong  
4. Busan (Pusan), South Korea  
5. Port Klang and TanjungPelepas, Malaysia  
6. LaemChabang, Thailand  
7. Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE)  
8. Shenzhen and Shanghai  
9. Kaohsiung and Chi-Lung  
10. Colombo, Sri Lanka  
11. Port Salalah, Oman  
12. Port Qasim, Pakistan  
13. Ashdod, Israel  
14. Haifa, Israel  
 
In Africa: 
1. Alexandria, Egypt  
2. Durban, South Africa  
Within the European Union (EU) the Revised Customs Code has been developed. 
It is done in line with the C-TPAT program and the Framework for Standards of 
the World Customs Organization (WCO). The Revised Customs Code is expected 
to be fully in force in 2009. Although currently lobbying of the latest European 
Commission proposal for transition arrangements for the industry, as all security 
criteria have already been met until 31 December 2009 is still not acceptable to 
trade (European Express Association, 2009). The EU introduced the principle of 
Authorized Economic Operator (AEO): an AEO will be subject to reduced customs 
inspections when he complies with the administrative rules and the supply chain 
security requirements as defined by the code; it is promoted to be the international 
concept, therefore resulting in international agreements between the EU and vari-
ous countries. The AEO concept means (DNV Consulting, 2005), that cargo pass-
ing through ports or crossing the outside EU borders will be subject to inspections 
for illegal goods. Simultaneously logistics operators with AEO status will get a 
“Green Lane” advantage through customs, implying reduced inspections and de-
lays. 
A majority of the US security initiatives do not have legal status (Only the 24 hour 
rule in the US has a legal base (DNV Consulting, 2005)). They are completely vol-
untary programs and only contain recommended measures which industries are 
free to implement. The US initiatives, implemented under the Department of 
Homeland Security, are however often criticized for their limited effectiveness be-
cause of their non-binding status. It is believed that only through stringent binding 
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policies effective implementation of measures can be assured (DNV Consulting, 
2005). 
4.1.6  The Smart and Secure Tradelanes Initiative 
Another program designed to harmonize C-TPAT and CSI initiatives is the Smart 
and Secure Tradelanes (SST). The Smart and Secure Tradelanes initiative was es-
tablished by the container shipping industry to ensure the security of cargo con-
tainers. The purpose is to identify the tampering of containers while in transit using 
automated tracking, detection, and security technologies (Hudson, 2009): 
1. Tight physical and information flows in supply chain in real time through 
automated data collection; 
2. Be compatible with business and political systems; 
3. Be appropriate to existing processes and technology solutions. 
SST’s objective is to “rapidly deploy a baseline infrastructure that provides real-
time visibility, physical security through non-intrusive, automated inspection and 
detection alerts, as well as a complete audit trail of a container’s journey from 
origin to final destination”. To achieve this objective, SST is using the Total Assets 
Visibility (TAV) network which was developed by the U.S Department of De-
fence. This network allows the integration of data collection devices such as RFID 
and GPS with the Universal Data Appliance Protocol (UDAP). Using these tran-
shipment port, and to final delivery. Ports involved in the initiative install RFID 
reader technology that can communicate with the network, enabling monitoring of 
containers with smart electronic seals (Hudson, 2009).  
4.1.7  Summary 
According to discuss above, the current security initiatives are a good start for im-
proving security arrangements in container transport chains. Nevertheless it is not 
address the end-to-end security problem (Dahlman, Mackby & Sitt, 2005). The 
government initiatives should provide security accountability of standards for all 
elements of container operations. Such an approach could lead to a harmonization 
of security requirements that can be applied to the container transportation opera-
tions from beginning to end: importers/exporters, port authorities, and shipping in-
dustry. 
Some security initiatives require the enhancing the traditional level of cargo securi-
ty thought integrating of new secure technology for containers. One kind of such a 
technology is container electronic seal. In the next sub-chapter we will consider 
different types of container seals.  
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4.2  Types of seals 
As noted by the World Customs Organization, “High security manual or mechani-
cal seals can play a significant role in a comprehensive container security pro-
gram. But it is important to recognize that container security starts with the stuff-
ing of the container and that seals do not evidence or guarantee the legitimacy of 
the container load” (Administrative Committee for the Customs Convention on 
Containers, 2004). Currently used container seals are not difficult to remove from 
the container door; they can be reproduced or simply forged. Conventional seals 
can be overreached by lifting off container doors or entering the container through 
holes that are cut out and welded back together afterwards. Stakeholders have had 
little motivation until recently to implement additional security measures in the 
highly competitive container transport market. 
4.2.1 Mechanical seals and locks 
To use mechanical cargo seals are part of conventional container transportation 
practice. There are two major categories, indicative and barrier seals, both of which 
detect tampering or entry (Fig. 9). 
Indicative seals, regarding to (Wolfe, 2002) are “usually made of plastic, wire, or a 
combination of both, marked with a unique serial number or identifier. The pur-
pose is simply to be a sign of whether or not the sealed entrance has been compro-
mised. If the seal is unbroken, one presumes the cargo has not been tampered with. 
If the seal is compromised, one presupposes the integrity of the cargo has been 
compromised as well (Wolfe, 2002). 
 
Fig. 9 Mechanical Seals (Transportation Information Service, 2009) 
Barrier seals add physical protection to tamper detection and are more difficult to 
overcome (Wolfe, 2002). It usually takes bolt cutters or special tools to remove a 
barrier seal, not simple wire cutters, or a sharp knife. The most protective barrier 
seals are bolt seals, which can be similar to heavy-duty bolts with specialized sin-
gle-use locking nuts and unique identifiers (Wolfe, 2002). 
While neither is highly secure, both have high levels of usage in industry for two 
primary reasons: when the unit costs are extremely low, typically pennies a piece; 
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when and for everyday low-vulnerability operations they have provided adequate 
protection.  
However, manual seals offer no precise information as to where, when, under what 
circumstances, or by whom the seal was broken. The best information, assuming 
the chain of custody and seal inspections has been maintained, is a time frame 
when and range of possible locations where the breach may have occurred – that is, 
since the last signature noting that the seal was intact. However, manual seals offer 
no precise information as to where, when, under what circumstances, or by whom 
the seal was broken. Such a situation can be modify by potential improvements 
from electronic cargo seals 
4.2.2 Electronic seals 
As it was introduced in "GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act” 
(GovTrack.U.S., 2005) the new security programs will require the use of ‘smart 
containers’, ones that are equipped with RFID sensing technology, that can detect 
tampering. One of the applications of this technology for container industry is elec-
tronic seal. 
Electronic cargo seals are a subset of sensor technology receiving serious attention 
from U.S. Department of Transportation, Customs, and others. Pre-September 11, 
many developers and potential users of electronic seals put priority on low cost and 
simple devices aimed at theft prevention. After September 11, attention shifted to 
more robust seals with greater security capabilities. These tools may help reduce 
congestion at border inspection areas at the same time they increase confidence 
about security. 
The general purpose of seals is to secure the content of containers. Conventional 
seals generally comprise a bolt that mechanically prevents the container from being 
opened (Field, 2005). At the destination it has to be validated that the seal is still 
intact and that it is still the same (Tirschwell, 2005). Conventional seals are com-
paratively cheap and not reusable: if a container is legitimately opened a new seal 
has to be affixed (Hadow, 2005) and its unique number (Field, 2005) has to be rec-
orded. Compared to their low purchase price the handling costs are quite high since 
the inspection has to be conducted manually and is therefore time consuming 
(Tirschwell, 2005). Although mechanical seals increase the effort for tampering 
with a container their benefits are still limited. As an example, criminals can re-
move the doors of the container completely without damaging the seal, cut a hole 
into another wall, or create a new seal after having finished. Furthermore, contain-
ers are not monitored in real-time (Hadow, 2005). 
Since October 15, 2008 U.S. Government requires sealing all maritime containers 
with a seal that meets the International Organization for Standardization, Publicly 
Available Specification 17712 (ISO/PAS 17712) (Fig.10), Freight Containers-
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Mechanical Seals (Winkowski, 2008). This mandate is the result of several 2007 
amendments to the Security and Accountability For every port (SAFE Port) Act of 
2006. The provisions of Section 1701 of the Implementing Recommendations of 
the 911 Commission Act of 2007, codified at 6 U.S.C. § 944, impose a self-
executing legal requirement. 
 
Fig. 10 .Samples of mechanical seals that meet the ISO/PAS 17712 standard (Gate Way 
Logistics Group, Inc., 2009) 
The statutory requirement applies to loaded containers, including freight remaining 
on board, arriving by vessel at U.S. ports of entry (SAFE Port). There are some ex-
ceptions, that includes tanks, non-standard containers (such as open top contain-
ers), and those incapable of being affixed with such a seal. U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Protection will ensure compliance with this new requirement as part of normal 
seaport container inspection activities and does not envision new activities aimed 
simply at seal verification. 
Electronic seals are intended to overcome some of the limitations of conventional 
seals. Apart from mechanically locking the container they also exhibit computation 
and communication abilities. Therefore, it is possible to verify them by an RFID 
scan (Tirschwell, 2005). This feature does not only massively decrease the han-
dling effort, but also enables an almost continuous monitoring as the scanning can 
be performed easily and often. Thus, the seal can also act as a surrogate for the 
container number since RFID technology enables a recognition rate of over 99% 
while optical character recognition systems achieve only about 80% under real-
world conditions (Hadow, 2005). Despite of their higher purchase price electronic 
seals might therefore be the better choice regarding their total cost of ownership 
(Tirschwell, 2005). 
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4.2.2.1 Technical aspects of e-seals 
E-seal is an electronic device to check the legitimacy and integrity of freight con-
tainers (Fig. 11 (http://www.gaports.com/)). This security device transmits infor-
mation about container status when it passes through the reading infrastructure and 
creates alerts in the case if the seal was broken or container is tampered with.  
 
Fig. 11 Electronic Container Seal 
 Communication protocol of e-seals 
The communications between an e-seal and a reader device process using a com-
mand-respond protocol, i.e. the reader always initiate the session using a com-
mand, and then the e-seal responds to it appropriate container/seal status data 
(Park, Lee & Kim, 2005; ISO, 2005). The e-seals employed various different 
communication protocols to transmit data to reader. 
There were three basic methods that were used by different vendors: 
1. Timed transmission from seal to reader (e-Logicity); 
2. Queried transmission from a reader (AllSet and Hi-G-Tek); 
3. Unique query type system that employs a “signpost” to query seals and separate 
reader to receive the transmitted seal signal (Savi). 
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 Communication frequencies of e-seals 
Electronic seals have also the different communication frequencies. It is not only 
technical considerations but also international availability of frequencies and eco-
nomic considerations. Only the 2.44 GHz frequency band is available worldwide 
and in that case the allowable power levels vary by country (Domdouzis, Kumar & 
Anumba, 2007). 
Frequency Countries 
125 – 134 kHz USA, Canada, Japan, Europe 
13.56 MHz USA, Canada, Japan, Europe 
433.05 – 434.79 MHz In most of USA and Europe and under consideration in Japan 
865 – 868 MHz Europe 
866 – 869 and 923–925 MHz South Korea 
902 – 928 MHz USA 
952 – 954 MHz Japan (for passive tags after 2005) 
2400 – 2500 and  
5.725 – 5.875 GHz 
USA, Canada, Japan, Europe 
Table 1 Frequencies of use RFID systems in different countries (Domdouzis, Kumar & Anumba, 
2007) 
 E-seal Reader infrastructure 
Reader infrastructure is also a major design trade-off between the e-seals produced 
by various manufacturers. 
E-seals have additionally various different seal locations and attachment methods: 
1. One of the ways to place the seal to secure container is to mount seals near the 
centre of the container doors close to the locking bars. The seals are affixed to 
the container and seal the doors either with a bolt through the hasp on the door 
handle or with a cable around the two vertical keeper bars. Tampering is detect-
ed if the bolt is removed or the cable is cut. 
2. The other possibility is to mount it on the upper right of the container door be-
tween the frame of the container and the door itself. The seal is either perma-
nently or affixed or help in place by a magnet. Tampering is detected using a 
pressure sensor on the door that is able to detect when the door is opened or 
closed. 
 
These variations of seals allocations also initiate potential logistical problems, be-
cause the door of the container must be open to install the seal; and in these cases 
where seals might be installed in-transit, security could be compromised by having 
to open the doors. 
Typically a security-enabled e-seal is operated in following steps (ISO, 2005): 
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1. The manufacturer sells the e-seal to the shipper and provides him with a set of 
cryptographic keys for each of e-seal. This process should be done in a secure 
way. The e-seal status is “Open and un-sealed”. 
2. The shipper programs the e-seal with the required information such as the mani-
fest for shipment or the policy on the environment inside a container. This 
“write” operation should be controlled using cryptographic mechanisms to pre-
vent an attacker’s unauthorized write attempts. 
3. After checking if required goods are loaded completely and safely, the shipper 
seals the e-seal and its status becomes “Closed and sealed”. 
4. During the transportation, the e-seal information can be read several times by 
carriers and at check points, or even by some attackers. While accesses to pub-
lic information of an e-seal, e.g., seal ID, are always permitted, accesses to con-
fidential information should be controlled by cryptographic mechanisms. 
5. After the container arrives at the destination point, the consignee checks the in-
tegrity of cargo container by checking the status of the e-seal attached to the 
container. At this point, the e-seal should be authenticated with the master key, 
since it could have been spoofed or cloned while transported.  
6. If there is no problem, then the e-seal will be open by the receiver, and it be-
comes “Opened” status. 
7. Optionally the e-seal can be recycled after deleting the information on the next 
shipment. 
Electronic seals tend to combine physical seals and specific electronic components. 
The result is a hybrid electronic seal that provides tamper evidence, physical secu-
rity, and data management. They indicate electronically whether a conveyance has 
been opened or tampered with. Electronic seals use RF (Radio Frequency), IF (In-
frared) and/or fibre optics. Combined with these technologies, an electronic seal 
can also be compatible with GPS (Global Positioning System) and mobile phone 
protocols for particular applications. Most of the electronic seals include passive or 
active technologies. 
 Types of electronic cargo seals 
There are typically four types of electronic cargo seals:  
1. RFID seals: passive and active 
2. Infrared Seals (IR) 
3. Contact Seals 
4. Remote Reporting Seals.  
The distinction between these four is found in the technical and functional means 
used by the seal and the reader to communicate with each other. 
RFID is the most popular Hi-tech for container security devices. It is an automated 
data-capture technology that can be used to electronically identify, track, and store 
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information about groups of products, individual items, or product components. 
The technology consists of three key pieces: RFID tags; RFID readers; and a data 
collection, distribution, and management system. RFID tags are small or miniatur-
ized computer chips programmed with information about a product or with a num-
ber that corresponds to information that is stored in a database. The tags can be lo-
cated inside or on the surface of the product, item, or packing material. RFID read-
ers are querying systems that interrogate or send signals to the tags and receive the 
responses. These responses can be stored within the reader for later transfer to a 
data collection system or instantaneously transferred to the data collection system. 
Lastly, data collection systems consist of computers running data processing soft-
ware, which typically are networked with a larger information management system 
(Sabbaghi & Vaidyanathan, 2008). 
Passive RFID seals are short range, low cost, and disposable. They have no inher-
ent electric power, such as a battery. The interrogator provides energy when it il-
luminates or scans the seal. The passive seal uses the absorbed energy to reflect its 
information back to the reader. The lack of on-board power limits the functionality. 
For example, since passive seals cannot provide continuous power to measure the 
condition of the seal cable, they cannot detect and record tampering at the time of 
the event – they simply report whether they are intact or not when interrogated by a 
reader (Wolfe, 2002). Pure passive RFID tags are relatively simple in design, inex-
pensive, and often disposable. When an energy source is added to a passive RFID 
tag, the range in which the seal can be read has the potential to increase to over 30 
meters. From a security and productivity standpoint, there are industry issues relat-
ing to the limited capabilities and effectiveness of the purely passive seals, howev-
er (Donath, Murray & Short, 2005). 
Active RFID seals are more sophisticated, have higher initial costs. Active seals 
carry batteries and the power permits longer range and greater functionality. They 
can detect tampering when it occurs and add it to a time log of events. If equipped 
or interfaced with GPS, an active seal can also log the location. Further, some seals 
can provide live “mayday” tampering reports as the events happen, mostly within 
specially equipped terminals (Wolfe, 2002).The term ‘active RFID’ generally im-
plies the use of an on-board power source, which in many cases gives the e-seal the 
following capabilities (Donath, Murray & Short, 2005): 
 
 Continuous monitoring of seal integrity within certain proximities; 
 Capturing and logging time data when the seal recognizes an event or break 
in integrity; 
 Omni-directional communications; 
 Longer communication ranges than found in passive RFID e-seals; 
 Real-time tampering reports. 
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Infrared seal is a less common media choice than RFID. Infrared seals essentially 
require line-of-sight communications capabilities (i.e. communications are blocked 
by any physical barrier between the seal and the reader.) Thus the effectiveness of 
infrared seals is limited to situations when readers and seals are within close range 
of each other (Donath, Murray & Short, 2005).There do not appear to be any 
standards issues about IR, but there are unresolved disagreements about its tech-
nical merits (Wolfe, 2002). 
Contact and near-contact technologies include contact memory buttons, PDA 
and electronic key plug-ins, low frequency RFID, and short range IR. Proponents 
of contact and near-contact solutions argue that it is important to have a human be-
ing visually observe the seal, and their solutions provide that added benefit (Wolfe, 
2002).These types of devices are generally not reusable (Donath, Murray & Short, 
2005). 
Remote reporting uses satellite or cellular communications. The great ad-
vantage is the ability to maintain visibility en-route and to obtain near real-time 
event reports. It is a high-end capability, usually at high-cost (Wolfe, 2002). 
Because of their low unit cost and operational simplicity, passive seals were gener-
ally the preferred solution for “pre-9/11” security requirements aimed against theft. 
The greater functionality of active seals enhances their application for “post-9/11” 
security against terrorist tampering. For instance, for supply chain applications 
where there is a need to store an electronic manifest within the tag, such as cus-
toms inspection, only active RFID e-seal is an appropriate option. Passive RFID 
does not provide sufficient data storage or data search capabilities (Savi 
Technologies, 2002; Horowitz, 2005; Hickey, 2004). Another distinguishing fea-
ture of active RFID tags they are re-writeable tags, where information on the tag 
can be erased, rewritten, or modified, also allow the updating of data, and therefore 
have high utility in security and identification applications. The progress of tech-
nology development is still not finished, and several hurdles stand in the way of 
wide use of electronic seals (Wolfe, 2002): 
 The International Standards Organization’s (ISO) Technical Committee 104 
is still developing the multi-protocol standard for passive and active elec-
tronic seals. 
 Today there are no global frequencies and technical specifications (for pow-
er levels and duty cycles) for electronic seals or other RFID logistics appli-
cations. 
 Operating practices for reusable seals still pose a challenge for shippers and 
carriers. It may be differ for a significant segment of repetitive commercial 
containers that is more suited to recycling seals; and if empty container 
movements were sealed for security reasons, it should simplify the recycling 
process. 
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 Field experience on the market of electronic seals is relatively low and they 
are in limited use. This situation requires more pilot and demonstration pro-
gram to accelerate the processes of accumulating field experience, fine-
tuning products, and developing customer confidence – all important to sup-
port regulatory requirements for e-seals. 
Thus, currently RFID technology is slightly too expensive for widespread security 
operations. There are high initial fixed costs – purchasing equipment, training em-
ployees, and upgrading information systems. RFID does have a few vulnerabilities. 
Tags or seals can be counterfeited, containers that contain cargo with and without 
tags are difficult to identify, containers still need to be shipped through facilities 
and terminals that may not be secure and RFID does not prevent dangerous cargo 
from being loaded into containers in the first place (Hickey, 2004). Even though 
the technology is still undergoing development, there are many potential uses and 
applications: 
 Secure “Greenlanes” where E-tags are used in combination with U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection initiatives and partnerships such as CSI and C-
TPAT 
 Secure transport and product tampering protection 
 Automatic seal verification 
 Security and tampering investigations 
 Logistics data provided in real time via Internet or file transfer technology 
 Early warning of problems, intrusion 
Electronic seals are part of a multi-layered approach to security; it is more crucial 
to precede the sealing process with business practices and tools that assure the in-
tegrity of the container loading and sealing process. The efficiency and productivi-
ty of global container system can be achieved when electronic seals are part of a 
harmonized and standard international transportation process. From a productivity 
perspective, electronic seals should be viewed as part of a management visibility 
and control system, not simply as a security tool (Wolfe, 2002). 
4.3 Electronic seals system 
Containers and their security systems are applied all over the world. The environ-
ment of each container changes dynamically on the way from its origin to its desti-
nation. The demand for flexible interaction with other entities often arises during 
transport. For instance, consider customs personnel wirelessly requesting security 
information with hand-held devices. As another example multiple containers from 
one company might cooperate in their security efforts in order to save their bound-
ed resources. Although a great many vendors of container security solutions exists, 
their interoperability currently remains an open issue due to a lack of standards 
(Horowitz, 2005). 
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Apart from the seal, container security systems can be enhanced by embedded sen-
sors which monitor tampering, theft, and placement of unintentional freight. Ex-
amples are door light sensors, gamma ray detectors, as well as chemical sensors 
(Schwartz, 2004). As the applied sensors depend on the concrete purpose, the par-
ticipating entities must be equipped with the ability to establish ad hoc networks. 
In this context it has to be ensured that access to the network is restricted to trust-
worthy entities, e. g., by certification. Otherwise, thieves or terrorists could corrupt 
the system by injecting manipulated data. 
The security systems interface to the outside world is another vulnerable point. As 
an example, stevedores and truckers are legitimate recipients of some security-
related data. Due to restricted resources it might also be an option to join forces 
with security systems of neighbouring containers. These forms of communication 
have also to be restricted to trustworthy partners. As an example, from the perspec-
tive of safety it might be desirable for a container to inform the environment about 
hazardous content. By contrast, this is not the case from a security point of view. It 
is not advisable to broadcast a container’s attractiveness for terrorist attacks to eve-
ryone including the terrorists themselves (Hadow, 2005). 
 
To recapitulate, electronic security systems can signiﬁcantly improve container se-
curity. Since they demand ﬂexible cooperation, their interaction with the outside 
world has to be secured itself. This can be achieved by limiting communication to 
trustworthy partners. For instance, Savi Networks company has already deployed 
data capture infrastructure (Witt, 2008) for active RFID e-seals in facilities at the 
U.S. ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach, Oakland, Savannah and Norfolk; the Chi-
nese ports of Hong Kong, Yantian, Shekou, Shatian, Chiwan and Mawan; the Ko-
rean ports of Busan and Kwangyang; the European ports of Rotterdam (Nether-
lands), and Felixstowe (United Kingdom); and, the ports in Kaohsiung, Taiwan; 
Laem Chabang, Thailand. Savi Networks LLC provides SaviTrak, an information 
service that is used to manage in-transit inventory in real-time, which extends to 
facilities at ports handling 20 percent of world trade. SaviTrak provides automated 
information and analytics derived from wirelessly captured data on the physical lo-
cation, security status, and environmental condition of inventory. The data is cap-
tured in real-time as inventory moves through a global wireless network operated 
by Savi Networks. 
 
Container security systems play an important role in securing container logistics. 
Nevertheless, a lack of standards currently prevents interoperability of components 
from different vendors. By implementing electronic seals and sensors as agents, 
standardized communication protocols can be applied for the interaction. In addi-
tion, aspects of trust and encryption must be considered as not every communica-
tion partner is trustworthy. In order to save resources multiple components of one 
container security system as well as multiple systems may join forces by cooperat-
ing (Werner, Schuldt & Daschkovska, 2007). 
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4.3.1 Challenges of e-seals implementation in global container 
networks 
An RFID-enabled seal or electronic seal allows importers, shipping companies, 
port officials and customs inspectors to determine, without a physical inspection, 
whether the seal has been tampered with and the security of the container compro-
mised. Currently, a number of companies produce e-seals. Nonetheless, it’s unlike-
ly the world's ports and ocean carriers, or U.S. importers, will invest in RFID seal 
and reader infrastructure until the International Standardization Organization (ISO) 
issues an e-seal standard (Barlas, 2009). 
Many solutions based on smart locks and seals have been examined and extensive-
ly tested since 9/11. Most of the current proposed solutions focus on the electronic 
lock, seal, and sensor on the container door. They do not address the problem of in-
trusion through other surfaces of the containers not touching the lock and seal or 
gasket or the contents stuffed inside the containers. There is a list of the basic chal-
lenges for standardized e-seals (Chung, 2005): 
 Impossible to inspect all of the containers or even 10%. 
 No way to know if tampering occurs during transit and too late to prevent 
loss upon arrival at unloading port. 
 Cannot be sure whether any contents may contain weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) 
4.3.1.1 Standardisation issue 
Regarding  (Sabbaghi & Vaidyanathan, 2008) it is still remains technical challeng-
es despite the increasing attention to RFID applications. The use of radio waves 
obviates the needs for a clear line-of-sight placement of a container door with 
RFID seal, because metal sides of the container reflect electromagnetic energy. 
This often results in decreased identification rates of seals. Electromagnetic inter-
ference from other nearby transmissions in a port area can also affect the tag per-
formance and tag to reader communications. Physical effects such as reflection and 
diffraction may also affect tag performance. Inconsistent interoperability across 
various RFID systems, companies, and countries also presents a challenge to the 
wide-scale development and deployment of RFID technologies. Technical stand-
ards, frequency and power levels are critical issues for successful global interoper-
ability of RFID systems. There are several efforts in progress to develop and refine 
technical standards for tags and readers, and common standards remain a goal. 
Likewise, differences in operational frequency ranges, allowable transmission 
standards, and allowable power limits in countries continue to serve as operational 
constraints. 
The current research and development of future RFID capabilities moves towards 
the processors fabricated with new conductive materials or use of organic micro-
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processors for RFID tags and other applications. For example, the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology is looking at the technical feasibility of replacing 
silicon or inorganic materials in RFID devices with mostly or wholly organic mate-
rials such as plastics. This and other ongoing research in materials and tag and chip 
design, fabrication, and production will result in more robust and functional tags 
over time (Sabbaghi & Vaidyanathan, 2008). 
Container transport is an open system with a broad variety of often unknown actors 
who contribute to the services in the transport chain. The owners’ code register of 
Bureau International des Containers in Paris notes more than 1600 owners and op-
erators of containers using their world-wide unique code to establish identity for 
their containers. Standardization is a vital condition of the current efficiency of the 
container transport system. Standardization is needed for security actions as well. 
The Customs Convention on Containers (Geneva 1972) defines that a seal for con-
tainer transport under customs seal must be approved by the national Customs 
Administration concerned. This regulation has, in the end, produced several 1000s 
of different seal designs. Under such condition, it would be most difficult to ascer-
tain whether a seal has been attached by an authorized party or been replaced 
somewhere under way (Seidelmann, 2005).  
The existing standards for electronic seals are developing by the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO). ISO is a network of the national standards in-
stitutes of 148 countries, on the basis of one member per country, with a Central 
Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland, that coordinates the system. Regarding 
ISO/IEC 19762, Parts 1 and 3, ISO 17712 electronic seal is “read-only, non-
reusable freight container seal conforming to the high security seal defined in ISO 
17712 and conforming to ISO 18185 or revision thereof that electronically evi-
dences tampering or intrusion through the container doors” (ISO, 2006). 
The original ISO PAS 17712, published in 2003, was developed by a working 
group of users and manufacturers assembled by ISO Technical Committee (TC) 
104, Freight Containers. It describes three types of mechanical seals: 
 High security seal 
 Security seal 
 Indicative seal 
The strength of a seal is measured with tests based on impact, shear, bend and ten-
sile strength. The values, the measures of strength, reflected numbers in use by ma-
jor customs authorities. As a series of programs, such as the US Customs-Trade 
Partnership against Terrorism and the World Customs Organization’s Framework 
of standards, endorsed and “encouraged” the use of ISO compliant seals, the quali-
ty of seals used in international trade improved. Following ISO procedures, the 
working group produced a Normative Annex for security-related management 
practices; the annex requires certification after inspection by a qualified and inde-
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pendent reviewer. TC 104 approved the revision and ISO published it as ISO PAS 
17712, 2006. 
Seals must show a mark to indicate their grade – “H” for high security, “S” for se-
curity and “I” for indicative. Only manufacturers certified as compliant with the 
normative annex may put grade marks on seals ergo ISO compliant seals can only 
come from ISO compliant sources. 
The ISO 18185 e-seal standard is close to complete and in a little while being 
available as a useful tool for solution developers and end users. ISO 18185 is an 
application standard for electronic container seals developed by Technical Com-
mittee ISO/TC 104, Freight containers, Subcommittee SC 4, Identification, and 
communication. Since the year 1999, a specific workforce in ISO/TC 104 dis-
cussed various approaches to an electronic seal. The working package of e-seals 
standards now is known as ISO 18185, “Freight containers – Electronic container 
seals”. Some basic principles have been agreed on meanwhile: The standard elec-
tronic seal will be an attachment device fixed to (or integrated into) the mechanical 
seal that secures the door of the container. The seal is programmed with a standard-
ized set of data with the following coded information (Seidelmann, 2005): 
 Seal ID number 
 Manufacturer ID number for the seal 
 An indication of the time when the seal had been closed and when it had 
been opened 
 A bit that indicates an eventual tampering of the seal. 
Currently ISO18185 consists of the following parts, under the general title Freight 
containers— Electronic seals (ISO, 2006): 
 ISO 18185-1, Freight containers – Electronic seals –Part 1: Communication 
protocol 
 ISO 18185-2, Freight containers – Electronic seals –Part 2: Application re-
quirements 
 ISO 18185-3, Freight containers – Electronic seals –Part 3: Environmental 
characteristics 
 ISO 18185-4, Freight containers – Electronic seals –Part 4: Data protection 
 ISO 18185-6, Freight containers – Electronic seals –Part 6: Messages sets 
for transfer between seal reader and host computer 
 ISO 18185-7, Freight containers – Electronic seals –Part 7: Physical layer 
The 18185 system consists of the three distinct components: e-seal, LF transmitter, 
and reader. The main feature of the system is their dual frequency operations.  
There are two kinds of political issues. The first is international and national spec-
trum regulation, which includes spectrum allocation and power and duty cycle reg-
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ulation; this is an issue in part because there is no global frequency set aside for 
RFID logistics applications. The second political issue is about commercial inter-
ests, as different companies aim for market advantage (Wolfe, 2002). There several 
frequencies of use RFID systems in different countries (Domdouzis, Kumar & 
Anumba, 2007). 
Therefore, undefined electronic seal’s status on the world market and manipula-
tions with international standards for such devices involve many discussions about 
when, how and what type of seal will be most effective and secure for container 
logistics purposes. The debates took a long time and there still no solution or trade-
off between customs authorities and business sector, between manufactures of e-
seals and standardization institutions regarding technical capabilities of security 
devices and logistics applications of it. 
4.3.1.2 Costs for e-seals implementation 
Increased container and port security will not come without costs, and it does not 
refer only to the money that the government must invest to increase security. It is 
essential to balance port and container security with economic efficiency of cargo 
flows. While port security is the crucial part of the competitive maritime transpor-
tation system, too much security can damper trade and leads to a loss of a sense of 
freedom and to feelings of insecurity (Firestone & Corbett, 2003). 
Maritime transportation and logistics activities traditionally have been among the 
largest costs in international trade. But in contrast to that, the most significant ad-
vances in modern logistics have not been in cost reduction, but in improved pro-
cesses to move goods and materials between nations in a timely and seamless 
manner. The implementation of CSI and other security initiatives have also placed 
an increased trouble in terms of processes and costs for all the players in global 
supply chains. This means that for CSI to be fully sustainable as a process in global 
supply chains, the financing of CSI must also be equitable or fair (Banomyong, 
2005). There are two possible sources for financing CSI: 
 Payment by users 
A tax or a fee can be charged by the relevant authorities. This specific fee can be 
collected to finance the extra process, equipment and technology used for CSI. The 
use of appropriate INCOTERMS will become critical in deciding whether the ex-
porter or the importer should pay this specific fee. 
 Public sources 
Financing can be national where each government is responsible for all security in-
itiatives within its borders, but this type of financing is biased as most developed 
countries would already have the majority of equipment in place while the devel-
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oping countries would have to invest a significant amount in order to achieve ac-
ceptable levels of security. Financing can be also international where the importing 
countries, such as the US, provide a grant to the implementation of CSI around the 
world. Public financing runs the risk of not achieving the desired level of security 
in global supply chains. Bilateral financing may help in the implementation of se-
curity initiatives but the financial sustainability of the initiatives must be demon-
strated. The collection of funds from whatever source is necessary in order to fi-
nance security initiative but it is an insufficient condition for the guaranteeing of 
full global supply chain security. However, the present trend is for exporters to 
fund these security initiatives thus increasing their financial burden (Banomyong, 
2005). 
DNV (Det Norske Veritas) Consulting international company has done the study 
for European Commission regarding estimating the general economic impact of in-
ternational and European programs towards improving and especially investing in 
transport security in EU (DNV Consulting, 2005). The DNV have analysed the 
effect from implementing high security seals, compliant to ISO/PAS 17712, for 
containers export to outside the EU if seal has a cost of below 0.75 Euro a piece. It 
is assumed that 80% of intra cargo (2 billion tons per year) is subject to the seal 
programme and an average cargo unit weighs 20 tons the number of seals needed 
to implement an EU seal program will be 80 million investment. It is assumed that 
it takes 2 minutes to mount and dismount such a high security bolt. The additional 
expenses for industry would be in the order of 150 million Euros. 
Understanding the finances of current intermodal container tracking first requires 
an understanding of incentives, investment values and returns. In practical terms, 
this means the cost of the equipment and the detention charges applied to keeping 
equipment longer than the specified free period. Once these elements of the system 
are well understood, the value of better tracking systems can be evaluated.  
The designs of reading infrastructure of e-seals have a principal impact on the 
range that the system can be effective and on the ability of the devices to com-
municate in complex environments such as container yard / terminal gate area. 
These differences in effective reader range have a key impact on the infrastructure 
required to cover a large reading area. This is an important trade-off that will de-
termine the total infrastructure cost of an installation. Less complex systems will 
have a lower potential cost per reader; however multiple readers will likely be re-
quired. More sophisticated devices could have greater potential investment per 
reader but only a single reader might be required (Le-Pong & Wu, 2004). 
The equipment costs can be broken down into the cost of the container, the seal, 
the RFID tag, and the smart box. The investment for new shipping containers is be-
tween $7,000 and $40,000, depending on the size and its function (dry goods or re-
frigerated goods) (Balog, Lim & Nettleton, 2005). High-security mechanical seals 
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cost between $0.50 and $2 per seal depending on the material employed 
(Tirschwell, 2005).  
Electronic seals developed by Savi Technology, used by the Department of De-
fence and tested in a pilot program with the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR), have a value between $300 
and $400 (Balog, Lim, & Nettleton, 2005), Industry estimates RFID tags hover 
around $0.25 and $0.55 cents. However, Alien Technology, a leading RFID manu-
facturer, predicts that in quantities of 1 billion, RFID tags will approach $0.10 
each, and in lots of 10 billion, $0.05 per tag (Balog, Lim & Nettleton, 2005). 
Finally, industry analysts estimate smart box technology costs approximately $50 
per container with an operational increase of $10 per container to account for the 
infrastructure. Savi Technology, a specialist in RFID components, currently sup-
plies the government side of the supply chain. Savi complies with the Department 
of Defence RFID policy, mandating that all DOD containers have the electronic 
manifests. These manifests are contained on an electronic seal that is approximate-
ly $300-$400 per seal.  
However, it does not contain a multi-sensor feature capable of detecting invasion 
into the container. In 2003, the Port of Seattle joined the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation's (APEC) program Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) as the 
North American partner. Together with Bangkok/Laem Chabang, this project aims 
to demonstrate end-to-end supply chain security between Thailand and the U.S. 
Savi electronic seals were used on inbound containers. While the trial produced 
encouraging results, the seals were cost prohibitive and Savi Technology was not 
willing to comply with port technology demands. These requirements included us-
ing commercial off the shelf technology in an open architecture environment, one 
where competitors are free to bid to the port price competitive technologies (Balog, 
Lim & Nettleton, 2005). 
15 October 2008, a mandate issued by the United States Customs Border Protec-
tion became effective requiring all US inbound maritime containers to be secured 
with an International Organization for Standardization ISO/PAS 17712 bolt seal. 
However, many shippers and container carriers have been using these bolts for 
years with no appreciable effect (Carroll, 2009). These seals are easily counterfeit-
ed, and their main advantage seems to be that they are inexpensive.  
The technology is available now to develop a single-use, disposable, inexpensive, 
versatile and reliable e-seal. Part of the argument put forward by the DHS for not 
using e-seals is the concern by both government and industry about the costs of the 
e-seals, the costs of an extensive and expensive RFID infrastructure, the logistics 
of returning reusable e-seals and responding to ‘false positive’ alarms caused by 
defective and unreliable e-seals. 
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Recent surveys show that many executives from the supply chain and logistics in-
dustry consider cargo theft as the main challenge to supply chain security, while 
safeguarding against a terrorist attack is slightly less important. This reflects an at-
titude that, despite a growing number of government regulations that suggest ter-
rorism is still a relevant threat; shippers are mainly worried about theft of their car-
go. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has estimated that the cost of cargo theft to 
the US is between $15 billion and $30 billion a year (Carroll, 2009). As the econ-
omies of the US and the EU in terms of GDP are equal it is not unrealistic to esti-
mate that the cost of cargo theft in the EU is in the same order of magnitude. 
SaviTrak customers in Asia and South America are discovering that the real-time 
data the system captures from shipments tagged with active Radio Frequency Iden-
tification e-Seals enhances security visibility, speeds clearance by their countries' 
Customs authorities, and reduces in-transit inventory costs. For example, Emprevi 
Ltda., a logistics and security firm, said the Savi Networks system has cut security 
costs in Colombia by $300 per container trip for its customers, which include 
Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer and Cadbury Adams. Western Digital, a leader in in-
formation storage products, says that per-trip costs have been reduced by $40 for 
point-to-point shipments from its manufacturing facilities to Royal Thai Customs 
authorities in Bangkok because the automated security devices speed collaboration 
and government clearances (Witt, 2008). 
Therefore we can recognize, that any technological advancement to enhance secu-
rity must also stimulate trade by reducing the cost or increasing the efficiency of 
operations. Therefore, integrating a modular tracking, seal and sensor system uti-
lizing RFID and GPS into the container structure will both increase container secu-
rity and optimize trade. Its success depends on business/government partnerships 
and international implementation. It must be partnered with stringent initiatives 
that enhance information exchange and security of the physical and personal com-
ponents of the supply chain. 
4.3.2 Business benefits of e-seals for global container chain 
As RFID is the most prominent technology for enhancing efficiency and security 
of global container systems, it is necessary to define the realistic benefits from its 
application in container security devices. Several companies are already experienc-
ing great savings and increased efficiencies using this technology in their supply 
chains. Moreover, the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, cou-
pled with use of RFID tags, has significantly improved the movement of containers 
through ports. For example, the Trans Pacific Container Service used to move 
7,000 containers a week through its 175-acre Los Angeles Terminal. Today, it 
moves 12,000 containers a week in the same amount of space as a result of imple-
mentation of a combination RFID and GPS tracking system. Links between gate, 
yard and vessel operations through the terminal’s computer system automatically 
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trace a container’s movement through the terminal (Sabbaghi & Vaidyanathan, 
2008). 
In the last years the benefits from RFID technology in supply chains have been 
made clear. However, there is still a lack of research about advantages from appli-
cation of electronic seals on containers in logistics networks. The general benefit 
from RFID e-seals in container supply chains are seemed to be only for securing 
purposes of customs authorities. However, the container transportation process is 
characterized by complex interactions of numerous operating companies and or-
ganizations. While a container moves from point of origin to destination point, as 
many as 20 different companies have to coordinate the operations of more than 25 
documents with approximately 200 data elements for only one international ship-
ment in the global container network (Downey, 2010). The companies include 
trucking firms, terminal operators, and the shipping company, the manufacturer of 
the shipped goods, the purchaser, banks, and others. 
Currently, based on different types of container security devices, a sophisticated 
platform, that is capable to provide high-end security tasks and elaborated logistics 
management applications, can be developed (Notteboom, 2004). Actually, the big-
gest container ports in the world, namely Singapore, Kaohsiung in Taiwan, Rotter-
dam in the Netherlands, Pusan in South Korea and the ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach, have already adopted RFID projects, in particular, testing e-seals abil-
ities for cargo tracking (Seymour, Lambert-Porter & Willuweit, 2007).  
The projects were focused on various advantages from RFID system implementa-
tion in container port environment, like greater efficiency by shortening the time 
for container checking and management through the port by using active RFID e-
seals (Collins, Korean seaports test RFID tracking, 2005c), the issues of congestion 
and security in the ports (Nguyen, 2006) or improving the security of containers 
destined for the USA, with more stringent security requirements (Clendenin, 
2005). Their results show that smart RFID e-seal with its multifunctional ability 
can be effective for logistics purposes and applications in container supply 
chains/container ports. 
4.3.2.1 Commercial and non-commercial benefits 
IT and technological solutions supporting security improvements will potentially 
benefit not only security but also some quality factors. With investments in techno-
logical solutions such as electronic seals and Radio-frequency identification 
(RFID) control and supporting IT infrastructure, the control of shipment visibility 
during transit and container transhipment points can be facilitated and therefore the 
shipment tracing capability of shipping lines, container operators and freight for-
warders/NVOCCs can also be enhanced (Thai, 2007). 
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We describe below the main areas of additional logistics applications of smart e-
seals in global container logistics: 
 Competitive advantages to connect container transhipment nodes into a global 
info-network 
Key factors for a container terminal are the efficiency of the stacking and transpor-
tation of this large number of containers to and from the ship’s side. Shipping 
companies ask for reliability regarding adherence to delivery dates and promised 
handling times (Tongzon & Heng, 2005). Thus, container terminals are forced to 
provide efficient and cost-effective services. They have to invest heavily to meet 
the stringent demands for faster service and higher quality. The competition be-
tween container terminals has increased due to large growth rates on major sea-
borne container routes. Terminals are faced with more and more containers to be 
handled in short time at low cost. Therefore, they are forced to enlarge handling 
capacities and strive to achieve gains in productivity. To secure the cargo contain-
ers more innovative companies use the smart e-seals, instead of simple mechanical 
seals.  
How does it influence the container operator? Terminal operators in order to keep 
their positions on the market need to adapt to the new security requirements for 
container system. Investments in RFID reading infrastructure will bring the bene-
fits by providing new kind of service for own innovative customers, who using e-
seals. Such a service as RFID reading infrastructure will open the port gates for 
new companies looking for the partners that can provide higher level of security 
and visibility for their cargo flows. Investments in e-seal is a situation when no 
player can benefit by being the only one who changes his strategy. No player can 
better his position by opting out the impact of RFID seals in container system. No 
player can improve his position by adopting smart seals alone. The only way to 
move from the one equilibrium to another is to organize an agreement or consorti-
um between the players to get some of them to adopt (Hadow, 2005). 
 Automation of containers passes through the gates 
E-seals can contain data about goods in container, ID number of container, ship-
pers contact information, point of cargo destination etc. By passing port gates the 
RFID seal transmits container information to the local port network through the 
reading device fixed on the gate. In this case truck driver should not make any 
manual formalities to get access to the terminal. This procedure takes much less 
time, has higher degree of accuracy, and eliminates technical mistakes (human fac-
tor). 
 Security and safety of containers along container transport chain 
Security aspect is the strongest side of e-seals. Container terminals usually are not 
open territories. Nevertheless, the security of the most ports territory provides by 
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the simplest methods of accident prevention. For a long time containers can stay 
without any supervision at a terminals that increase vulnerability of the container 
in total. E-seal can prevent un-authorized access or theft of the container contents 
and inform about such accident by alarm function. On the other hand, container 
door with any type of seal can be removed or container can be cut and open from 
the top, bottom and sides. It makes a huge loss for owners of high value cargo and 
for insurance companies as well. To avoid container intrusion, pilferage and thefts 
of containers or goods, it is necessary to combine electronic seal with different 
sensors (temperature, light, etc.). 
 Control of access to the containers contents 
E-seals possess a useful function to record the time of authorized access to the con-
tainer contents or unauthorized access at the moment of e-seal breaking. Further-
more, the broken e-seal cannot be fabricated or changed on another one without 
any damages of electronic part of the seal. Hence, uniqueness of the e-seal ID 
number and alarm function of this device provides reliable security of goods and 
the real time control of access to the containers contents. 
 Identification of containers and their locations in the logistic chain 
Each ISO container has a unique ID number. Nonetheless, several identification 
numbers on the same container are the real case for many intermodal containers. In 
these cases terminal operators should identify which of the ID numbers is correct. 
Such type of information can be coded to the e-seal memory. Each time a container 
changes the hands or documents regarding the container are transferred, the poten-
tial for miscommunication and human mistakes exists. For instance, a trucker 
might bring a container to a port but do not communicate to the shipping company 
that he has arrived. It causes a container not to be loaded onto a ship. These kinds 
of problems cost money to the company awaiting the shipment. Electronic infor-
mation, transmitted from e-seal to the local network of the terminal, can provide 
companies with authorized access with required data in real time about individual 
container location. 
 Monitoring of containers movements 
E-seals together with Real-Time Locating Systems (RTLS) allows not only control 
the container location, but also to monitor every moving of the container on the 
port territory. RTLS is indispensable to container operators because container 
yards and van pools are so vast and store so many containers that without the sup-
port of locating systems, workers cannot find a particular container in required 
time limit. This informative function of e-seal can be useful to the forwarding or 
agent companies to inform whether the container loaded or unloaded from the ship. 
 Improving the congested situation in the container transhipment nodes  
The combination of dramatic increases in freight traffic and transportation systems 
operating at or near capacity limit has only recently resulted in growing visibility 
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of freight and its role in urban congestion and environmental problems as a symp-
tom of greater supply chain congestion (Regan & Golob, 2000). The waiting time 
and variability of waiting time at ports can be significant. Delays are encountered 
entering the ports as well as inside the gates. Almost 44% of operators serving 
ports reported that their operations were often affected by congestion at the ports 
(Regan & Golob, 2000). By creating the Greenlane RFID e-seals can play an im-
portant role in paperless information exchange. Time savings in container pro-
cessing through the container terminal will influence the improvement of situations 
with truck congestions at the port gates; that also will have a “green” impact on re-
ducing of port-related truck emissions because of accelerating of truck-turn-over 
time at the terminals. 
Another series of potential benefits belong to the logistics applications of e-seals 
for all businesses (Importers, Carriers, Manufacturers, and Service Providers). Re-
garding C-TPAT Survey 2007 (Diop, Hartman, & Rexrode, 2007) more than three-
quarters (76.5%) of survey participants reported that it is extremely important to 
“reduce the time and cost of getting cargo released by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP)”. Next on the list of most important motivations for joining secu-
rity programs are “to reduce the time in CBP secondary cargo inspection lines” and 
to “improve the predictability in moving goods and services across borders”. 
 Benefits for private sector from security enhancement – GreenLane 
Membership in “GreenLane” Programm for U.S. firms operating in the supply 
chain is becoming the norm rather than the exception (Silverman & Seely, 2007), 
especially among service providers who have found it to be a relatively low cost 
and effective marketing tool. C-TPAT membership has certain benefits: several 
time less likely to be targeted for physical inspections, resulting in considerable 
savings in time and money as CBP increases the number of exams overall; priority 
for cargo inspection; reduce the handling costs by removing to their own location 
all containers not selected for inspection before CBP has completed its inspection 
of the entire shipment (Silverman & Seely, 2007). At present, the customs service 
physically inspects only 2 percent to 4 percent of containers arriving at U.S. sea-
ports (Jackson, 2003). The smart-seal program can boost the number of the right 
inspected containers. Simultaneously, by using smart e-seals or smart boxes the 
shippers will get the most attractive benefit – the “GreenLane” advantage – to ac-
celerate their cargo clearance and expedite processing through the port. More than 
half of C-TPAT Survey participants in 2007 indicated that benefits from enhanced 
security outweighed the costs (32.6%) or the benefits and the costs were is about 
the same (24.2) (Diop, Hartman & Rexrode, 2007). 
 Smooth border crossing and gate processing 
The enhanced security system could influence as well in another manner the con-
tainer flows going through the port gates or borders of the countries: a U.S. De-
partment of Transportation program “TransCore” shows that electronic seals could 
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help secure containers and reduce border congestion (RFID Journal, 2002). At the 
Port of Seattle a reader at the port's gate indicates that the truck has entered/left the 
port. The truck is tracked at six weight stations and processing centres along a 300-
mile stretch of Interstate 5. When the truck arrives at the Blaine border crossing, 
the e-seal is read with a handheld reader or a roadside reader. Information on the 
carrier, vehicle, cargo, location and time of detection, drivers, and security status is 
uploaded to a secure Web site. The shipper and carrier, as well as U.S. Customs 
Service agents and the U.S. Department of Agriculture agents can view the infor-
mation on a secure Web site. The system requirements to be the most effective is 
existence of special lanes for trucks with sealed containers; otherwise, it do not 
help to reduce congestion at the port terminals or smooth the border crossing 
(RFID Journal, 2002). 
 Improve process flows in global container networks 
The improvement of process flows in container networks means that the flow of 
materials and the flow of information are synchronized when the information sys-
tem continually displays the current status and stream of goods. The information 
system is thereby not just more accurate but is also up to date. E-Seals, which are 
unaffected by weather, can improve the process flow for containers at the gates 
(improvement of the operations at port gates by e.g. remote readability of a con-
tainer number) as well as refine on the matching of the container to the manifest; or 
avoid typically errors made during issuing and receiving of goods, such as incor-
rectly logged quantities. 
 Protect the brand name and the reputation 
Looking for rewards from security programs, the huge companies like Procter & 
Gamble, Boeing, Starbucks, and Kmart with high-value products emphasize that 
they need to secure the cargo in order to “protect the brand” (Downey, 2010). Elec-
tronic seals with their track-and-trace ability not only ensure the container supply 
chain, but also gain supply chain efficiency from automatically tracking containers. 
Damage to intangible assets and the contingent losses which could arise in cases 
where e-seals are not used are even greater, e.g. damage to reputation (contaminat-
ed goods or non-delivery of goods). In some case the pilferage from the container 
or theft may lead to the loss of sensitive information or intellectual properties, 
therefore the container flows have to be under protection of secure environment at-
tached to the particular container in the form of smart devices. 
 Anti-temper system for container flows 
One of the main applications of RFID technologies in the context of shipping con-
tainers is their use as e-seals. In the most cases they are active tags which provide 
efficient and instant notification of container security breaches. An identification 
number of an e-seal is protected by electronic encryption and authentication. Elec-
tronic seals have to work in harsh environments often under severe conditions. Ac-
tive tags contain batteries, have more processing and operating power and hence 
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appear be the most promising in container logistics. Such devices provide a 100% 
check to ensure the e-seals are not tampered with/replaced and could detect 
when/where container tampering occurred (this information can be useful for in-
surers, the police as well as for bankers). Smart seals integrate in itself useful in-
formation other than the seal number e.g. container number, destination and con-
signee. The shippers get automate monitoring and tracking of containers as well as 
higher processing level for their shipments through the customs via eliminating of 
human errors in reading or visual inspection or recording the seals on the contain-
ers and more effective customs work. 
 Minimizing of container loss, tampering/theft or cargo pilferage 
The risk of theft, especially if the goods have a black market value, is very real. 
Worldwide, the direct cost of cargo theft is estimated at about US$50 billion per 
year, with indirect costs many times higher, and US$15 billion of merchandize 
losses in the United States alone. Cargo theft occurs in freight-forwarding yards, 
warehouses and during transportation in trucks and on ships. Cargo is particularly 
vulnerable while in the process of being loaded or unloaded from trucks, or 
through documentary fraud (Mayhew, 2001). To ensure the process of container 
operations on its different stages the cargo owner or their service providers, either 
the carrier and port operators should provide the reliable protection of each con-
tainer during its transportation. The e-seal is a right key to solve this problem. It 
combines mechanical mechanism to lock the container with specific electronic 
components. Therefore, it can provide tamper evidence, physical security and data 
management as well as indicate electronically whether a conveyance has been 
opened or tampered with. 
 Loss of insurance claims 
Theft or pilferage of goods from container leads to insurance claims. If the seal is 
checked at multiple points as the container moves through the supply chain, it will 
help the carrier, the shipper and the insurer to determine the weak link in the chain. 
But if the container seal have not been checked at different stages as the container 
moves through the supply chain, they will not be able to pin down the location 
where the pilferage is occurred, and law-enforcement agencies will not be able to 
deploy their resources effectively (Armbruster, 2006). Identifying the location of 
the breakdown by using of smart e-seals will help determine which party is respon-
sible for the loss and thus to settle insurance claims to them. 
Thereby, the range of presented e-seals advantages for container logistics describe 
the most attractive and useful functions for largest container logistics providers 
such as port operators, shipping companies, forwarders etc. Nevertheless, there are 
still some challenges in worldwide adoption of e-seals system. The first discussion 
point is what kind of technology should be used as a worldwide standard of e-seals. 
This discussion has a substantial importance for the next issues: what kind of infra-
structure need to be installed and what kind of functionality one could obtain from 
the device (World Shipping Council, 2006). The infrastructure for e-seals does not 
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presently exist and need to be installed on thousands of different properties. An-
other actual issue for e-seals global implementation is international ISO standards 
for the devices. It is still an open question what the product needs to do; what spe-
cific events must be captured and recorded; is capturing entry through the doors 
enough or must it detect entry into the container through the walls, ceiling or floor; 
does the device have to detect conditions other than entry intrusion? Thus, the gov-
ernments and industry have to achieve equilibrium from security requirements and 
all businesses benefits, before to set all these specifications for e-seals or container 
security devices. 
4.3.2.2 Security improvements through supply chain 
The main purpose of security control and management is to drive out the variabil-
ity of pick-up, transit and delivery time, therefore increasing the reliability of ser-
vice (Wolfe, 2002). Security improvements can also help maritime transport ser-
vice providers in having better shipment loss and damage control; in other words, 
shipment safety and security. The impact between security improvements and 
shipment safety and security is the most direct and comprehensible. The im-
portance of security improvements in this respect has been long acknowledged as a 
contributing factor to increase profits for organizations. In maritime transport, in 
addition, cargo loss and damage records have always been considered an indicator 
of service quality (Thai, 2007). 
For example, at Kaohsiung Harbour, one of the 10 largest ports in the world, more 
than 1 million transit containers are imported and exported annually. To prevent 
smuggling, Taiwan Customs officers are required to escort some 50,000 unloaded 
containers each year from the carrier yard, through downtown, to one of the port's 
five container terminals (Friedlos, 2009). The escorts result in increased expenses 
for Customs, due to the need for additional employees, and for carrier companies, 
which must pay an escort fee. In addition, the long inspection times can cause an 
inconvenience. In 2004, the Taiwanese Government sought to replace manual es-
corts with an automated system to improve security and efficiency, as well as cut 
costs by reducing manned escorts. Some 40 Speedway readers were then installed 
at checkpoints along 20 lanes used for transporting containers. Customs has also 
purchased 40,000 e-seals, as well as handheld interrogators. When a transit con-
tainer is chosen for e-sealing, a notification is sent to the carrier, and an e-seal is 
used to lock the container at the carrier's yard. A handheld reader is utilized to in-
terrogate the RFID chip's ID number, which is transferred to a secure database, and 
the information is synchronized with the driver's ID, as well as those of the con-
tainer and truck, which are printed on the vehicle and container. The system has an 
accuracy rate of 97.42 percent at a distance of more than 7 meters. It should result 
in an annual reduction of 6,000 man-hours for escorts, through the elimination of 
10,000 escorts by Customs officers. 
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4.3.2.3 Economic effects from investing in e-seals 
Heightened container security requirements, especially for import operations, in-
fluence the container custom inspection process in ports. Extensive inspections be-
come a bottleneck for container supply chains that slow down and decrease opera-
tional performance. Tightened security control traditionally means increasing the 
inspection rate for container content rather than enhancing the effectiveness of it 
(Lee & Wolfe, 2003). The effect of increased random sampling checks of contain-
ers leads to extended dwell time of containers in a port through the increasing 
number of containers waiting for inspection and additional logistic costs. 
The greatest part of world container volume is repetitive: the same shippers make 
the same shipments for the same consignees with a large number of containers. 
These routine container flows are quite easy to “secure” and can be placed under 
less precise customs scrutiny (Christ, Crass & Miyake, 2005). Participation in the 
C-TPAT program and third-tier status will give companies an opportunity to avoid 
the additional expenses on containers waiting for inspection, to save costs of man-
ual customs inspections itself and to accelerate the container turnover through the 
whole supply chain. Electronic seals, as a necessary part of “green lane” ad-
vantage, lead to additional investments in “secure” container logistic processes. 
We present the evaluation of cost-benefit influence of three different e-seals on ef-
ficiency of container supply chain by using the “green lane” opportunity. Cost-
Benefit Analysis (CBA) allows us to weigh the expected investments against the 
expected benefits of one or more alternatives to choose the best or most profitable 
option. 
To estimate additional logistic expenses caused by investments in electronic seals 
we compare three types of electronic seals: 
1. “Container Security Device” (CSD), containing seal ID number, container 
ID number, additional sensors to indicate environmental status of container 
content, alarm function to inform in real-time and satellite communication 
via GPS/INMARSAT systems. With the ability to provide real-time global 
visibility for container supply chain, CSD has the highest level of costs for 
its use. We assume that one CSD costs 4,000 € (Wolfe, 2002) and the possi-
ble rent price is equal to 10% from the original amount, i.e. 400 € per con-
tainer per trip. We assume additional operating costs for container sealing 
(2.5 € per trip) and costs for information transaction (3 € per trip), when the 
minimum number of transactions is equal to 6 transactions per trip. 
2. Reusable or permanent active RFID e-seal also includes a seal ID number, a 
container ID number; can initiate alarm calls and record time/date of con-
tainer tampering. The current problem of RFID seals is that, for its imple-
mentation, they need worldwide RFID reading infrastructure. The question 
of who will invest to build a global RFID net is still under discussion among 
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many parties involved in container logistics. We assume that one permanent 
e-seal costs 500 € and the possible rent price is equal to 10% from the origi-
nal price, i.e. 50 € per trip. We assume both additional operation costs for 
container sealing (1 € per trip) and costs for information transaction (3 € per 
trip). The minimum number of transactions is equal to 6 transactions per 
trip. 
3. Read-only, non-reusable e-seal defined in ISO 18185. This type of electronic 
seals contains only a seal ID number and is attractively priced in comparison 
to the two previous e-seals. The most common technology for such e-seal is 
passive RFID, which requires an appropriate reading device and software. 
We assume that one-used e-seal costs 5 € per trip. We assume as well that 
operating costs for container sealing is 5 € per trip and costs for information 
transaction is 3 € per trip, the minimum number of transactions is equal to 6 
transactions per trip.  
We assume that necessary global reading infrastructure already exists for RFID 
transponders or will be a part of investments from the government. The RFID read-
ing infrastructure is the most extensive share of all investments in e-seals and the 
issue of its responsibility is still open. The annual repair costs for e-seals are as-
sumed as 5% from the original price of e-seals. 
We assume that 1,000 containers move through the ports and each container makes 
10 trips per year.  
We consider two scenarios for containers shipping through the ports (Daschkovska 
& Scholz-Reiter, 2007): 
1. Scenario without e-seals. When containers enter the port of loading A, as it 
shown in Fig. 12, two alternatives of physical container flows exist: the con-
tainer goes directly to the waiting area to be loaded on the ship, or it is moved 
to the customs checking territory to be manually inspected by customs. The 
latter alternative brings additional operating cost for container logistics as well 
as extends container dwell time at the port, which in turn creates additional ex-
penses. We assume that the volume of such expenses is equal to 1% of lost 
sales. We assume inspection costs to be 200 € per container. The realistic rate 
of customs inspections is 2% of total number of containers. We assume as well 
that inspections cause additional storage costs for a container at a port. It is as-
sumed that storage costs 10 € per day. The number of storage days due to in-
spection control is 7 days in the port of loading and in the port of discharge. 
Following inspection a container at port A will be loaded on a ship and di-
rected to a port of discharge B. We consider 3 possible variants of physical in-
spections: first, a container is checked once at the port of loading; second, a 
container is inspected once at the port of discharge, and; third, a container is 
checked once at the port of loading and once at the port of discharge. Customs 
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inspections are random checks, so no shipper can be fully confident that his 
containers will not be opened to scrutiny. 
 
Port A Port B
Customs Inspection Customs Inspection
 
Fig. 12 1st Scenario for container processing through the ports under customs inspections 
2. Scenario with e-seals. The second scenario describes the perspective of using 
“green lane” advantage for “secure” containers equipped with e-seals. A con-
tainer moves from port A to port B without any stops for physical inspection, 
(Fig. 13). We assume that it brings one benefit for shippers like the possibility 
to increase container turnover at least by 1%.We consider that customs checks 
randomly 2% of total number of shipped containers in the first year following 
implementation of e-seals and in the second year is only 0.5% of all containers; 
since third year the “greenlane” advantage is fully available to use for “secure” 
containers. 
 
Port A Port B
 
Fig. 13 2nd Scenario for container processing through the ports without customs inspections 
The authors look only at the change in logistic expenses from the point of view of 
customs inspections and investments in electronic seals. Thus the assumption is 
that all other logistics overheads for container transportation through the ports do 
not change. Consequently, we can first calculate the customs costs in the cases 
when the inspection takes place at one or at two ports for the same container and 
storage expenses for inspected container. To calculate investments in e-seals we 
distinguish two variants of e-seal use: renting or buying them. The project time pe-
riod is 5 years. We assume an increase in container turnover by 1% after the im-
plementation of e-seals in container logistic process as one of others possible bene-
fits. Its monetary effect is assumed as 1% annual growing in sales of carrying by 
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container merchandise (estimated value of 1 container is equal 5,000 € per contain-
er). Our investigation distinguishes investment projects when CSD or reusable e-
seal are rented by shipper for each container trip each year (I and II projects) and 
considers the situation where e-seals are purchased once (III-V projects) for whole 
project period: 
I. “Rent CSD”  
II. “Rent reusable e-seal”  
III. “Buy CSD” 
IV. “Buy disposable e-seal” 
V. “Buy reusable e-seal” 
Table 2 presents the initial data for the investment projects. 
 Initial Data Abbr. Container 
Security 
Device 
(CSD) 
Disposable 
E-seal 
Reusable  
E-Seal 
E-seal Investment, €/unit  Sb 4 000,00 €  5,00 €  500,00 €  
Rent E-seal Investment, €/unit Sr  400,00 €  -   €  50,00 €  
Infrastructure Investment Si -   €  -   €  -   €  
Number of Ports n 2 2 2 
Sealing costs per container clos-
ing/opening, €/trip/cont. 
Ss 2,50 €  3,00 €  1,00 €  
Transaction Costs, €/transaction Str 3,00 €  3,00 €  3,00 €  
Min Number of Transactions per trip ntr 6 6 6 
Number of Containers Ncont 1000 1000 1000 
Number of Trips of 1 container per year Ntrip 10 10 10 
Inspection Costs, €/cont. Sinsp 200,00 €  200,00 €  200,00 €  
Percent of inspected containers per year p 2 2 2 
Percent of inspected containers per year 
after implementation e-seals 
p' 0,5 0,5 0,5 
Number of Containers Inspected with 
2%, cont.  
Ncont-
insp 
200 200 200 
Number of Containers Inspected with 
0.5%, cont. 
Ncont-
insp' 
50 50 50 
Storage Costs at a Port, €/day Sstor 10,00 €  10,00 €  10,00 €  
Number of Storage Days via Inspection 
in Loading port 
Nd-i 7 7 7 
Value of 1 Container, €/cont Vcont 5 000,00 €  5 000,00 €  5 000,00 €  
Project Time Period, years t 5 5 5 
Percent of Salvage Value, % a 50 - 50 
Repair Costs, %/ €/unit krep 1 1 1 
Interest Rate, % r 10 10 10 
Value of increased sales after 1 year, % Vs 1 1 1 
Table 2 Initial Data (authors estimations and personal communications) 
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Preliminary evaluation of the projects costs require to evaluate the investments 
volumes (IC) and further expenses (such as Transaction costsܴଵ, Sealing costsܴଶ, 
Repair costsܴଷ, Customs costsܴସ, Storage costsܴହ,) that follow the projects 
through the evaluation period. 
The investment has been evaluated for two cases: if e-seals have been rent for the 
whole project period (ܫܥ௥௘௡௧) and if they have been bought (ܫܥ௕௨௬) at once. 
ܫܥ௥௘௡௧ ൌ ܵ௥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥ כ ௧ܰ௥௜௣ כ ݐ (1) 
ܫܥ௕௨௬ ൌ ܵ௕Ǥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥ (2) 
The operation expenses we evaluate by the following way: 
ܴଵ ൌ ܵ௧௥Ǥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥ כ ௧ܰ௥௜௣ כ ݊௧௥Ǥ (3) 
ܴଶ ൌ ܵ௦Ǥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥ כ ௧ܰ௥௜௣ (4) 
ܴଷ ൌ
ሺܵ௕Ǥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥ כ ݇ሻ
ͳͲͲ  
(5) 
ܴସ ൌ ௜ܵ௡௦௣Ǥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥି௜௡௦௣Ǥ (6) 
ܴହ ൌ ܵ௦௧௢௥Ǥ כ ௗܰǤି௜Ǥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥି௜௡௦௣Ǥ (7) 
ܴସ′ ൌ ௜ܵ௡௦௣Ǥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥି௜௡௦௣Ǥ′ (8) 
ܴହ′ ൌ ܵ௦௧௢௥Ǥ כ ௗܰǤି௜Ǥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥି௜௡௦௣Ǥ ′ (9) 
The salvage value is used in conjunction with the purchase price and accounting 
method to determine the amount by which an asset depreciates each period. We es-
timate a salvage value of electronic equipment for containers within a useful life of 
five years (equation 10) and then the depreciation with a straight-line basis (equa-
tion 11). 
ܸܵ ൌ ܵ௕Ǥ כ ܽ (10) 
ܦ ൌ
ሺܵ௕Ǥ െ ܸܵሻ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥ
ݐ  
(11) 
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ܫ ൌ ௦ܸǤ
כ ௖ܸ௢௡௧Ǥ כ ௖ܰ௢௡௧Ǥ כ ௧ܰ௥௜௣
ͳͲͲ െ ܦ 
(12) 
The investment benefit for each project might be found from the equation 12. 
To obtain the Cash Flows (CF) value for each project we have used following 
equations for the first year (13), for the second year (14) and for the following 
years (15): 
ܥܨଵ ൌ ܫ െ ܴଵ െ ܴଶ െ ܴଷ െ ܴସ െ ܴହ (13) 
ܥܨଶ ൌ ܫ െ ܴଵ െ ܴଶ െ ܴଷ െ ܴସ′ െ ܴହ′ (14) 
ܥܨଷ ൌ ܥܨସ ൌ ܥܨହ ൌ ܫ െ ܴଵ െ ܴଶ െ ܴଷ (15) 
The Table 3 demonstrates the obtained cash flow values for the evaluated projects 
in 5 year period. 
Projects Cash Flows, CF (ͳͲ଺ €) IC 
 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year  
       
I "Rent CSD" -0.139 € -0.114 € -0.105 € -0.105 € -0.105 € 20 € 
II "Rent reusable e-seals" 0.226 € 0.252 € 0.260 € 0.260 € 0.260 € 2.5 € 
III "Buy CSD" -0.179 € -0.154 € -0.145 € -0.145 € -0.145 € 4 € 
IV "Buy disposable e-seals" 0.256 € 0.281 € 0.290 € 0.290 € 0.290 € 0.25 € 
V "Buy reusable e-seals" 0.221 € 0.247 € 0.255 € 0.255 € 0.255 € 0.5 € 
Table 3 Cash Flows 
The cost-benefit calculations of e-seals investments involve, at first, using time 
value formulas for Present Value (PV) and Net Present Value (NPV) calculations 
as well as Profitability Index (PI); and secondly, formulas based on record apprais-
als like Payback Period (PP). It is required to analyse every potential investment 
project to consider the rent prices on e-seals, costs to buy each type of e-seal and 
additional operational expenses that occur within their use. We computed the val-
ues of PV, NPV, PI and PP for each project of potential investment by using Excel. 
The analysis of the obtained results (Table 4) noted that variants IV and V are ac-
ceptable for realization over a reasonable 5-year project period. Project IV is the 
most profitable. It has the greatest NPV value and the highest ARR percent. The 
payback period is also the lowest for project IV. At the same time, reusable e-seals 
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have a lower NPV and PP than project IV for the variant when a shipper buys the 
seals (Project V). It shows that this project is also acceptable for the future invest-
ment. Furthermore, considering that the NPV of single-use seals is not much larger 
than that of reusable e-seals, these two variants of investment should be analysed 
as alternative projects taking into account investments in reading infrastructure, 
development of device prices in the future, and the benefits for potential e-seal us-
ers. 
Projects IC,  
(ͳͲ଺ €) 
PV, (ͳͲ଺ 
€) 
NPV PP, years PI ARR, % 
       
I "Rent CSD" 20 € -0.44 € -20.44 € -176,2 -0,022 0,91% 
II "Rent reusable e-seals" 2.5 € 0.95 € -1.55 € 9,9 0,093 32,73% 
III "Buy CSD" 4 € -0.59 € -4.59 € -26,1 -0,192 3,33% 
IV "Buy disposable e-seals" 0.25 € 1.06 € 0.81 € 0,9 5,629 400,00% 
V "Buy reusable e-seals" 0.5 € 0.93 € 0.43 € 2,0 2,465 120,00% 
Table 4 Results of the investment values for different types of e-seals 
Projects I and III have all negative parameters as seen from the Table 4. So we can 
conclude that, with current prices of CSD, to buy and exploit them the shipper has 
to get more monetary benefits. These benefits should be included in the investment 
analysis to get more realistic results. 
Thus, it was analysed two scenarios for container shipping through the ports. The 
scenario without e-seals presents the current inspection costs for containers. For 
the scenario with e-seals we have analysed how effective investments in container 
“security” by means of e-seals will be. The direct impact of “secure” container 
trade comes from avoiding customs inspections. Already this advantage can bring 
monetary benefits for shippers in less than one year. Considering the obtained re-
sults the paper shows the positive tendency in influence of investing in security de-
vices on efficiency of container business. 
4.4 Summary 
Firstly we discussed the background and motivation for intensive development of 
electronic seals since last 20 years. We have discussed the security initiatives post 
9/11 that stimulate the appearance of different types of electronic container device 
on the market. 
Then we have considered different types of container seals. The traditional me-
chanical seals contain only information about unique container number, however 
they do not provide any data as where, when, under what conditions or by whom 
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the seal was broken. Electronic seal is an electronic device to check the legitimacy 
and integrity of freight containers.  
In this chapter we also have analysed four different technologies that are used for 
electronic seals. As showed the analyses RFID e-seals can extremely improve the 
processes of container transportation. The most promising e-seals for logistics ap-
plications are active RFID seals. Such electronic seals can electronically provide a 
user with the data about seal ID number, security status of device, information 
about users, alarms, seal & container location, date & time, battery status, contain-
er ID number about and different environment conditions inside container. E-seals 
operate various communication protocols to transmit data to reader. Reader infra-
structure for particular e-seals is major component in order to obtain and transmit 
the data from e-seal. During the communication process e-seals from different pro-
ducers use diverse communication frequencies. We have explained how and what 
kind of different logistic information about goods in container, ID number of con-
tainer, shippers contact information, point of cargo destination, electronic cargo 
manifest, can be stored on the electronic chip in e-seal. The data can be approached 
by authorized users by means of reading devices for e-seal.  
Therefore, the usage of the electronic cargo information in container e-seal can im-
prove the container logistics processes by speed up the container passes thought 
the container transhipment nodes (port terminals), prevention and control of unau-
thorized access or theft of the container contains, provide the information for the 
companies and authorities about container location as well as getting automate 
monitoring and tracking of the containers, avoid typically errors during issuing or 
receiving of goods. Some of this data we will apply in the model to investigate dy-
namical properties of a container transportation system, when containers are 
equipped with electronic container seals.  
We have completed simple cost benefit analyses to calculate the investments in 
different types of e-seals under only one condition, that container equipped with e-
seal can avoid customs controls. The obtained results show that the shippers will 
obtain less than in one year the first advantages. Nevertheless, this result is possi-
ble just for the case, when smart e-seal will be used for container transported ex-
pensive goods. 
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5 Modelling and simulation of container logistics 
networks 
In this chapter we analyse a container transportation network from two perspec-
tives: theoretic-analytical and by means of simulation. We begin with the applica-
tion of the queuing theory as a suitable mathematical tool to describe the dynamics 
in a network with stochastic events. It will be seen that this approach works effi-
ciently for networks of small size only. As the complexity grows, an analytic solu-
tion is hardly possible, i.e., this approach is not effective in case of networks with 
large number of nodes. Therefore, discrete-event simulation in MATLAB has been 
chosen to investigate the dynamics of container flows in a larger realistic network. 
5.1 Modelling and simulation of complex systems 
Most complex, real-world systems with stochastic elements cannot be accurately 
described by a mathematical model which can be evaluated analytically. A possi-
ble way how to study complex systems was described by Law and Kelton (Averill 
& Kelton, 1999) (Fig.19). 
Thus, in many cases a simulation is the only possible approach to investigate dy-
namics and relevant logistics characteristics in large scale networks. Simulation 
can be used to check the validity of assumptions or to predict certain properties in a 
particular model. We would like to mention that analytic and simulation approach 
are complementary to each other, each of them possesses its own advantages and 
drawbacks. In both cases the notion of system (Graybeal & Pooch, 1980) is central 
in modelling and investigation of the desired properties. A system can be defined 
more broadly than a collection of physical objects and their interactions. 
In our case, we consider two systems with different sizes: a container port terminal 
is considered to be a smaller system consisting of operations and interactions as the 
collection of objects. The second one is a system with large number of nodes, 
which models a global transhipment network. We begin with a brief introduction to 
queuing theory. 
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Fig. 14 Ways to study a complex system (Averill & Kelton, 1999) 
5.2 Analytical approach based on Queuing theory 
Queuing theory is concerned with the phenomenon of queues and its dynamics in-
dependently on its origin. A queue can be, e.g., the waiting line of ships at the sea 
ports or of container trucks to the gates entering a port. Other examples are queues 
of information messages inside a computer system; queues of industrial machines 
waiting for being repaired or queues of parts waiting to be processes at a machine. 
The objects waiting for a service are called customers. A queuing system is a sys-
tem designed to serve customers demands arriving at random moments of time. It 
can be represented as a dynamic system or “system of flows” (Kleinrock, 1975). A 
facility that serves the customers’ demands is called server (channel). A flow sys-
tem is one in which some commodity flows, moves, or is transferred through one 
or more finite-capacity channels in order to go from one point to another. The mo-
ments of time at which customers arrive in a queuing system and the lengths of 
time that these customers occupy the servers are modelled by stochastic processes 
with given distributions. The purpose of the queuing theory is to describe the sto-
chastic behaviour of the lengths of the queues and to provide tools to control and / 
or optimize the length the queues. 
Historically, the specific probabilistic problems that led to the development of 
queueing theory emerged in connection with the operation of telephone systems. 
System 
Experiment with 
actual system 
Experiment with a 
model of actual system 
Physical 
model 
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The pioneers of queuing theory are the Danish mathematician Erlang (1917) and 
the Swedish mathematician Palm (1943) (Willie, 2004). Later on, it was discov-
ered that similar problems arise in trade, in product equipment management, in 
scheduling of events and processes, in calculation of the traffic capacities of high-
ways, bridges, tolls, canal locks, berths at seaports, etc. 
Queuing theory is a branch of applied probability theory that is known as well as 
traffic theory, the theory of mass service, theory of stochastic service systems, and 
congestion theory. 
5.2.1  Basic Notions and Notation 
Most queuing systems can be defined in terms of the following characteristics: 
 input process 
 service mechanism 
 queue discipline 
 topology of the service network 
The input process is a process of arrivals of customers, i.e., it is a sequence of 
times at which demands for service occur. These are random time instants that can 
be described in terms of distribution functions of the lengths of time between con-
secutive customer arrival instants. 
The service mechanism includes characteristics such as the number of servers and 
the lengths of time that the customers occupy the servers. These are service times 
that are random with given distribution functions. In case of several types of cus-
tomers and different types of servers, each kind of customer possesses its own ran-
dom service time at each type of servers. 
In case different kinds of customers are waiting in a queue at one server, certain 
rules can be prescribed for the order of serving these customers. These rules are 
called disciplines. A queue discipline manages the order of servers’ occupation by 
the customers belonging to different types at the moment of their arrival or at the 
moment of service completion of a customer arrived before. For example, it can be 
assumed that arriving customer leaves the system immediately, if all servers are 
busy, or waits for a service in a queue and is served from the queue in his arrival 
order FIFO (First In First Out). 
The topology of a queuing system determines the rule of customer’s transition 
from one node of queuing network to another after being processed. Every node is 
a queuing system with its own service mechanism and queue discipline. The real 
prototype of such a queuing network is the data communication or container trans-
portation nets. 
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Fig. 15 Structural scheme of a queuing system 
The aim and the scope of the queuing theory is to establish relationships between 
the random flow of customers, the capacity of the given channel, the number of 
channels, the service disciplines, and the efficiency of service performance. 
All queuing systems can be divided in two large subsets: single-server (one chan-
nel) and multi-server (multi-channel) systems. There is a difference between con-
gestion system (system with refusal) and delay queuing systems. A customer arriv-
ing at a congestion system, when all servers are busy, is refused service and de-
parts without taking part in any further proceedings. In a delay queuing system, a 
customer arriving when all servers are busy does not leave the system but waits for 
free server. The number of places in the queue can be limited or unlimited. If the 
number of places is zero, a delay system turns into a congestion system. A queue 
may be bounded both in terms of the number of customers in it (the size of queue 
length or volume of waiting room) and in terms of the queuing time (“system with 
impatient customers”). Delay systems are also subdivided in terms of queue disci-
pline, i.e. customers may be served either in order of arrivals in a random fashion, 
or some customers may be able to get the service before others (a priority disci-
pline). A priority service may have several ranks of pronto (e.g. service without 
waiting). 
The problems queuing theory deals with include calculation of probabilities of var-
ious states, i.e., queue lengths of the queuing system and establishing relationships 
between the parameters (the number of servers, the intensity of the input flow of 
customers, the distribution of the service time, etc.) and indices of service perfor-
mance. The most important are the following indices: 
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 mean queue length 
 mean waiting time 
 mean time-in-system 
 mean number of idle time of servers 
 probability of refusal, i.e. the probability that an arriving customer will not 
be served 
 intensity of served customers’ flow 
All mentioned indices are time dependent. However, in many practically important 
cases it can be assumed that the real queuing system operates under the same con-
ditions for a long period of time and, therefore, its operation can be considered to 
be in steady-state (stationary), which is simpler to analyse. By means of the infor-
mation about these indices one can formulate and solve several optimization prob-
lems concerning finding the optimal values of processing rates of servers, optimal 
number of servers, optimal configuration of system, optimal priorities, etc. 
Modern probability theory of queues owes a great deal to the two fundamental pa-
pers by Kendall (Kendall, 1953; Kendall, 1951). In these works Kendall introduced 
the notation GI/G/n for the n-channel system, where GI (general input) indicates 
that the inter-arrival times have an arbitrary distribution, G that the service times 
have an arbitrary (general) distribution, and n indicates that the system has n serv-
ers. The simple queue is denoted by M/M/n, where M denotes the Markov (absence 
of memory) property of the arrival process and of the service times. Such queuing 
systems are called elementary queuing systems.  
If all the flows of events are stationary Poisson flows, then the process in a queuing 
system is called Markov random process with discrete states and continuous time. 
In this case, the analysis of a queuing system can be carried out in a rather simple 
way. 
Currently, the stationary distribution of waiting time and queue length is found in 
the closed analytical form only for the systems M/G/1, GI/M/n and some of their 
generalizations. The exact solutions in relatively simple or observable form for 
M/G/n and GI/G/n queues are known. 
Nowadays, queuing theory includes a large number of different types of mathemat-
ical models and theoretical tools for their analytic, asymptotic, and numerical in-
vestigation. Queuing theory has a number of applications in modelling of logistics 
systems; in particular it is very convenient and flexible to describe the material 
and/or information flows in transportation systems. 
Along this line, in the next sub-chapter we consider a model based on queuing the-
ory for a small size transportation system with container flows through the port 
terminal. We consider 3 cases of container processing through the port gates; in 
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this approach we consider as well the differences in dynamics of flows for contain-
ers equipped with electronic seals and the container flow without smart devices. 
5.2.2 Two-phase queuing system without e-seals 
In the first case, we have one gate with a flow of trucks with containers which are 
sealed with mechanical seals (Fig. 16).  
    Queue of containers 
 
 
Fig. 16 Structure of 2-phase queuing system in a port “gate-warehouse-ship” for containers with-
out e-seals 
In this model we assume that: 
 The flow of containers entering a port gate and then going to customs clear-
ance warehouse is a Poisson distribution process with parameter λ; 
 The cargo quantity in each container is random quantity with a distribution 
function G(x), where capacity of all container are mutually independent ran-
dom numbers with the same distribution function G(x); 
 The time for gate processing is a random quantity with the distribution func-
tion ͳ െ ݁ିఈ௧, where time for gate processing of all containers are mutually 
independent and identically distributed random numbers; 
 After check-up process at the gate, a container proceeds to a warehouse and 
then will be loaded on a ship (we consider that warehouse capacity is suffi-
ciently large, in other words we neglect a container ability to wait for free 
place in a warehouse); 
 A container is loaded from a warehouse to a ship with an intensity W (if a 
warehouse is not empty) if there is a ship on a berth; 
 If a warehouse is empty, a loading process of a ship is interrupted until new 
cargo arrives at the warehouse; 
 The cargo quantity to be loaded from a warehouse on a ship is a random 
number denoted by ܤሺݔሻ; 
 The total time of a trip of a ship to unloading in a destination port is a ran-
dom quantity with a distribution functionܣሺݐሻ. 
 
The considered system (Fig. 16) is 2-phase queuing system, where the first phase is 
“gate processing” (single channel system) and the second phase is “berth for ship 
loading” (as well single channel system). The particularity of the mentioned queu-
ing system is that the operations on the second phase can be interrupted for the 
random time if a ship is absent at the point of loading. 
Gate of 
port 
Warehouse Berth 
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The current state of the system at time t can be described by random vector 
ܩԦሺݐሻ ൌ ൫ߛଵሺݐሻǡ ߦሺݐሻǡ ߛሺݐሻ൯ 
where ߛଵሺݐሻ is the number of containers in a queue at a gate in time moment t; 
ߛሺݐሻ is the number of ships at a berth at time moment t, i.e. ߛሺݐሻ ൌ Ͳ or 1; 
ߦሺݐሻ is the number of cargo at a warehouse at time moment t.  
The processܩԦሺݐሻ is not Markov. It becomes Markov if: 
ܣሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ ݁ିఈ௧ 
ܤሺݔሻ ൌ ͳ െ ݁ି௫௕ 
 
(16) 
We assume that the above conditions hold true and introduce the following nota-
tion: 
ܨ௞ǡ௜ሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൌ ܲሼߛଵሺݐሻ ൌ ݇ǡ ߛሺݐሻ ൌ ݅ǡ ߦሺݐሻ ൑ ݔሽǡ ݇ ൌ Ͳǡͳǡʹǥ Ǣ ݅ ൌ ͲǡͳǢ ݔ ൒ Ͳ 
For practical applications, the most interesting quantity is the limit distribution of 
probabilities: 
ܨ௞ǡ௜ሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൌ ௧՜ஶܨ௞ǡ௜ሺݔǡ ݐሻ 
i.e., the steady-state distribution, which will hold after a transition time period. 
To calculate the function ܨ௞ǡ௜ሺݔǡ ݐሻ by standard methods, we introduce the follow-
ing system of integral-differential equations: 
Ͳ ൌ െ൫ߣ ൅ ߙ ൅ ߤݑሺ݇ሻ൯ܨ௞ǡ଴ሺݔሻ ൅ ߣܨ௞ିଵǡ଴ሺݔሻݑሺ݇ሻ ൅ ܾሺݔሻܨ௞ǡଵሺݔሻ ൅ ߤන ܨ௞ାଵǡ଴ሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ
௫
଴
 
െܹܨ௞ǡଵƲ ൌ െሺߣ ൅ ߤݑሺ݇ሻ ൅ ܾሺݔሻሻܨ௞ǡଵሺݔሻ ൅ ߣܨ௞ିଵǡଵሺݔሻݑሺ݇ሻ ൅ ߙሺݔሻܨ௞ǡ଴ሺݔሻ ൅ ߤන ܨ௞ାଵǡଵሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ
௫
଴
 
݇ ൌ Ͳǡͳǡʹǥ Ǣ ݔ ൒ Ͳ 
 
(17) 
 
 
(18) 
where ݑሺ݇ሻ = 1, if ݇ ൐ Ͳ, ݑሺͲሻ ൌ ͲǢ ܾሺݔሻ ൌ ܾ௠௜௡ሺͲǡ ݔሻ 
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From equations (17) with x=0 we obtain  
ܨ௞ǡ଴ሺͲሻ ൌ Ͳǡ ݇ ൌ Ͳǡͳǡʹǥ   (19) 
Similarly from equation (18) with x = 0 we find 
ܹܨ௞ǡଵƲ ሺ݋ሻ ൌ ሺߣ ൅ ߤሻܨ௞ǡଵሺͲሻ ൅ ߣܨ௞ିଵǡଵሺͲሻݑሺ݇ሻ        (20) 
ଵ
௕ is the mean time for ship loading under condition that there are sufficient quanti-
ty of the cargo at the warehouse. 
The system of equations (17) and (18) can be solved by the method of method of 
generative functions and Laplace transformation. We introduce derivative of func-
tions 
௜ܲሺݖǡ ݔሻ ൌ ෍ݖ௞
ஶ
௞ୀ଴
ܨ݇ǡ݅ሺݔሻǡ ݅ ൌ ͲǡͳǢ ȁݖȁ ൑ ͳ 
 
and transform them by means of the system (17) and (18): 
െܹ ݀݀ݔ ଵܲሺݖǡ ݔሻ ൌ െሾߣሺͳ െ ݖሻ ൅ ߤ ൅ ܾሺݔሻሿ ଵܲሺݖǡ ݔሻ ൅ ߙ ଴ܲሺݖǡ ݔሻ ൅ 
 
൅ߤݖ න ൣ ଴ܲሺݖǡ ݔ െ ݕሻ െ ܨ଴ǡ଴ሺݔ െ ݕሻ൧݀ܩሺݕሻ
௫
଴
൅ ߤܨ଴ǡ଴ሺݔሻ 
 
(21) 
൅ߤݖ න ൣ ଵܲሺݖǡ ݔ െ ݕሻ െ ܨ଴ǡଵሺݔ െ ݕሻ൧݀ܩሺݕሻ
௫
଴
൅ ߤܨ଴ǡଵሺݔሻ 
 
(22) 
We apply the Laplace transformation to equations (20) and (21) with respect to the 
variable x and use the known rule of transformation of convolution. As a result we 
got the following set of equations: 
Ͳ ൌ െቈߣሺͳ െ ݖሻ ൅ ߤሺͳ െ ݃
ሺݏሻ
ݖ ሻ ൅ ߙ቉ ଴ܲሺݖǡ ݏሻ ൅ ܾ ଵܲሺݖǡ ݏሻ ൅ ߤሺͳ െ
݃ሺݏሻ
ݖ ሻܨ଴ǡ଴
כ ሺݏሻ 
 
 (23) 
ܹ ଵܲሺݖǡ Ͳሻ ൌ െ ቈߣሺͳ െ ݖሻ ൅ ߤሺͳ െ
݃ሺݏሻ
ݖ ሻ െܹݏ ൅ ܾ቉ ଵܲ
כሺݖǡ ݏሻ ൅ ߙ ଴ܲכሺݖǡ ݏሻ ൅ ߤሺͳ െ
݃ሺݏሻ
ݖ ሻܨ଴ǡଵ
כ ሺݏሻ 
 (24) 
where ଵܲכሺݖǡ ݏሻ ൌ ׬ ௜ܲ ሺݖǡ ݏሻ݁ି௦௫݀ݔ
ஶ
଴  , ܴ݁ݏ ൐ Ͳǡ ݅ ൌ ͲǡͳǤ  
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By direct substitution in (20) and (21) we can be sure that under condition λ<μ (it 
is the condition of existing steady-state regime of 1st phase of our system) the fol-
lowing correlation holds: 
where function ܨ௜ሺݔሻ satisfies the next system of integral-differential equations: 
െܹܨଵƲሺݔሻ ൌ െሺߣ ൅ ܾሻܨଵሺݔሻ ൅ ߣන ܨଵሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅ ߙܨ଴ሺݔሻǡݔ ൒ Ͳ
௫
଴
  (25) 
We apply the Laplace transformation to system (25) and obtain the following: 
Ͳ ൌ െܨ଴כሺݏሻሾߣሺͳ െ ݃ሺݏሻሻ ൅ ߙሿ ൅ ܾܨଵכሺݏሻ 
ܹܨͳሺͲሻ ൌ ߙܨͲሺݏሻ െ ሾߣሺͳ െ ݃ሺݏሻሻ ൅ ܾ െܹݏሿܨଵכሺݏሻ 
ܨ௜כሺݏሻ ൌ න ݁ି௦௫
ஶ
଴
ܨ݅ሺݔሻ݀ݔ 
ܴ݁ݏ ൐ Ͳǡ ݅ ൌ ͲǡͳǤ  
 
(26) 
The solution of the system (26) has the following form: 
ܨ଴כሺݏሻ ൌ
ܾ
ߣሺͳ െ ݃ሺݏሻ ൅ ߙ ܨଵ
כሺݏሻ 
ܨଵכሺݏሻ ൌ
ܹܨͳሺͲሻሾߣሺͳ െ ݃ሺݏሻሻ ൅ ߙሿ
ሾߣሺͳ െ ݃ሺݏሻሻ ൅ ߙሿሾݏܹ െ ܾ െ ߣሺͳ െ ݃ሺݏሻሻሿ ൅ ܾܽ 
 
(27) 
 
The constant mean of ܨଵሺͲሻ is the probability that a ship at a random time is at a 
berth and there is no cargo at a warehouse, i.e. it is the probability of non-
productive ship berthing and can be calculated from the condition of normaliza-
tion: 
ܨ଴ሺλሻ ൅ ܨଵሺλሻ ൌ ͳ (28) 
Taking into account that ܨ௜ሺͲሻ ൌ ௦՜଴ ݏܨ݅
כሺݏሻǡ ݅ ൌ Ͳǡͳ from equations (27) and (28) we 
find (applying the Lapthal’s rule): 
ܨଵሺͲሻ ൌ
ܽ
ߙ ൅ ܾ െ
ߣ݃ଵ
ܹ  
݃ଵ ൌ න ݔ݀ܩሺݔሻ ൏ λ
ஶ
଴
 
(29) 
௜ܲሺݖǡ ݏሻ ൌ
ߤ െ ߣ
ߤ െ ߣݖ ܨ௜ሺݔሻǡ ݅ ൌ Ͳǡͳ 
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where ݃ଵ is the mean capacity of one container. 
Since we require ܨଵሺͲሻ ൐ Ͳ from equation (29), it follows that condition: 
ߣ ൏ ܹߙ݃ଵሺߙ ൅ ܾሻ
 
Thus, is necessary for ergodicity of the process ܩԦሺݐሻ it is required to satisfy the ine-
quality: 
ߣ ൏  ൬ ܹߙ݃ଵሺߙ ൅ ܾሻ
൰  (30) 
The representation of the system of equations (20) and (21) in product-form (24) is 
a property known in the queuing theory as Berke theorem (17). By means of the 
mentioned theorem the output flow from a queuing system M/M/n in the steady-
state regime is a Poisson process and it is congruent with the input flow. 
It has also of practical interest to find time instants of limiting distribution for car-
go quantity of the warehouse ξ(t), which is denoted by ܨሺݔሻ. Laplace transfor-
mation of this distribution is specified by the following formula: 
ܨכሺݏሻ ൌ ܨ଴כሺݏሻ ൅ ܨଵכሺݏሻ  
The Laplace-Stieltjes transformation (18) is specified by formula: 
߮ሺݏሻ ൌ න ݁ି௦௫݀ܨሺݔሻ ൅ ܨଵሺͲሻ ൌ ܵሺ
ஶ
଴ା
ܨ଴כሺݏሻ ൅ ܨଵכሺݏሻሻ ൅ ܨଵሺͲሻ 
 
(31) 
From equations (27) and (31) we find, for instance, the mean cargo quantity at a 
warehouse: 
ܯߦ ൌ െ߮ƲሺͲሻ ൌ ߣ݃ଶ
ሺߙ ൅ ܾሻ ൅ ʹߣ݃ଵሺܹ െ ߣଵሻ
ʹሾߙܹ െ ߙ݃ଵሺߙ ൅ ܾሻሿ
 
݃ଶ ൌ න ݔଶ݀ܩሺݔሻ ൏ λ
ஶ
଴
 
 
(32) 
where ݃ଶ represents the second initial distributing moment of discharge of the con-
tainers. 
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5.2.3 Two-phase queuing system with and without e-seals 
In the second case the gate at port entering is equipped with RFID readers for con-
tainers with e-seals. The general flow of containers consists of two sub flows: the 
first of them is a flow of containers which are equipped with e-seals, and the sec-
ond one is a flow of containers without e-seals (Fig. 17). 
Queue of containers  
with and without e-seals  
  
 
Fig. 17 Structure of 2-phase queuing system in a port “gate-warehouse-ship” for containers with 
and without e-seals; the port gate is equipped with e-seals reading infrastructure 
RFID readers on the port gate allow to speed up the control process for the con-
tainers at the gate and influence also the velocity of general container flow in the 
port. 
For substantiation of appropriateness of investments in RFID reader infrastructure 
and speeding-up a procedure container entering to the port it is necessary to com-
pare the efficiency of gate work in the both cases on a list of criteria. The base cri-
teria could be some economical or time indicators. For example, the probability 
ܨଵሺͲሻ in the previous case could be interpreted as a time ratio over the long period 
of time (e.g. year), when a ship is non-productive berthing through low rate of port 
gate throughput. Consider high value of ship berthing costs per day, we can appre-
ciate in monetary expression appearing in this case lost. 
Now we describe the formal language the work of 2-phase queuing system with 
two types of requirements corresponding to the flow of containers with and with-
out e-seals. We assume that the sequence of service in the 1st phase (i.e. gate) is 
without any priority for containers with e-seals, e.g. FIFO (first in – first out). We 
assume as well that a time of gate control for any container with e-seal is randomly 
distributed by exponential law with parameter μ1; and a time of gate control for 
any container without e-seal is randomly distributed as well by exponential law but 
with parameter μ2, where μ2< μ1. 
General flow of containers entering a port, as earlier, will be considered to follow 
the Poisson distribution with parameter λ. This flow is generated by means of su-
perposition two independent Poisson flows of containers: the first of each is de-
scribed the process of container arrivals which are equipped with e-seals (its pa-
rameter is equal μ1), and second – the process of arrivals of containers without e-
seals (the parameter of this flow will be considered to be equal μ2). The rest of the 
assumptions mentioned above remain unchanged. 
Gate of 
port 
Warehouse Berth 
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Now let us introduce a random process. 
ܩԦሺݐሻ ൌ ൫ߛଵሺݐሻǡ݉ሺݐሻǡ ߦሺݐሻǡ ߛሺݐሻ൯ 
where ߛଵሺݐሻ – the mean number of containers in the first phase at a time moment t; 
 ݉ሺݐሻ – number of containers’ flow at a gate at a time moment t, i.e.  
݉ሺݐሻ=1 or 2, if ߛଵሺݐሻ ് Ͳ; if ߛଵሺݐሻ ൌ Ͳ then component ݉ሺݐሻ should be omitted. 
The parameters ߛሺݐሻand ߦሺݐሻ keep the previous meaning. 
We identify that: 
ܨ଴ǡ௜ሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൌ ܲሼߛଵሺݐሻ ൌ Ͳǡ ߛሺݐሻ ൌ ݅ǡ ߦሺݐሻ ൑ ݔሽ 
ܨ௞ǡ௠ǡ௜ሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൌ ܲሼߛଵሺݐሻ ൌ ݇ǡ݉ሺݐሻ ൌ ݉ǡ ߛሺݐሻ ൌ ݅ǡ ߦሺݐሻ ൑ ݔሽ 
݇ ൐ ͲǢ ݉ ൌ ͳǡʹǢ ݅ ൌ ͲǡͳǢ ݔ ൒ Ͳ 
For the limited distribution: 
ܨ଴ǡ௜ሺݔሻ ൌ ௧՜ஶܨ଴ǡ௜ሺݔǡ ݐሻ 
ܨ௞ǡ௠ǡ௜ሺݔሻ ൌ ௧՜ஶܨ௞ǡ௠ǡ௜ሺݔǡ ݐሻ 
By the means of common probability of argumentation (1) we can derive the fol-
lowing system of integral-differential equations, where ߣ ൌ ߣଵ ൅ ߣଶ: 
Ͳ ൌ െሺߣ ൅ ߙሻܨ଴ǡ଴ሺݔሻ ൅ ߤଵ න ܨଵǡଵǡ଴ሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅ ߤଶ න ܨଵǡଶǡ଴ሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅
௫
଴
௫
଴
ܾሺݔሻܨ଴ǡଵሺݔሻ 
 
(33) 
Ͳ ൌ െሺߣ ൅ ߙ ൅ ߤ௠ሻܨଵǡ௠ǡ଴ሺݔሻ ൅ ߤ௠ܨ଴ǡ଴ሺݔሻ
൅ ߣ௠ߣ ߤଵ න ܨଶǡଵǡ଴ሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅
ߣ௠
ߣ ߤଶ න ܨଶǡଶǡ଴ሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅
௫
଴
௫
଴
ܾሺݔሻܨଵǡ௠ǡଵሺݔሻ 
݉ ൌ ͳǡʹ 
 
(34) 
Ͳ ൌ െሺߣ ൅ ߙ ൅ ߤ௠ሻܨ௞ǡ௠ǡ଴ሺݔሻ ൅ ߣܨ௞ାଵǡ௠ǡ଴ሺݔሻ
൅ ߣ௠ߣ ߤଵ න ܨ௞ାଵǡଵǡ଴ሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ
௫
଴
൅ ߣ௠ߣ ߤଶ න ܨ௞ାଵǡଶǡ଴ሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅
௫
଴
ܾሺݔሻܨ௞ǡ௠ǡଵሺݔሻ 
݉ ൌ ͳǡʹǢ ݇ ൐ ͳ 
(35) 
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െܹܨ଴ǡଵƲ ሺݔሻ ൌ െሺߣ ൅ ܾሺݔሻሻܨ଴ǡଵሺݔሻ
൅ ߤଵ න ܨଵǡଵǡଵሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅ ߤଶ න ܨଵǡଶǡଵሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅
௫
଴
௫
଴
ߙܨ଴ǡ଴ሺݔሻ 
 
(36) 
െܹܨଵǡ௠ǡଵƲ ሺݔሻ ൌ െሺߣ ൅ ܾሺݔሻ ൅ ߤ௠ሻܨଵǡ௠ǡଵሺݔሻ ൅ ߣ௠ܨ଴ǡଵሺݔሻ
൅ ߣ௠ߣ ߤଵ න ܨଶǡଵǡଵሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅
ߣ௠
ߣ ߤଶ න ܨଵǡଶǡଵሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅
௫
଴
௫
଴
ߙܨଵǡ௠ǡ଴ሺݔሻ 
 
(37) 
െܹܨ௞ǡ௠ǡଵƲ ሺݔሻ ൌ െሺߣ ൅ ܾሺݔሻ ൅ ߤ௠ሻܨ௞ǡ௠ǡଵሺݔሻ ൅ ߣ௠ܨ௞ିଵǡ௠ǡଵሺݔሻ
൅ ߣ௠ߣ ߤଵ න ܨ௞ାଵǡଵǡଵሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ
௫
଴
൅ ߣ௠ߣ ߤଶ න ܨ௞ାଵǡଶǡଵሺݔ െ ݕሻ݀ܩሺݕሻ ൅
௫
଴
ߙܨ௞ǡ௠ǡ଴ሺݔሻ 
݉ ൌ ͳǡʹǢ ݇ ൐ ͳ 
(38) 
After getting the solution for the system of equations (33) – (38) we can calculate 
several parameters of work effectiveness for the 2-phase queuing system. For ex-
ample: 
 Stationary probability that a ship stands idle because of the lack of contain-
ers at a warehouse:  
ܨଵሺͲሻ ൌ ෍෍ ܨ௞ǡ௠ǡଵሺͲሻ ൅ ܨ଴ǡଵሺͲሻ
ଶ
௠ୀଵ
ஶ
௞ୀଵ
 
 
 mean number of containers at a warehouse:  
ܯߦ ൌ න ݔ݀ܨሺݔሻ
ஶ
଴
 
 
where ܨሺݔሻ ൌ σ σ ሺܨ௞ǡ௠ǡ଴ሺݔሻ ൅ ܨ௞ǡ௠ǡଵሺݔሻሻ ൅ ܨ଴ǡ଴ሺݔሻ ൅ ܨ଴ǡଵሺݔሻଶ௠ୀଵஶ௞ୀଵ  
 Distribution of an interval of a warehouse unloading, i.e. time from the mo-
ment of the beginning of empty warehouse infill up to the next the same 
moment. 
The system (33) – (38) is an infinite system of linear integral-differential equa-
tions. It can be solved analytically using the method of course-of-value function 
and Laplace transformation; however its solution is connected with huge analytical 
difficulties. 
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Ship 
(empty)
Ship 
(full)
For its numerical solution it is required to cast out the equation for k > R where R 
is a tolerance length of containers queue. The equations (35) and (38) for k = R in 
this case has the following form: 
Ͳ ൌ െሺߙ ൅ ߤ௠ሻܨோǡ௠ǡ଴ሺݔሻ ൅ ߣܨோିଵǡ௠ǡ଴ሺݔሻ ൅ ܾሺݔሻܨோǡ௠ǡଵሺݔሻ 
െܹܨோǡ௠ǡଵƲ ሺݔሻ ൌ െሺߙ ൅ ܾሺݔሻ ൅ ߤ௠ሻܨோǡ௠ǡଵሺݔሻ ൅ ߣܨோିଵǡ௠ǡଵሺݔሻ ൅ ߙܨோǡ௠ǡ଴ሺݔሻ 
݉ ൌ ͳǡʹ 
If we assume that a loading of all containers is constant and equal to݃ଵ, i.e. 
ܩሺݔሻ ൌ ൜ͳǡ ݔ ൒ ݃ଵͲǡ ݔ ൏ ݃ଵ 
Then the integral remainders in equations (33) – (38) are interchanged to the fol-
lowing: 
ߣ௠
ߣ ߤଵܨ௞ାଵǡ௠ǡ௜ሺݔ െ ݃ଵሻ ൅
ߣ௠
ߣ ߤଶܨ௞ାଵǡ௠ǡ௜ሺݔ െ ݃ଵሻ 
and we get the finite system of delay differential equations for ݔ ൒ ݃ଵ. 
System (33) – (38) and the derived finite system should be solved subject to condi-
tion of normalization: 
෍෍෍ܨ௞ǡ௠ǡ௜ሺοሻ ൅෍ܨ଴ǡ௜ሺοሻ ൌ ͳ
ଵ
௜ୀ଴
ଵ
௜ୀ଴
ଶ
௠ୀଵ
ஶ
௞ୀଵ
 
Variation 3  
In the third case we have 2 gates, one of them is equipped with e-seals reader, and 
the second gate is a standard gate (Fig. 18). 
Queues of containers  
with and without e-seals 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18 Structure of 2-phase queuing system in a port “gate-warehouse-ship” for containers with 
and without e-seals; the port gate is equipped with e-seals reading infrastructure 
Gate of 
port 
Warehouse Berth 
Gate of 
port 
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Containers with e-seals go directly to the gate which is equipped with necessary 
reading infrastructure, and containers without any e-seal can enter a port from both 
gates. 
For described situation, as for the variation 2, different priorities in operational 
services on the gates for containers with and without e-seals might be determined. 
Then we can investigate their influence on parameters of work effectiveness of 2-
phase queuing system. From a theoretical point of view, it is easier to limit our-
selves to any non-priority discipline, e.g. FIFO. 
In that case we can similarly derive the respective infinite or finite system of inte-
gral-differential equations.  
In this section we have modelled several cases of transportation flows of containers 
with and without security devices via the port gates by using of the queuing theory 
techniques. We have seen that this method leads to rather complex systems of 
equations already in the case of simple scenarios with one-two nodes. Writing 
down the counterpart system of equations for the case of a larger number of nodes, 
say more than ten nodes, becomes very cumbersome and its solution may be in-
tractable. However, in a realistic network the number of nodes can be much larger. 
An alternative way to investigate dynamics in this case is to use discrete-event 
simulations executed on the computer. This approach is frequently used as a low-
cost way of gathering information for decision making (Fishman, 2001). 
5.3 Discrete-event simulation 
In discrete-event simulation, the operation of a system is represented as a chrono-
logical sequence of events. Each event occurs at an instant in time and marks a 
change of state in the system (Robinson, 2004). Discrete-event simulation is a 
powerful computing technique for understanding the behaviour of dynamical sys-
tems. It offers many advantages that make this tool an attractive for analysis 
(Fishman, 2001): 
 Ability to compress time, expand time 
 Ability to control sources of variation 
 Avoid errors in measurement 
 Ability to stop and review 
 Ability to restore the systems state 
 Facilitates replication 
 Possibility  to adjust the level of detail 
By a system we understand a collection of entities (e.g., people and machines) that 
interact over time. A classical system example is a queuing system with a single 
server. Here, customers arrive with certain service requirements, get served in 
some order, say first-come-first-served, and depart when their service is completed. 
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Note that a customer who arrives when the server is busy has to wait (in a queue). 
For this system, we can determine the average waiting time for customers, the av-
erage number of customers in the system, the fraction of time the server is busy, 
etc. 
In general, to determine whether a system satisfies a certain property, we have to 
come up with a mathematical model of the system. In discrete-event simulation, 
the models are restricted to so-called discrete-event models. Here, a set of system 
states is specified for the system, and the evolution of the system is viewed as a se-
quence of the form: ݏ଴ǡ ሺ݁଴ǡ ݐ଴ሻǡ ݏଵǡ ሺ݁ଵǡ ݐଵሻǡ ݏଶ ǥ , where the ݏ௜ are system states, the 
݁௜  are system events, and the ݐ௜  are nonnegative numbers representing event oc-
currence times. Informally, the above sequence means that the system started at 
time 0, in state ݏ଴; then event ݁଴ occurred at time ݐ଴ taking the system to state s1; 
then event ݁ଵ occurred at time ݐଵ taking the system ݐଵ state ݏଶ;and so on. Each 
event occurrence is assumed to take zero time. Theݐ௜ are required to be non-
decreasing, i.e., ݐ௜ ൑ ݐ௜ ൅ ͳ for every i. In the discrete-event models there are at 
most a finite number of transitions over any finite time interval. 
Given the evolution of a system, we can determine its properties (e.g., steady state, 
is it cyclic, etc.) and evaluate appropriate performance measures (e.g., the steady 
state values, the cycle period, etc.). 
There is a set of system parameters, referred to as input parameters, that determines 
the evolution of the system, and hence the properties and performance measures. 
For example, the input parameters to the queuing system are the customer service 
requirements and arrival times. Typically, the input parameters of a system are de-
scribed stochastically (or probabilistically), instead of deterministically. That is, in-
stead of fixing the input parameter values deterministically, we let them be random 
variables, taking values from some domain with some probability distribution. 
Each set of input parameter values gives rise to a unique evolution. 
In a real-life system there are no exact characterizations of the input parameters. 
Hence, using probabilistic inputs makes the results of the analysis more robust. 
Second, even if we do have an exact characterization of the input parameters, it is 
often computationally too expensive or analytically intractable to take them into 
account. 
The problem in discrete-event simulation is similar to that for any mathematical 
optimization problem. Given an objective function (expressed in terms of the simu-
lation outputs), the aim is to find the optimum value of some decision variables 
(simulation model inputs), subject to a set of constraints (allowable range for the 
simulation model inputs). The difference from mathematical optimization is that no 
algorithms exist that guarantee an optimal solution will be found. Simulations are 
normally developed because a system is too complex to be represented in any other 
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way. If the systems that are being modelled are complex, the simulations them-
selves must involve some level of complexity, although at a level of abstraction 
from the system. It may, therefore, not be the simulation tools that are difficult to 
use, but the systems that are being modelled that are difficult to represent. In this 
respect, “difficulty-in-use” is almost to be welcomed since it means that simulation 
is succeeding in helping with difficult problems that could not be addressed other-
wise (Robinson, 2005). 
5.3.1 Description of simulation scenario and its goals 
Container terminals are crucial connections between modes: a bottleneck in termi-
nal operations may affect both inbound and outbound traffic. Inspection is a signif-
icant, yet bureaucratic and time-consuming procedure (Tsilingiris, Psaraftis & 
Lyrdis, 2007a) in container port processing. No more than 2-3% of all the ocean 
incoming containers are checked for security purposes. Truck incoming containers 
are usually not checked. This check is not homogeneous in the sense that the ma-
jority of certain sets of “suspect” containers may be inspected while other non-
suspect sets may not be opened at all. This is performed via a decision-support in-
spection system, which produces a probability inspection function. Variables of the 
function are cargo data like origin, destination, etc. In essence, this program re-
solves the containers that will be checked. The inspection takes place only after the 
container has been stacked, the operator has adduced declarative documents to the 
customs, and the container has been stored in the port information system as a 
stored container. If the decision support system suggests the inspection of the con-
tainer, the customs broker/clearer communicates with the customs the inspection 
command. Promptly, the container is “blocked” and the container operator is in-
formed via an XML message. Then, the container is moved to the area where the 
inspection takes place. When the inspection finishes, a new seal is put to the 
cleared container, the customs “unblock” the container, and the container is again 
stacked. Thus, the unblocked container can be retrieved by a trucker. 
Whether the initiatives for increased safety, security, and environmental protection 
are contradictory with operational excellence or not, it is certain that these initia-
tives will be the drivers for change in container transport. Thus, the ocean contain-
er carriers and the port terminals that will deliver enhanced safety and security will 
attain a competitive advantage. Although RFID utilization is not mandatory, RFID 
and other innovative IT technologies can assist in regulatory compliance as regards 
safety, security, and environmental protection. 
This thesis describes a model for container transhipment through the terminal 
which is developed considering new coming regulations for security and safety of 
container transport chains. The method for the measurement of the effect of the 
container secure devices (active RFID e-seals) on logistics container network was 
evaluated.  
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The work is based on the assumption that a typical electronic seal with a small chip 
inside and some sensors can contain some logistic data which can be used during 
the transportation of a cargo. We consider 3 types of container seals that can have 
an effect on container flows in global network. After that we compare container 
networks with these deferent types of seals. 
The first type of container seal that is used in our model is mechanical seal or high 
secure container bolt that provides the customs officer with information about con-
tainer number mentioned in container manifest in a non-electronic form.  
Second type is an electronic seal. Its task is only to provide electronic evidence that 
container was not tampered with or to inform the authorized person about the elec-
tronic number and status of e-seal. 
The third one is the most advanced container security device. Here we assume that 
with help of an RFID chip a container seal can transmit and receive information. 
The electronic seal attached to a container can be read at key checkpoints (terminal 
gates, quay container loaders). The read information from advanced e-seal can be 
sent via Internet or some other networks directly to container operators, 3PL opera-
tors, forwarders etc. Through the obtained real-time information the person respon-
sible for container delivery may take a routing decision for the container trip. 
These possibilities are not available in the simplest electronic seal mentioned 
above. 
In this section the description of simulation scenario is given. The developed sce-
nario is introduced in Fig. 19. The model consists of 20 nodes. Through each of the 
ten port nodes (Port 21-25 and Port 31-35) of the presented container network we 
consider complex container flows under customs inspections. The container flows, 
as in a real port situation, are going in both directions, i.e., we consider specifically 
import and export container flows. This means that each port is modelled as a sub-
network with terminals and gates described below.  
The ten distribution centres (DC11-15 and DC41-45) are the points of origin and 
accordingly the destinations for container flows in the container network. The con-
nections between the nodes show the container flows inside the network. To make 
the simulation model more realistic we consider the main directions of container 
flows in the world. The main container flows connect Europe with Asia; and Asia 
with North America (Christ, Crass & Miyake, 2005); obviously, there are many 
other major cargo flows in the world economy, however for our modelling process 
it is sufficient to consider only 3 from many others. 
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Fig. 19 Container logistics network 
For the modelling purposes we decided to consider the busiest world container 
ports (in the bracket the port abbreviation for the model): 
Europe (EU): 
 Rotterdam (Port 21) 
 Hamburg (Port 22) 
 Antwerp (Port 23) 
North America (USA): 
 Los Angeles (Port 24) 
 New York/New Jersey (Port 25) 
Asia (China): 
 Shanghai (Port 31) 
 Hong Kong (Port 32) 
 Shenzhen (Port 33) 
 Qingdao (Port 34) 
 Ningbo-Zhoushan (Port 35) 
The distribution centre was chosen by the principle of good road port accessing 
and the opportunity to transport the container in the most attractive port. 
The attractiveness of the port is an option for the advanced transport units with 
smart RFID secure device. Containers with smart e-seals are able to make deci-
sions based on: 
1. Information about queues at the port gates, i.e. the container can change the 
route if the queues are too long and to go to another more attractive port; 
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2. Information about ship arrival times in the nearest ports, i.e. the container 
can estimate the travel and waiting time and make a decision about the 
shortest alternative; 
3. Information obtained at the point of origin (distribution centre) and at the 
port of loading. 
The container equipped with conventional or simple e-seal cannot make routing 
decisions. They are following the principle to choose the nearest port, considering 
the point of destination.  
The structure of container flows inside a port is described as follows. There are 
several queues inside the port area; in particular there are different queues for con-
tainers with e-seals and for other containers (Fig. 20). 
 
Fig. 20 Network of container flows inside a port node 
The container flows in the whole network and inside the port nodes are considered 
in both directions (import & export container flows). The grey blocks with red dots 
on the graph are the containers with any type of e-seals; they have their own 
queues at the port gates as well as for customs proceeding, and during the load-
ing/unloading processes at the berth. For the containers with mechanical seals 
(grey blocks) the same procedure is assumed but separately from containers with e-
seals. In this simulation model there are two types of entering gates at the transit 
points (ports): one type of gates serves only the containers equipped with electron-
ic device; another type of entering gates serves only containers with mechanical 
seals.  
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The goal of the simulation is to estimate the influence of each type of container 
seal on global container flows. The flows of containers with mechanical seals will 
show the conventional situation and will be compared with flows in case contain-
ers with electronic seals. The developed model will present the impact of active 
RFID electronic seals on the dynamics of container logistics processes at the con-
tainer terminal and provides the evaluation of changes in dynamics of physical 
container flows through a maritime terminal. The implementation of new types of 
container seals, i.e. electronic seals, in transportation process should be approved 
by any feasible impact to make container system more effective, sustainable, and 
secure. Our aim is also to proof the economical effectiveness to invest in new con-
tainer secure devices; i.e. to evaluate whether the more security for container flows 
will bring as well the business efficiency for private sector. 
5.3.2 Initial data for simulation 
In discrete-event simulation, the operation of a system is represented as a chrono-
logical sequence of events. Each event occurs at an instant in time and marks a 
change of state in the system (Robinson S. , 2004). The container network model is 
in the discrete-event form. For its solving, we apply appropriate simulation tool 
programmed in MATLAB. MATLAB (meaning "matrix laboratory")) is a lan-
guage for technical computing. It can be used for mathematical computations, 
modelling and simulations, data analysis and processing, visualization and 
graphics, and algorithm development (Gilat, 2007). The simulation is presented for 
the above mentioned three types of container seals. It is assumed that containers 
equipped with electronic seals can use the GreenLane advantage (free moving 
through the ports or border crossing with minimum stops for security checks by 
customs). 
 
The initial data was taken from statistical sources (Sea-Rates.com, 2009; 
Maps.google, 2009) and by author estimations. The container traveling time inside 
the system and between the particular port nodes is represented in table form (Ta-
ble 5): 
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 21 22 23 24 25 41 42 43 44 45 
11 1 2 1 0 0      
12 2 1 2 0 0      
13 1 2 1 0 0      
14 0 0 0 2 4      
15 0 0 0 3 1      
31 16,93 17,46 16,93 9,53 16,91 1 1,5 1 0,2 2 
32 15,79 15,70 15,79 10,20 18,03 1,5 1 1 1,5 0,1 
33 15,79 16,32 15,79 10,20 18,04 1,5 1 1 1,5 0,1 
34 17,47 17,99 17,47 9,53 17,38 1,5 2 1,5 0,5 2 
35 16,90 17,43 16,90 9,52 17,36 1 1 0,5 0,5 2 
Table 5 Transportation time between the nodes in container network, in days (Maps.google, 
2009; Sea-Rates.com, 2009) 
After completing the simulation we are interested in the final transportation time 
inside the network between the point of origin and the destination point. 
Additionally we required to know the average number of containers living the 
warehouses or distribution centres every day in the system (Table 6):  
 11 12 13 14 15 41 42 43 44 45 
11 0 0 0 0 0 20 10 25 20 10 
12 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 25 10 10 
13 0 0 0 0 0 15 10 5 15 30 
14 0 0 0 0 0 10 20 10 15 15 
15 0 0 0 0 0 10 15 5 10 30 
41 30 20 15 15 10 0 0 0 0 0 
42 15 30 10 40 10 0 0 0 0 0 
43 30 15 5 30 15 0 0 0 0 0 
44 10 15 25 20 30 0 0 0 0 0 
45 10 10 25 10 40 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 6 Number of containers living each distribution centre per day; authors estimations 
It is natural to assume that the time to process a container through the customs 
scrutiny is different for containers equipped with e-seals and for containers with 
conventional seals. This time depends on different abilities of customs authorities 
to check the information about container content, information about supplier of this 
cargo and any shipment data. With electronic version of information about con-
tainer content, the customs officer is able to speed up the container processing 
through the port. Subsequently, we defined the average customs processing for 
containers without e-seal in different countries and make estimations for containers 
equipped with new electronic secure device (Table 7): 
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 Ports E-seal, hours* Mechanical seal, days** 
China (Shanghai,  
Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Qingdao, Ningbo-
Zhoushan) 
2; 4; 8; 16; 24 4 
Rotterdam, Hamburg 2; 4; 8; 16; 24 2 
Antwerp  2; 4; 8; 16; 24 1 
USA (Los Angeles, New York/New Jersey) 2; 4; 8; 16; 24 15 
Table 7 Customs clearance time;*authors estimations and ** (IELA, 2009) 
In the simulation model we consider two scenarios:  
1. for containers equipped with smart seals the scenario with routing de-
cisions was simulated; 
2. for containers equipped with mechanical or simple e-seals a scenario 
without possibility to change the route was developed. 
There exist shipping lines between the ports in the network; ships enter the port 
weekly. Hence, if a container is 1 day late then it has to wait 1 week for the next 
ship. 
5.4 Analysis of simulation results 
The simulation of model for containers transhipment through the network is devel-
oped with discrete-event method by using MATLAB software (see the program in 
Appendix). 
5.4.1  Global container turnover  
The model was simulated 20 times in order to get average results then. Each simu-
lation was completed for two possible situations: when e-seals have ability for 
routing decisions and for container equipped with seals without smart functions, 
i.e., e-seals or mechanical seals without routing decisions. For the situation when 
all containers are equipped with conventional seals or 100 % of all containers have 
e-seal, as well as 100% of containers can be equipped with smart seals, were ob-
tained the following results (Fig. 21): 
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Fig. 21 Network containers turnover when 100% of containers equipped with one type of seal 
This result shows that even the simple electronic version of conventional container 
seal may improve the global container operation system. The variation in global 
container turnover comparing container volumes with mechanical seals and opera-
tions with e-seals is almost 30%. Accordingly, the growth in container turnover 
when container equipped with smart seals with routing decisions is 32%. As pre-
sented below (Fig. 22 and Fig. 23) the simulation was accomplished for 2 scenarios 
and for different conditions of container checking process in the ports: the contain-
ers with e-seals are processed by the customs in 2, 4, 8, 16 and 24 hours respective-
ly. For conventional seals these data is accounted in days, 1, 2, 4 and 15 days ac-
cordingly. 
 
Fig. 22 Scenario 1: containers are equipped with e-seals with routing decisions 
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Fig. 23 Scenario 2: containers are equipped with e-seals without routing decisions 
The best simulation results for container turnover are achieved when 70% of all 
containers are equipped with e-seal and the rest 30% are with mechanical seals. 
The reason is that in this simulation scenario it is not stipulated that container can 
change the entering gate to the port; and even one of the gates for containers with 
mechanical seals is free the container with e-seal cannot enter the port through this 
gate. At certain moments, like in the situation with 70/30 proportion of containers 
with and without e-seal, the gate with e-seals reading infrastructure reached the 
maximum throughput limit. At the next moment when the number of containers 
with e-seals is increasing and container flow of containers with mechanical seals 
appropriate decreasing, the total container throughput at terminal gate is decreasing 
as well. That is why on the next step when the number of containers with e-seals is 
80%, the total throughput of the terminal gates is less then when it was in the case 
of 70% of electronic devices were on containers. 
From the model evaluation we have calculated the number of containers that 
passed the system under the following particular conditions: 
 different quantity of containers equipped with various types of seals; 
 container can pass the customs control with different time durations; 
 E-seals are able to make a routing decisions. 
The following details of achievable container turnover in the global container sys-
tem were obtained considering the conditions described above (Table 8 and Table 
9): 
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In these tables we present the average total turnover of containers of each type in 
one simulation period for different constellations of shares of these types of con-
tainers in the system. For example, in the case the share of containers with e-seals 
is 0%, all 23891 containers with mechanical seals have arrived to their destina-
tions. In case 10% of all containers are equipped with electronic seal 4270 of them 
will reach their destination and 22210 containers with mechanical seals will arrive 
at their destination. The total turnover in this case is 26480, i.e. larger than in the 
previous case. 
The distribution of containers equipped with e-seals and without e-seals for differ-
ent shares of the container types entering the system is given on Fig. 24. The simu-
lation results show a significant influence of electronic devices on container turno-
ver in total. 
 
Fig. 24 Comparing of container turnover in per cent 
The acquired results will be used in section 5.5 “Cost-Benefit Analyses of contain-
er secure network” to evaluate investments efficiency for such a new device like 
electronic seal or smart seal.  
5.4.2 Time savings 
The time factor is very important component for the model results evaluation. In 
this section we will describe the main data that play a significant role in the judg-
ment of new technology impacts on existing container transportation processes. 
Since container flows depend on “just-in-time” principle the time criteria should 
force the decision in which technology to invest – e-seals/smart seals or stay with 
old mechanical bolts? 
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The next observed data are concerning the time that containers spent in the net-
work at its different points. As the results show, this time depends on customs 
clearance time as well as on the queues at the transit points. The time that contain-
ers spent in different queues, i.e. the time a container waits at the gates of the port 
terminal or the time a container has to wait for its customs control after it has ar-
rived at a harbour, are observed during the simulation of the model processing as 
well as the total time of a container in the system. 
 The first factor that we will discuss is the time that container waits before 
the entering the terminal and how it depends on the type of securing device. 
Figure 25 demonstrates the time distribution for containers which are equipped 
with simple e-seals (without routing decisions) and with mechanical seals in the 
terminal that they spent for the entering the terminal. Here we present the time 
graphs for containers for different situations: when container is under customs con-
trol for 2, 4, 8, 16 and 24 hours respectively or when it is without e-seal and fol-
lows the conventional procedure for customs scrutiny. The minimum waiting time 
to pass through the terminal gates is 5.08 days. In the figure 25 we can see that the 
minimum time difference that container spent awaiting for passing the gate is in 
port 21, which is 0.09 days. The maximum time that containers have to wait at the 
terminal is 10.51 days. These data show the time distribution for containers 
equipped with simple e-seals and containers that have mechanical seals. 
The next graph presents the situation with time distribution at the terminal for con-
tainers waiting for entrance to the terminal if 50% of all containers were equipped 
with electronic seals and 50% containers are not equipped with e-seals (Fig. 26). 
As represented by these figures, the time that a container waits at the entrance of 
the terminal has no consequential influence on the total transportation time. This 
holds true for both scenarios, i.e. for container flows with e-seals as well as for 
container flows with conventional seals. 
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Fig. 25 Time at the terminal if 100% of containers are with e-seals (without routing decisions) or 
100% of containers with mechanical seals (w/o seals) 
 
Fig. 26 Time at the terminal if 50% of containers are with e-seals (without routing decisions) and 
50% of containers with mechanical seals 
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Next we investigate the time spent at the terminal for the situation when a contain-
er is equipped with a smart seal (Fig. 27). The simulation outcome for the scenario 
with smart seals is essentially different from the results in simulations for container 
processes with simple e-seal or with mechanical bolts. The smart functions of e-
seals, like communication ability, contribute to the speeding up of transportation 
processes and impact the efficiency of container flows. The time spend by each 
container in front of the territory of the port only waiting for the entrance is signifi-
cant differs to the previously discussed results. The minimum time difference for 
container with smart seal and for standard equipped container is 0.72 day (point 
24); the maximum variation in time is 8.35 days.  
 
Fig. 27 Time at the terminal if 100% of containers are with smart e-seals (with routing decisions) 
or 100% of containers with mechanical seals (w/o seals) 
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Fig. 28 Time at the terminal if 50% of containers are with smart e-seals (with routing decisions) 
and 50% of containers with mechanical seals (w/o seals) 
As demonstrated in Figure 28, even in the system where 50% of all containers are 
equipped with smart seal the difference between waiting time in queue in front of 
the terminal can be more the 1.5 hours (point 23). 
 Second time parameter that was aggregated in the simulation model is the 
time a container has to wait for its customs control after it has arrived at a 
harbour. 
After a container passes the gate control to the terminal, it is required to complete 
customs formalities. Some documents about the container can be sent to the cus-
toms authorities in advance to be approved. In some cases a container needs to wait 
at the harbour under the customs control up to 2-3 weeks; in other cases it passes 
the customs scrutiny in several hours.  
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Fig. 29 Time duration in the queue at the terminal waiting for completing customs formalities, if 
100% of all containers are equipped with e-seals (without routing decisions) or 100% 
of all containers are equipped with mechanical seals (w/o seals) 
In Figure 29 we present the simulation results for the situation when 100% of con-
tainers are equipped with simple e-seals and customs control for them takes 2, 4, 8, 
16 and 24 hours respectively. In this case the customs processing time is very low, 
0.20 day. The situation is different for the scenario when containers have conven-
tional seals. Under such conditions the containers are subject to intensive examina-
tion that takes in extreme case up to 119.69 days (point 24). 
 
Fig. 30 Time duration in the queue at the terminal waiting for completing customs formalities, if 
50% of all containers are equipped with e-seals (without routing decisions) and other 
50% of containers are equipped with mechanical seals 
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The next diagram (Fig. 30) demonstrates the situation in the scenario when 50% of 
all containers are equipped with simple e-seals and the other 50% are the contain-
ers with mechanical seals. Under these conditions the customs waiting time is sig-
nificantly dropped in the case of point 24, i.e. 28.89 hours instead of 119.69 hours. 
These results show how the implementation of the new technology can impact the 
current situation with customs clearance. 
 
Fig. 31 Time duration in the queue at the terminal waiting for the customs c completing customs 
formalities, if 100% of all containers are equipped with smart e-seals (with routing 
decisions) or 100% of all containers are equipped with mechanical seals (w/o seals) 
 
Fig. 32 Time duration in the queue at the terminal waiting for completing customs formalities, if 
50% of all containers are equipped with smart e-seals (with routing decisions) and 
other 50% of containers are equipped with mechanical seals 
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The distribution of the time that smart containers spent at a terminal waiting for the 
customs decision is similar to the containers that are equipped with simple e-seal 
(Fig. 31-32). The reason is that the procedure for customs clearance does not de-
pend on the type of electronic secure device on the container. The customs inspec-
tion process depends strongly on the possibility to approve the container integrity 
in electronic form or not. That is why for containers with mechanical bolt the cus-
toms scrutiny takes much more time. 
 The third time factor that was obtained from the simulations is the total 
transportation time of a container in the system. 
This factor is crucial for the answer on the most important question of the thesis: 
How does the choice of particular seal’s type impact the dynamics and effective-
ness of the whole transportation process in container network? 
 DC41 DC42 DC3 DC44 DC45 
DC11 43,38 41,389 43,96 44,787 44,561 
DC12 45,787 41,472 44,158 46,951 51,219 
DC13 44,523 40,982 41,675 46,679 47,023 
DC14 113,5 120,53 133,18 116,45 117,75 
DC15 111,58 121,28 135,92 130,11 132,58 
Table 10 Time duration of a container in the system if 100% of containers are equipped with me-
chanical seals, days 
We have simulated the container flows with actual time for customs processing 
and imitated situation with container queues during the transportation process. The 
obtained results are presented in the Table 10. The next Tables 11 and 12 present 
the detailed information about the total container transportation time in the system 
for the following scenarios: container equipped with e-seals without routing deci-
sions and container equipped with smart e-seals with routing decisions. As an ex-
ample, we used 2 scenarios introduced below where 100% of all containers have e-
seal and when 24-hour time for customs control was applied for container flows. 
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 DC41 DC42 DC43 DC44 DC45 
DC11 
 
40,53 38,127 39,519 40,702 42,265 
DC12 
 
42,238 38,11 39,759 42,194 45,713 
DC13 
 
41,257 38,01 38,515 41,84 43,505 
DC14 
 
42,171 44,106 44,845 40,589 47,344 
DC15 
 
53,767 54,966 57,181 54,631 58,629 
Table 11 Time duration in the system when 100 % of containers equipped with e-seals (without 
routing decisions) under 24 hours customs control 
 DC41 DC42 DC43 DC44 DC45 
DC11 35,149 34,599 34,749 34,576 34,437 
DC12 35,095 34,232 33,946 34,974 34,287 
DC13 35,26 34,356 34,479 35,292 34,269 
DC14 35,047 36,083 35,091 32,354 37,038 
DC15 37,204 36,293 36,966 35,869 38,03 
Table 12 Time duration in the system when 100 % of containers equipped with smart e-seals 
(with routing decisions) under 24 hours customs control 
Tables 9, 10, 11 present different transportation times from any point of origin in 
the container network to any final destination point. Following the data represented 
in the tables, the tendency to the decreasing of the total transportation time depend-
ing on which type of container secure device was used in the transportation process 
can be seen. 
The total transportation time consist of transportation time from DC to Port and 
from Port to the final destination (DC), transit time on the containership, time spent 
by the container on the customs and time that container waited in front of terminal.  
On the next diagram we illustrated the difference between the total transportation 
times, for instance, from distribution centre (DC) 43 in China to the DC12 in EU 
and as other example the total transportation time from DC 41 in China to the 
DC15 in USA.  
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Fig. 33 Total transportation time for container in the network (without e-seals and with e-seal 
under 24 hour’s customs control) 
Figure 33 demonstrates a strong tendency to decrease transportation time in de-
pendence on which secure device was chosen for container integrity. This data 
shows that even in cases when customs control can be passed during the optimal 
time slot (in EU customs border control may takes less than 0.5 day), it is still pos-
sible to improve the whole container transportation process. In the situation when 
the customs scrutiny is a significant part of delivery time (as in a second illustra-
tion for DC41 to DC15; in USA customs formalities may take up to 15 days for 
each container shipment), it is a meaningful effect from electronic container intru-
sion detection technology that can shorten a transportation time and speed the de-
livery time of containers. 
The above considerations prove and make it evident that implementation of elec-
tronic devices can essentially accelerate the global container turnover. 
5.4.3 Impact on storage places  
Storage is an important constraining factor in logistics management for many 
ports. The terminal storage capacity depends on stacking heights, net storage area 
available, storage density (containers per acre), dwell times for empty containers, 
and break-bulk cargo (Chen, Fu, & Lim, 2004). The obtained simulation results do 
not affect directly the optimization of container storage in the ports.  
44,158
111,58
39,749
53,767
34,479 37,204
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
DC43 to DC12 DC41 to DC15
Ti
m
e,
 d
ay
s
w/o e-seals e-seal w/o routing decisions smart e-seal with routing decisions
  5.4  Analysis of simulation results 
 107 
Nevertheless, the fact, that application of electronic intrusion detection technology 
decreases the throughput time at terminals and in the whole system, it allows to es-
timate the indirect impact on the optimization processes in the port, in particular in 
communication sphere and in solving of optimization problems. In the case of 
dramatic drop down of time for customs checks in the ports (from the maximum of 
118.41 days to the maximum of 28.89 days) and a reduced time that containers 
spent in the stay-going-process in the queues in front of the terminal (more than 8 
days less) as it is simulated in the work, the storage places in the ports can be more 
effectively used by more containers. In our case, the simulation results show that 
under the same conditions in the ports but using the new securing and at the same 
time communication technology (e-seals) the container turnover in the port can in-
crease by 30-32% annually. In other words, using the same port storage territory 
the port can get higher utilization rate already on the storage places.  
Creation of new area for container storage territories requires very expensive in-
vestments for many ports. Moreover in many cases there are no more free spaces 
nearby a lot of mega-ports. Due to these reasons it is extremely difficult to build 
new container storage areas. Investments in new infrastructure for more secure 
container trade can bring a new utilization rate for port storage territory without 
any investments in its expansion or re-organization. 
The globalization of the world economy by which locations of productions and 
consumptions has been diversified into nations has resulted in rapid growth of de-
mands for the intermodal container transportation. Globalization in world trade has 
a great variety of environmental impacts extensively marked in numerous global 
change and climate change. The emergence of new markets, sectors, and new 
forms of competition results in an increase of trade and foreign direct investment. 
The general trend in international transport is clearly a growth in volume and dis-
tance and a modal shift to less environment friendly modes. If these trends contin-
ue, CO2 emissions caused by transport will lead to increasingly unsustainable out-
comes (van Veen-Groot & Nijkamp, 1999). 
In general, four categories of technologies for improvement of global environment 
can be distinguished, namely, an improvement of existing transport modes, the de-
velopment of new transport modes, improvement in the management of transport 
(such as logistics and route planning systems) and the development of alternative 
fuels (van Veen-Groot & Nijkamp, 1999). One of these directions is closely related 
to the enhancement of the safety and security situation in container logistics. Smart 
e-seals which are able to communicate with logistic operator/provider and react 
suitably on the real-time conditions during cargo transportation can improve the 
container transport management. 
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5.4.4 Environmental aspects 
It is reality that the transport sector is a significant contributor to local air pollution, 
noise annoyance and intrusion of landscapes, congestion, and high fatality rates. 
Transport also damages the global environment. It contributes to two prominent 
global environmental problems, namely, the greenhouse effect (global warming) 
and the depletion of the ozone layer. Certainly the heavy traffic jams of trucks at 
the gates of container terminals negatively affect the ecology. 
This thesis considers as well environmental damages caused by container conges-
tions in ports. Our simulation results (from the model simulated with help of 
MATLAB) are used to investigate how implementation of advanced secure devices 
on containers can reduce the congestion of trucks at a gate of container terminal 
and impact on ecological aspects of port industry. Truck delays associated with op-
erations at the Southern California ports (Giuliano & O'Brien, 2007); about 40% of 
all transactions, pick-ups or drop-offs of container, have an estimated wait times of 
over 2 h. Survey results showed that drivers spend a significant portion of their 
workday waiting at the ports (Giuliano & O'Brien, 2007). 
The simulation model simulates two possible alternatives: when containers are 
equipped with very simple electronic seals and when containers are modernized 
with smart technology, like smart e-seals. Based on simulation outcome the time 
that container with difference types of e-seals spent in the queues in front of the 
terminal gates is different as well. Unnecessary idling of trucks with containers 
wastes fuel and results in emissions that degrade local air quality and contribute to 
climate change.  
The percentage of shipments sent to the diverse U.S. secondary inspection stations 
varies from crossing to crossing but is generally consistent with the availability of 
inspection capacity. Customs strives to ensure that its NII equipment is kept con-
tinuously operating. The private-sector reports that, occasionally, port directors 
impose inspection blitzes where 100 percent of the vehicles entering the port dur-
ing a given time period are sent to an NII station. Officials at smaller ports of entry 
that lack NII equipment typically conduct higher rates of canine and manual nar-
cotics inspections. Approximately 10 to15 percent of shipments governed by the 
USDA are physically examined. 
The length of time commercial vehicles spend waiting for and undergoing second-
ary inspections is also highly variable. NII inspections take between 2 and 12 
minutes to complete but may require queuing times of 30 to 60 minutes. Delays for 
USDA and FDA inspections usually range from 20 to 45 minutes if an inspector is 
readily available. 
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Idling Time 1 hour 365 hours 
Engine Post 1995 Class 8  
Diesel Truck Engine 
Post 1995 Class 8 
Diesel Truck Engine 
RPM 800 800 
Fuel Consumption 4 litres 1,460 litres 
GHG Emissions 11.2 kg 4,008 kg 
PM 1 - 5 g 365 - 1,835 g 
NOx 140 g 51,000 g 
Cost of Diesel  
(99.9 cents/liter) 
$4.00 $1,458.54 
Table 13 Examples of trucks' idling impact (EPA, 2009) 
In the world the most giant container ports are situated near to the cities or inside 
them. Therefore, another important reason to reduce criteria air pollutants, carbon 
dioxide emissions, and toxic air emissions is an emerging issue for the transporta-
tion community in general and many metropolitan areas in particular. The resulting 
emissions related to truck idling include 163,000 metric tons (180,000 tons) of ni-
trogen oxides (NOx), 4,535 metric tons (5,000 tons) of particulate matter, and 9.98 
million metric tons (11 million tons) of carbon dioxide (CO2) per year. Environ-
mental Protection Agency US (EPA) estimates that approximately 500,000 to 1 
million long-haul trucks are in operation today, each idling anywhere from 1,800 
to 2,400 hours per year. EPA data have shown that a long-haul truck at idle for 1 
hour burns approximately 3.8 litters of diesel fuel. Cumulatively, idling wastes as 
much as 3.78 billion litters of fuel per year (EPA, 2009). Reducing unnecessary 
idling could save each truck over $3,000 in fuel costs, reduce air pollution, and cut 
19 metric tons of carbon dioxide annually. 
Hence, the simulated scenarios with using various types of container seals demon-
strated the ability of more advanced secure devices to invest in the saving of global 
environment. The ability of innovative technology to react on the changes in con-
tainer transportation situation in real-time and in need-time, promises to decrease 
the level of congestion at the port terminal gates. 
5.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis of container secure network 
The container industry has proven to be a remarkably efficient commercial system, 
designed to move goods through the international supply chain in the fastest way. 
The main drivers of the system are speed and low cost. The existing trend demon-
strates the importance of development and implementation of new security detect-
ing technology, like RFID e-seals in container transportation to achieve interna-
tional secure and efficient global trade. Here we propose a model for cost-benefit 
analysis to estimate potential costs and direct benefits through the implementation 
and use of RFID container electronic seals in global secure container network. We 
have the aim to create a cost/benefit model to prove the benefits from container se-
curity devices in new kind of transport networks – secure container networks. The 
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model is based on Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and developed within the Excel 
framework for fast analysis of requested secure networks or supply chains. In the 
next sections we describe and discuss the cost-benefit model for secure networks 
and present final the results and conclusions. 
5.5.1 General Description of Cost Benefit Model 
We consider a container network that connects China and Europe through contain-
er transportation. In this network the containers are equipped with container securi-
ty devices that use RFID technology. We assume that under such condition the 
container network will achieve several levels of safety and security. These security 
levels depend on the security/safety protection level of secure devices and their 
ability to provide container track-and-tracing during containers journey. 
In the research we propose the analysis that intends to estimate possible costs and 
benefits through the implementation and use of RFID container electronic seals in 
global secure container network. All supply chain data and cost information can be 
modified based upon actual information. Each benefit is based upon anticipated 
changes in supply chain performance that may or may not be realized (i.e. reduced 
inspections, reduced security costs, etc.) from using RFID e-seals technology. In 
the cost-benefit model (CB Model) we assume that infrastructure costs for ports 
(RFID reading equipment, container security devices, software, etc.) and individual 
intra-infrastructure costs are accounted to the shippers and customers. In this case 
ports and container terminal operators do not need to finance the building of RFID 
infrastructure, although it would require the legal allowances from their authorities. 
In this work we assume that all costs and further exploitation costs will be under-
taken by private sector (shipper/customers/service providers). Therefore, in the 
analysis it is assumed that ports and terminal operators or customs administrations 
are not purchased for any charges to use the security devices/infrastructures. There 
are several qualitative benefits for supply chains participants that have not been in-
cluded in CB Model. One of them is the ports competitive advantages from CSDs’ 
detection infrastructure. Ports can provide new kind of service for the innovative 
customers, which has already use e-seals in the transportation process. Another 
gain is that such ports are more attractive among others for new companies looking 
for the partners that can provide higher level of security and visibility for their car-
go flows. The benefits to shippers/customers such as brand protection and damage 
of reputation (contaminated goods or non-delivery of goods) or common benefits 
such as impact on global environment (i.e. reduction of port traffic congestion, re-
duction of air pollution via idling trucks at the ports etc.) have been not included as 
well. 
Here we propose the analysis which is intended to estimate possible costs and ben-
efits through the implementation and use of RFID container electronic seals in 
global secure container network (Scholz-Reiter, Haasis & Daschkovska, 2012). 
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5.5.2 Description of the initial conditions for Cost Benefit Model 
In this research work we consider two types of container electronic secure devices: 
 Electronic seal (simple e-seal) with basic functionality to detect container 
door breach and identify a location at pass points in container network via 
readers.  
 Advanced container electronic secure device (smart e-seal) with functionali-
ty such as ability to send alarm information about container status in real 
time and make routing decisions autonomously. The temperature or humidi-
ty sensors that may have additional costs and benefits are not included. 
Containerized cargo includes every commodity imaginable – retail such as clothing 
and electronics, foodstuffs, agricultural products and industrial goods. One 20' con-
tainer can hold 6,192shoeboxes, which might be equal to 61,192 EUR. One 20' 
container can hold 27,755 cartons of filtered cigarettes; and they are equal already 
to 555,110 EUR (if one carton (10 boxes) costs 20 EUR). However, when we con-
sider the costs for detection technology new infrastructure, then it is required to as-
sume some data essential for calculations on return on investments. 
Most benefits assigned primarily are to the shipper/consignee with some benefits 
being shared with container terminals and Customs administrations. The entire 
benefits obtained from using new technology in container logistics are intercon-
nected with all partners in supply chain and cannot be achieved by individual com-
pany or industry. The infrastructure investments for ports (such as RFID reading 
equipment, software) are also taken inti account in this analysis as well as individ-
ual intra-infrastructure investments for shippers and customers. The investments 
for ports or terminals might come to zero in case when technology providers or 
shippers/customers invest in it. We assume that all investments and further exploi-
tation will be undertaken by private sector (shipper/customers/service providers). 
Therefore, in the analysis we assume that ports and terminal operators or customs 
administrations do not invest in the security devices/infrastructures. 
We included only the direct benefits which are on the top of the pyramid of the po-
tential benefits from e-seals in container systems. In other words, the CBA deals 
with anticipated benefits from applying the RFID seals on containers such as re-
duced inspections, reduction in insurance costs and lead time variation costs, etc. 
Not all of these benefits might be realized in each supply chain based only on im-
plementation of e-seals in container processes. 
The qualitative benefits like ports competitive advantages from having RFID con-
tainer e-seal detection infrastructure by providing new kind of service for own in-
novative customers, that using e-seals, and open the port gates for new companies 
looking for the partners that can provide higher level of security and visibility for 
their cargo flows, etc. have not been included. The benefits to shippers/customers 
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such as brand protection and damage of reputation (contaminated goods or non-
delivery of goods) or common benefits such as impact on global environment (i.e. 
reduction in port traffic congestion, reduction of air pollution via idling trucks at 
the ports etc.) have been not included as well. 
We considered the results obtained from the simulated model of our container sys-
tem and found that the total throughput through secure network from origin point 
to destination point is 23,891 TEUs (T) yearly for container equipped with me-
chanical seals. An important aspect is transportation time under the customs in-
spections in the ports. This value is changing depend on the country of origin and 
destination.  
We apply the analysis to the various cases: 
1. Containers are equipped with different types of e-seals (simple e-seal and 
smart e-seal); 
2. Containers contain cargo with diverse cost values (namely, shoes and ciga-
rettes); 
3. Transportation time depends on shippers and customers geographical posi-
tions and the customs procedures in each country (two routes with container 
flows were chosen from China (DC 43) to Europe (DC12) and from China 
(DC41) to US (DC15) and vice versa). 
Case 01: container is equipped with simple e-seal and carries the shoeboxes from 
China to EU. 
Case 02: container is equipped with smart e-seal and carries the shoeboxes from 
China to EU. 
Case 03: container is equipped with simple e-seal and carries the cigarettes from 
China to EU. 
Case 04: container is equipped with smart e-seal and carries the cigarettes from 
China to EU. 
Case 05: container is equipped with simple e-seal and carries the shoeboxes from 
China to US. 
Case 06: container is equipped with smart e-seal and carries the shoeboxes from 
China to US. 
Case 07: container is equipped with simple e-seal and carries the cigarettes from 
China to US. 
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Case 08: container is equipped with smart e-seal and carries the cigarettes from 
China to US. 
The data for transportation time on different container routes were derived from 
the simulation model for container secure network (Table 14). The average values 
of transportation time information for two main global container flows China-
Europe and China-US are used to evaluate the cost-benefit analysis for container 
secure devices. 
Route Without e-seals, t1 With electronic seals, t2 
  Simple e-seals, Smart e-seals 
China – EU 44 days 40 days 34 days 
China – US 111 days 54 days 37 days 
Table 14 Average trip duration per container, days (author’s calculations) 
Table 15 introduces the general supply chain data required for cost benefit analysis 
of secure container network. The data of Table 15 consider the structure of the 
model of our container system as well as customs formalities procedure and costs 
for inspections. 
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General Container Network Information Abbr. Data 
Container turnover per year, TEU N 23,891 TEUs 
Average value of each container shipment, 2 types, € V 
61,192 € (cheap) 
555,110 € (expensive) 
Inventory costs, % α 5 % 
Insurance costs , % β 5 % 
Reduction in insurance costs due to e-seal use (expected), 
% 
βa 1 % 
Average reduction in containers lost/theft per year, % l 0,5 % 
Avoiding safeguards costs in shipper budget for securing 
containers, € 
Csec. 200 € 
Reduction in securing processes costs for shipper due to e-
seal use, % 
μ 
20 % (simple seals) 
75 % (smart seals) 
Transaction costs  for E-seal integrity verification per trip 
(at least 2 times per € 3), € 
Cinteg. 6 € 
Current customs (noninvasive) inspection rate for contain-
ers, % 
r 5 % 
Customs inspection rate for containers with e-seals, % ra 
2 % (simple seals) 
0 % (smart seals) 
Average costs for customs inspection , € Cinsp. 200 € 
Current secondary (invasive) inspection rate (physically), 
% 
r" 0,5 % 
Customs secondary inspection rate for containers with e-
seals, % 
r"a 
0,2 % (simple seals) 
0 % (smart seals) 
Average costs for customs secondary inspection, € C"insp. 1000 € 
Time delay via physical inspection, days td 3 days 
Table 15 General container network customs inspection information  
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To estimate the investment costs in network infrastructure it is required to analyse 
the structure of each port and possible changes in distribution centre equipment 
(handheld or fixed readers), the costs for container equipment with RFID seals and 
possible communication costs connected with system operation (Table 16). 
E-seals Infrastructure Information Abbr. Data 
Number of ports in the network  p 10 
Number of gates per port to be equipped with fixed readers pf 20 
Number handheld readers per port ph 20 
Number of shippers/customers DCs d 10 
Number of fixed readers per DC df 1 
Number handheld readers per DC dh 1 
Cost per fixed reader Cf 3000 €/unit 
Cost per handheld reader  Ch 500 €/unit 
E-seal cost per trip Ce 
0,50 € (simple seal) 
€ 50 € (smart seal) 
Security fee per container per port f 5 € 
Data communications costs per reader per year Ccomm. 
61,680 €/unit(simple 
seal) 
69,668 €/unit(smart 
seal) 
Cost of installation per fixed reader Cinst. 1,500 €/unit 
Cost of license for new service, other additional costs  Co € 5,000 € 
Table 16 E-seals infrastructure data in container network 
Therefore, the cost benefit model in order to obtain the total profit from the imple-
mentation of secure infrastructure in the whole network can be given in the follow-
ing form: 
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ܲ ൌ ሺܴ െ ܥሻ ௖ܰ௢௡௧ǤΤ  (39) 
where R is the total savings in the secure network and C is the total costs associat-
ed with implementation of required infrastructure for the network. 
Furthermore, we determine costs and savings in our model in order to evaluate the 
effect of implementation of container security devices to the logistic supply chain. 
5.5.3 Evaluation of infrastructure costs in cost-benefit model 
Here we introduce our model in order to evaluate total infrastructure, equipment 
(e-seals) and communication costs for the considered container network. The total 
infrastructure costs in the container network C consist of all costs needed to be as-
sessed in order to build a fully functional secure network, except costs mentioned 
earlier: 
ܥ ൌ෍ܥ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
ǡ ݊ ൌ ͷ 
(40) 
where ܥ௜ – different infrastructure costs; ݊ – number of investment costs modules. 
Total port infrastructure costs C1 can be obtained from the following formula: 
ܥଵ ൌ ݌ כ ൛݌௙ כ ൫ܥ௙ ൅ ܥ௜௡௦௧ ൅ ܥ௢൯ ൅ ݌௛ כ ܥ௛ൟ (41) 
We evaluate the distribution centres equipment infrastructure costs C2 via: 
ܥଶ ൌ ݀ כ ൛݀௙ כ ൫ܥ௙ ൅ ܥ௜௡௦௧ ൅ ܥ௢൯ ൅ ݀௛ כ ܥ௛ൟ (42) 
The next element of the total costs is container security device costs C3 can be ob-
tained from the following formula: 
ܥଷ ൌ ܥ௘ ൅ ʹ כ ݂ ൅ ܥ௜௡௧௘௚௥ (43) 
The e-seal’s costs per trip after the 2nd year of use should be evaluated with differ-
entiation between two types of e-seals considered in this research. Namely, the 
costs for usage of simple e-seals in the second year C6 simple are similar to each year. 
Simple e-seals cannot be applied for the second trip of the container as well as to 
be in operation after they are tampered with or broken by customs authorities for 
the physical checks of the containers.  
In contrast to that, smart e-seals are able to stay in operation for many container 
trips. In the first year of usage the main component of costs C3 for smart e-seals is 
the costs of the device itself. Therefore, during the usage of the container in 2nd and 
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the next years the costs, C6 consist of “additional cost per trip per port for security 
fee in the ports, f” and “cost per trip to verify seal integrity or check container door 
in the terminal, i”: 
ܥ଺௦௜௠௣௟௘ ൌ ܥଷ (44) 
ܥ଺௦௠௔௥௧ ൌ ݂ ൅ ݅ (45) 
Communication costs C4 for ports in the network and for each distribution centre 
C5 of same network we evaluate by mean of the following equations: 
ܥସ ൌ ܥ௖௢௠௠ כ ݌ כ ሺ݌௙ ൅ ݌௛ሻ (46) 
ܥହ ൌ ܥ௖௢௠௠ כ ݀ כ ሺ݀௙ ൅ ݀௛ሻ (47) 
Taking into consideration the initial data for network infrastructure (Table 17), the 
general investments in the whole container system were evaluated. 
 E-seals Infrastructure Costs 
Data 
Simple e-seal Smart e-seal 
Total port infrastructure costs 2,020,000.00 € 2,020,000.00 € 
Total distribution centres’ infrastructure costs 101,000.00 € 101,000.00 € 
E-seal costs per trip 16.50 € 316.00 €* 
E-seal costs per trip after 2nd year of use 16.50 € 16.00 € 
Data communications costs for port 13,933,600.00 € 13,933,600.00 € 
Data communications costs for distribution centres 696,680.00 € 696,680.00 € 
Table 17 Total infrastructure costs for container secure network 
In this section the fixed costs for acquisition of RFID devices and the appropriate 
equipment for reading and programming them as well as original costs of equip-
ment have been indicated and calculated. 
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5.5.4 Evaluation of direct benefits from usage of electronic secure 
devices in secure container network 
The total benefits that shipper/customers might acquire from investing in secure 
container network consist of reductions in inspection costs and securing the con-
tainer transportation processes, as well decrease in lead time variation in container 
transport system and insurance rates per container and dropping down the number 
of lost or theft container over the container system. The data for total benefits or 
savings in the system evaluation are obtained by using following equations. 
Total costs saving per container per trip in secure container network ܴ savings per 
container per trip for each type of possible benefitܴଵᇱ : 
ܴ ൌ෍ ௝ܴ
௞
௝ୀଵ
ǡ ݇ ൌ ͸ 
(48) 
 
௝ܴ
ᇱ ൌ ௝ܴܰ ǡ ݆ ൌ ͳǡ ݇
തതതതതǡ ݇ ൌ ͸ 
(49) 
where ௝ܴ– different infrastructure costs; ݇ – number of saving costs elements. 
One of the essential savings in secure container network can be achieved through 
the reductions in customs inspection costs ܴଵ and reductions in additional physical 
inspection costs ܴଶ: 
ܴଵ ൌ ܰ כ ܥ௜௡௦௣ כ ሺݎ െ ݎ௔) (50) 
ܴଶ ൌ ܰ כ ܥ௜௡௦௣ᇱᇱ כ ሺݎᇱᇱ െ ݎ௔ᇱᇱሻ ൅
ݐௗ
͵͸ͷ כ ߙ כ ܸ כ ݎ௔
ᇱᇱ 
(51) 
We obtain the further advantages in secure network from the reductions in avoid-
ing additional costs for container securing processܴଷ: 
ܴଷ ൌ ܰ כ ܥ௦௘௖ כ Ɋ (52) 
The improvement of the safety and security standards in the container transporta-
tion can impact the insurance rates for the container voyage. This benefit can be 
verified from the following equationܴସ: 
ܴସ ൌ ܰ כ ܸ כ ߚ כ ߚ௔ (53) 
Reliable and predictable container transportation processes will influence the sup-
ply chain lead time variation and can reduce the appropriate costs ܴହ: 
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ܴହ ൌ ܰ כ ܸ כ
ݐଶ െ ݐଵ
͵͸ͷ כ ߙ 
(54) 
We consider reductions of supply chain container lost or theft costs ܴ଺: 
ܴ଺ ൌ ܰ כ ܸ כ ݈ (55) 
After defining cost and benefit aspects of container secure network we make an 
analyses of our cost-benefit model. 
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As illustrated in the Table 18 the parameters have always positive values. In other 
words, even if the changes in containers transportation due to use of secure device 
are not too significant, the total profit per container trip still exists. The benefits are 
obtained from the implementation of additional security tracking technology (e.g. 
e-seals) that helps to achieve the maximum savings of costs for the whole network. 
In some cases the savings are essential (cases 04-06) comparing to other ones. This 
situation occurs because of differences in transport/customs clearance durations on 
different transport routes. If there is a possibility to avoid or to minimize lead time 
variations, it comes to vital reductions in transport time / lead time variations in se-
cure networks. 
Nevertheless, to achieve these savings it is required first to invest in the container 
network infrastructure. By means of return on investment analysis we are able to 
evaluate the investment by comparing the magnitude and timing of expected gains 
to the investment costs. 
5.5.5 Cost-benefit ratio for container secure networks 
Previously we have defined cost and savings parameters of secure container net-
work. In order to evaluate our model we consider the Cost Benefit Ratio of the 
whole transport system. The general formula the Ratio is following (Roulstone & 
Phillips, 2008): 
ܥܤܴ௡௘௧௪௢௥௞ ൌ ܤ݂݁݊݁݅ݐݏ ܥ݋ݏݐݏ்Τ  (56) 
CostsT are expenses that have been spent during the particular evaluation period to 
create the secure container network.  
T is a time period equal to 1 year. The CBRs are calculated taking into considera-
tion a 3 year (T=1, 2, 3) evaluation period for the whole container secure network. 
A proper Cost Benefit Ratio in the container network/container trip we can calcu-
late as follows: 
ܥܤܴ݌݁ݎܿ݋݊ݐǤ ൌ ܥܤܴ௡௘௧௪௢௥௞ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܥ݋݊ݐܽ݅݊݁ݎܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ 
(57) 
The cost-benefit ratios has been calculated based on 3 years period. The obtained 
results are shown below for the previously introduced supply chain scenarios (Ta-
ble 19). 
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Cases Total Cost per container 
trip after 3 year period, € 
Total Benefit per container 
trip after 3 year period, € 
Profit per container trip af-
ter 3 year period, € 
Case 01  660,41   113,89   -546,52  
Case 02  659,51   590,38   -69,53  
Case 03  660,41   630,72   -29,68  
Case 04  659,91   1512,58   852,67  
Case 05  660,41   563,44   -96,96  
Case 06  659,91   989,04   329,14  
Case 07  660,41   4660,98   4000,57  
Case 08  659,91   6379,30   5719,39  
Table 19 Results of cost benefit ratios 
The profit values for each case have been acquired from the proposed cost-benefit 
model and presented in the following tables. 
 
The analysis of cost-benefit ratio comparing between evaluated scenarios allows us 
to summarize that the last three cases 06-08 offer the best cost-benefit ratio values 
because of enormous dissimilarity in delivery time for each container before and 
after e-seals implementation in transportation process (Scholz-Reiter, Haasis & 
Daschkovska, 2012). 
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Fig. 34 Results of cost benefit analyses (case 01) 
Case 02: container is equipped with smart e-seal and carries “cheap” cargo from 
China to EU. 
 
Fig. 35 Results of cost benefit analyses (case 01) 
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Case 03: container is equipped with simple e-seal and carries “expensive” cargo 
from China to EU. 
 
Fig. 36 Results of cost benefit analyses (case 03) 
Case 04: container is equipped with smart e-seal and carries “expensive” cargo 
from China to EU. 
 
Fig. 37 Results of cost benefit analyses (case 04) 
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Case 05: container is equipped with simple e-seal and carries “cheap” cargo from 
China to US. 
 
Fig. 38 Results of cost benefit analyses (case 05) 
Case 06: container is equipped with smart e-seal and carries “cheap” cargo from 
China to US. 
 
Fig. 39 Results of cost benefit analyses (case 06) 
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Case 07: container is equipped with simple e-seal and carries “expensive” cargo 
from China to US. 
 
Fig. 40 Results of cost benefit analyses (case 07) 
Case 08: container is equipped with smart e-seal and carries “expensive” cargo 
from China to US. 
 
Fig. 41 Results of cost benefit analyses (case 08) 
719,77 € 675,25 € 660,41 €
4.660,98 €
3.941,20 € 3.985,72 € 4.000,57 €
- €
500,00 €
1.000,00 €
1.500,00 €
2.000,00 €
2.500,00 €
3.000,00 €
3.500,00 €
4.000,00 €
4.500,00 €
5.000,00 €
1 2 3
Total Cost per Container Trip Total Savings/Benefit per Container Trip
Cost Benefit Ratio per Container Trip
1.019,27 €
674,75 € 659,91 €
6.379,30 €
5.360,02 €
5.704,55 € 5.719,39 €
- €
1.000,00 €
2.000,00 €
3.000,00 €
4.000,00 €
5.000,00 €
6.000,00 €
7.000,00 €
1 2 3
Total Cost per Container Trip Total Savings/Benefit per Container Trip
Cost Benefit Ratio per Container Trip
  5.6  Summary 
 127 
The analysis of cost-benefit ratios allows us to compare the considered scenarios. 
Table 7 demonstrates that, for instance, cases 07-08 have got the best cost-benefit 
ratios values. For one, this is due to enormous dissimilarity in delivery time for 
each container before and after e-seals implementation in transportation process. 
Secondly, in the last two cases the containers transport high-value goods, e.g. ciga-
rettes. The value of transported goods is directly connected with evaluation of cost 
savings in secure model. 
In the cases 05-06 the dissimilarity in delivery time is also observed. Nevertheless, 
the CBRs are not as big as in previously described cases. This is caused by the 
lower cost value of the transported goods. As it has been mentioned, the value of 
transported goods has an essential meaning in estimation of costs and savings in 
the proposed secure model. On the other hand, from the view of the profit for the 
whole network, case 05 is not successful because of a negative profit value after 
the third year of e-seals implementation. 
The first four cases introduced in the Table 19 can be considered as the most objec-
tive. In those cases the distance factor, e.g. lead time variation savings, has no es-
sential impact on the final results in the model. The tendency of increasing of 
CBRs (cases 01-04) after each year of e-seals usage is presented. Therefore, it is 
difficult to define the most attractive project for implementation of container se-
cure model.  
However, the results obtained from comparison of other cost-benefit ratio values 
make it obvious that currently the most attractive venture project is the case 04. In 
this case there is a combination of smart e-seals on the containers and “expensive” 
value of container itself. In this case there are positive CBR as well as positive 
profit per container trip after the three years period are existed. In contradiction to 
the case 04, for instance, in case 03 CBR has also the positive scoring. However, 
the profit value after the third year is still not positive. It is important to mention 
that in both cases (03 and 04) the container are shipping the same high value cargo 
in the same network configuration. Nevertheless, the benefits from smart e-seals 
that are applied in the cases 04 in order to secure the routes have more vital influ-
ences on the network in total. 
However, it should be taken into account that each real-world element can affect 
the cost-benefit ratios in described modelling cases in positive or negative way. 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter we have investigated dynamical properties of a container transporta-
tion system distributed over two continents and consisting of 10 ports and 10 dis-
tribution centres. Container flows from each distribution centres on one continent 
with a destination at a distribution centre on the other continent were considered. 
Depending on the container equipment these flows are split into different terminals 
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in each port and go through different customs gates. The waiting queues at the ter-
minals can be of different length, the customs processing times at different gates 
depend on the container equipment. Queuing theory was applied to study the dy-
namics of average queue lengths inside of a particular port, i.e. for a network with 
a small size. We have seen that even in this relatively simple case the analytic solu-
tion is very cumbersome and that its derivation for a larger network is hardly pos-
sible. However it can be used for the prediction or optimization of local dynamics. 
To study a global dynamics, i.e., transportation process in a large realistic network, 
a simulation program was written in MATLAB that models the container flows 
depending on the queue lengths at the terminals and on the equipment of containers 
that can use the information about the queue lengths. In our simulations we have 
calculated such important parameters as the average global and local waiting times 
of containers at nodes, the total average time from source to destination for differ-
ent types of containers as well as the total container turnover per time unit. Three 
types of seals for containers were considered: usual mechanical seals, electronic 
seals without a possibility to make decisions and electronic seals with a possibility 
to make decision on the base of local information about the queue lengths at the 
nodes of their next transportation stage. 
In our simulations we have demonstrated that electronic devices improve all the 
relevant parameters and that the most efficient transportation dynamics is achieved 
by use of smart electronic seals that can make a decision, which waiting queue to 
choose depending on its length. All the above mentioned parameters are quantified 
depending on the percentage of the containers with and without electronic seals. 
We have explained that the shortening of the transportation times by use of e-seals 
can positively affect the size of the needed container storage areas in the ports. The 
positive effect for the ecology was also discussed. The next important question is 
about the expenses of investments needed to equip containers with e-seals to be 
able to profit from the above mentioned advantages. We proposed a cost-benefit 
analysis which is intended to estimate possible costs and benefits through the im-
plementation and use of RFID container electronic seals in global secure container 
network. We included only the direct benefits from e-seals in container systems. 
The cost-benefit analysis has been applied to eight different business cases and ap-
propriate cost-benefit ratios values were calculated. The most cost-effective project 
for investment in security technology is when containers carry a so called “expen-
sive” cargo, i.e. cigarettes, computers, alcohol bottles, or even dangerous cargo. 
Therefore, the investment in case of “expensive” cargo under such conditions be-
comes more attractive. We have shown that return of investments can be assured in 
this case within a few years.
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6 Summary and Outlook 
Currently the dynamics of global market and the complexity of container supply 
chains requires from their numerous participants to look for alternatives to increase 
efficiency and safety of container flows over the world and reduce costs, by organ-
ization of strong links in international supply chains. The role of new electronic 
devices to be implemented in global container transportation networks has been 
widely recognized as the potential of being driving forces in facilitation and accel-
eration of dynamic container flows. Simultaneously, the container industry has 
proven to be a remarkably efficient commercial system, designed to move goods 
through the international supply chain in the fastest way. Therefore, large capacity 
gains and substantial transit-time savings can be obtained from efficiency im-
provements and from the redefinition of the processes within transportation net-
works. 
The existing tendency demonstrates the importance of development and implemen-
tation of new security container detecting intrusion technology, namely, container 
electronic seals. In order to define and to explore the trade-off between security in-
ternational requirements and commerce companies, analysis of one of the technol-
ogies – RFID e-seals – promising to improve container transportation processes, 
have been evaluated in this doctoral research. 
The unpredictable changes in international affairs after events 9/11 have affected 
the global container traffic rules. The huge volume of container traffic plus the 
normal controls over cargo packing and shipping provide opportunities to intro-
duce weapons of mass destruction into a container at several stages of the supply 
chain. The amount of documentation, companies, and institutions involved over-
whelmed the customs inspection processes aimed to discover any illegal activities 
including theft of goods and vehicles, fraud, illegal immigration, drug and contra-
band smuggling, potential targeting dangerous goods and terrorist activities. We 
have shown that e-seals can simplify and improve these processes. 
Considering the benefits from RFID technology in container supply chains, there is 
still a lack of research about advantages from application of electronic seals on 
containers in logistics networks. However, there are numerous business benefits 
from implementation of new technology in container processes that have been ex-
amined and described within this work. E-seals allow importers, shipping compa-
nies, port officials and customs inspectors to determine, without a physical inspec-
tion, whether the container has been tampered with and the security of the contain-
er compromised. The challenges for e-seals implementation in global container 
system issue have been clarified as well. 
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It should be noted that the lack of a common global frequency for transmitting data 
as well as the high costs of electronic seals and supporting infrastructure represent 
significant barriers to implementation in private industry. Therefore, in this thesis 
the model for container transhipment through the terminal considering new regula-
tions for security and safety of container transport chains is developed to investi-
gate the possible impacts of container e-seal technology on container logistics and 
especially on the dynamics of container logistics processes in global transport net-
works and the evaluation of changes in dynamics of physical container flows 
through the global container supply chain. This model provides a possibility for 
costs-benefits analysis for implementation of e-seals. 
6.1 Research contributions 
The developed model in the doctoral work is based on the suggestion that the typi-
cal electronic seal with a small chip inside and some sensors can contain some lo-
gistics data which can be used during the transportation of a cargo. With help of an 
RFID chip a container can transmit and receive information. The electronic seal at-
tached to a container can be read at key checkpoints (terminal or distribution cen-
tres gates). It has been assumed that containers equipped with electronic seals can 
use the GreenLane advantage (“semi-free” moving through the ports or border 
crossing with minimum stops for security checks by customs). Two types of e-
seals have been considered: one is a simple e-seal, that to inform the authorized 
person about the electronic number and status of e-seal; a smart e-seal can transmit 
and receive information, the read information from advanced e-seal can be sent via 
the Internet or some other networks direct to the person, responsible for container 
delivery, who may take a routing decision for the container trip. 
Several theoretical models have been developed in order to solve the task based on 
queuing theory and discrete event simulations. First, a small container transporta-
tion system with queues in front of port gates for the cases when containers are 
equipped with e-seals was derived in the queuing theory framework. This model 
was compared with a scenario when containers are not equipped with e-seals. We 
have shown that analytic solutions can be found in these small networks. The next 
step is to model a more realistic scenario with a large number of nodes in the 
transportation network. However, the complexity and size of modelling system do 
not allow to obtain solutions analytically. We have demonstrated that the queuing 
theory is hardly possible to apply for large-scale networks. Therefore, discrete-
event simulations executed on the computer were performed for further analysis in 
our work. 
A model for container transhipment network that consists of 10 ports and 10 distri-
bution centres has been simulated with discrete-event method by using MATLAB 
software. The simulation has been presented for two alternative objectives: when 
containers transhipped through the maritime terminal are equipped with electronic 
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seals (with and without routing decisions), and, when containers are equipped only 
with mechanical seals. The simulations have established what impact each type of 
the container seals (mechanical seal, simple e-seal, and smart e-seal) has on global 
container flows. The flows of containers with mechanical seals demonstrated the 
conventional situation and have been chosen as the basis for container turnover 
comparing when container equipped with different types of e-seals and in various 
proportions, e.g. 10% of container are with e-seals and the rest 90% with conven-
tional mechanical seals. The implementation of new types of container seals, i.e. 
electronic seals, approved the feasible impact to make the global container system 
more effective, sustainable, and secure. 
Nevertheless, the return on investment for smart seals is difficult to quantify at this 
stage of electronic devices development, while the electronic shipment monitoring 
might pay for itself by reducing cargo theft and supply chain interruptions. Import-
ers, moreover, stand to benefit once Customs begins offering "fast lane" clearance 
for companies that use approved electronic seals on their inbound containers. 
The obtained simulation outcome has been applied in the proposed cost-benefit 
analysis to estimate possible costs and benefits through the implementation and use 
of RFID container electronic seals in global secure container network. In this work, 
we have proposed the cost-benefit model that intends to estimate possible costs and 
benefits through the implementation and use of RFID container electronic seals in 
global secure container network. E-seals can be an important element of the com-
plete solution for securing and improving of visibility for the shipments. We con-
sidered the e-seals’ benefits that are on the top of the pyramid of the potential prof-
it from e-seals in container systems. In other words, the CBA deals here with antic-
ipated benefits from applying the RFID seals on containers such as reduced inspec-
tions, reduction in insurance costs and lead time variation costs, etc. Not each of 
these benefits can be achieved in each supply chain based only on implementation 
of e-seals in container processes. 
The cost-benefit analysis has been applied to eight different business cases and ap-
propriate cost-benefit ratios values were estimated. The most cost-effective project 
for investment is achieved when containers move “expensive” cargo, i.e. ciga-
rettes, computers, alcohol bottles, or dangerous cargo, and are equipped with smart 
security technology. It is necessary to emphasize the critical influence of different 
factors as delivery time, different types of e-seals and different values of shipped 
goods on the decision for attractiveness of investment project. Another significant 
aspect is that most of the benefits in container secure model assigned primarily to 
the shipper/consignee can be shared with container terminals and customs admin-
istrations by indirect influence. The entire benefits obtained from the usage of the 
new technology in container logistics are interconnected with all partners in supply 
chain and cannot be achieved by individual company or industry. 
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The main contributions of the doctoral research can be summarized as follows: 
(i) The most feasible advantages of new container security technology (e-seals) 
and the framework of its application have been determined. 
 
(ii) The influence of different types of e-seals on the dynamics of container lo-
gistics flows in the global network has been simulated and modelled analyti-
cally; various scenarios have been developed and considered to include the 
most happened situations in the practical cases. 
 
(iii) The evaluation model based on the cost-benefit analysis have been proposed 
and approved by different business cases for adoption of different types of e-
seals in container system; the return on investment index have been calculat-
ed to compare investments in security electronic devices under different ini-
tial conditions. 
As a final conclusion we can say that e-seals are worth implementation in container 
logistics as they provide many benefits such as acceleration of container turnover, 
improved security and visibility of logistics container processes, possibility for 
control and decision making. Moreover one can expect the return on investments in 
a reasonable time.  
6.2 Further research 
Our work has shown that implementation of e-seals improves the container turno-
ver and provides monetary benefits. Further impacts as robustness properties in 
view of possible disturbances as accident route change or theft, impacts on ecology 
of environment, visibility effects are next possible directions of research. For ex-
ample an investigation of the supply chain visibility level considering different 
types of e-seals is of interest. It is known that various electronic seals confirmed or 
not by the standardized organizations bring different level of container process-
es/operations visibility. The efficiency of the whole shipper-customer container 
chain depends on the ability of electronic device on the container alerts regarding 
any disturbances along the transportation process. The seals' inventory-tracking 
capabilities can provide shippers with enough benefits to cover the expense of im-
plementing an electronic system.  
Another research direction is to investigate the ecological impact of applying e-
seals on maritime containers. As 90% of all cargo flows in the world is moving in 
maritime containers, any technology that can improve this transportation process 
has an influence on the global environment. In the world the most giant container 
port are cited near or inside urban areas. To reduce air pollutants, carbon dioxide 
emissions, and toxic air emissions are an emerging issue for the transportation 
community in general and many metropolitan areas in particular. As it has been in-
vestigated in this doctoral research the impact of e-seals on containers congestion 
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in the ports is considerable. Therefore, further investigation to measure and to 
model the advantage from improvement of daily congested situation in the ports by 
equipment of containers with advanced communication and security devices on the 
containers should be in the focus of the research. 
Moreover, the influence of container dynamics on the planning and allocation of 
containers in the port area have been considered in this research. The application of 
electronic intrusion detection technology has an effect on the decrease of the 
throughput time at terminals and in the whole system that has been computed in 
the research. This allows for estimation of the indirect impact of e-seals on the op-
timization processes in the port, in particular in communication sphere and in solv-
ing optimizing problems. In the case of dramatically dropping down of time for 
customs checks in the ports and a reduced time when containers are in idling pro-
cess in the queues in front of the terminal as it has been simulated in the doctoral 
work, the storage places in the ports can be more effectively used by more contain-
ers In other words, using the same port storage territory, the port can get higher uti-
lization rate already on the storage places. Investments in new infrastructure for 
more secure container trade can bring the new utilization rate for port storage terri-
tory without any investments in its expansion or re-organization. 
Since electronic seals can be used for control purposes it is of interest to develop 
related methods and in particular to use them for optimization of the container 
flows. Which information should be stored at the e-seals for this purpose has to be 
investigated. 
Finally, the new coming changes in security regulations of international container 
trade have already introduced the necessity to consider the smart container tech-
nology. The electronic seal device is an essential part of smart container design. 
Therefore, one of the next investigations could be the investments evaluation in 
new type of maritime containers as well as analysis of smart container technology 
influence on container dynamics and cost and benefits distribution between part-
ners in supply chains. 

7 Literature 
135 
7 Literature 
Administrative Committee for the Customs Convention on Containers. (2004). 
Amendment Proposals by Contracting Parties. Brussels. 
Armbruster, W. (2006, February 20). Security devices deter potential for cargo 
theft. The Shi already pping Digest Magazine. 
Averill, M. L. & Kelton, D. M. (1999). Simulation Modeling and Analysis. 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education. 
Balog, A., Lim, J. J. & Nettleton, K. (2005). Riding the wave on ship container 
seal and tracking system. 2005 Symposium on the global commerscialisation 
of environmental technologies.  
Banomyong, R. (2005). The impact of port and trade security initiatives on 
maritime supply chain management. Maritime Policy & Management, 32(1), 
pp. 3-13. 
Barlas, S. (2009). RFID Journal / ISO Reconsidering E-Seal specification. 
Retrieved June 22, 2009, from 
www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1696 
Barnes, P. & Oloruntoba, R. (2005). Assurance of security in maritime supply 
chains: Conceptual issues of vulnerability and crisis management. Journal of 
international Management, 11(4), S. 519-540. 
Bergami, R. (2009). U.S. Customs: The new 10 + 2 Rules. International Review of 
Business Research Papers, 5(2), pp. 273-282. 
Bichou, K. (2004). The ISPS Code and the cost of port compliance: an initial 
logistics and supply chain framework for port security assessment and 
management. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 4, pp. 322-348. 
Bichou, K. & Bell, M. G. (2007). Internationalisation and consolidation of the 
container port industry: Assesment of channel structure and relationships. 
International Journal of Maritime Economics and Logistics(9), pp. 35-51. 
Binnendijk, H., Caraher L. C., Coffey, T. & Wynfield, H. S. (2002). The virtual 
border: Countering seaborne container terrorism. Center for Technology 
and National Security Policy, National Defence University. 
  136
Bowersox, D. J., Closs, D. J. & Cooper, M. B. (2007). Supply chain logistics 
management. 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. (2008, November 25). Importer security 
filing and additional carrer requirenments. Federal Register, 73(228), 90-
113. 
Carroll, G. (2009, February / March). Seal Launch. Cargo Security International, 
pp. 52-53. 
Chen, P., Fu, Z. & Lim, A. (2004). Port yard storage optimization. IEEE 
Transactions on Automation Science and Engeneering, 1(1), 26-37. 
Chen, T. C. (2005, August 5). RFID and sensor-based container content visibility 
and seaport security monitoring system. (E. M. Carapezza, Ed.) Proc. SPIE 
5778, Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 
(C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, pp. 151-
159. 
Cho, H., Choi H. & Lee, W. (2006). LITeTAG: design and implemetation of an 
RFID system for IT-based port logistics. Journal of Communications, 1(4). 
Christ, P., Crass M. & Miyake, M. (2005). Container transport security accross 
modes. European Conference of Ministers of Transport and Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, S. 127. 
Chung, K. (2005). Secure cargo cargo container and supply chain management 
based on real-time end-to-end visibility and intrusion monitoring. New 
Jersey, USA: Avante International Technology. Retrieved November 12, 
2012, from Secure cargo cargo container and supply chain management 
based on real-time end-to-end visibility and intrusion monitoring: 
http://www.avantetech.com/uploads/pdf/Container%20Locating.pdf 
Clendenin, M. (2005, August 3). EE Times. Retrieved February 9, 2009, from 
South Korea rolls out RFID for cargo port: 
http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1195727 
Collins, J. (2005a, January 12). GE uses RFID to secure cargo. The RFID Journal. 
Collins, J. (2005b, March 10). Korean seaport tests RFID tracking. The RFID 
Journal. 
Collins, J. (2005c, March 10). Korean seaports test RFID tracking. RFID Journal. 
Retrieved June 18, 2007, from 
www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1438/1/12/ 
  137 
Crist, P. (2003). Security in maritime transport: Risk factors and economic impact. 
The Organisation foe Economic Co-opertaion and Development (OECD). 
Dahlman, O., Mackby, J. & Sitt, B. (2005). Container security: A proposal for a 
comprehensive code of conduct. National Defence, S. 31. 
Daschkovska, K. & Scholz-Reiter, B. (2007). Electronic seals for efficient 
container logistics. In H.-J. Kreowski, B. Scholz-Reiter, & H.-D. Haasis, 
Dynamics in Logistics (pp. 305-312). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Diop, A., Hartman, D. & Rexrode, D. (2007). Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism / Cost/Benefit Survey Results. Report by CSR, University of 
Virginia. 
DNV Consulting. (2005). Study on the impacts of possible European legislation to 
improve transport security. Final Report: Impact assesment. Antwerpen / 
Brussels: European Commission DG TREN. 
Domdouzis, K., Kumar, B. & Anumba, C. (2007). Radio-Frequency Identification 
(RFID) applications: A brief introduction. Advanced Engineering 
Informatics, 21(4), S. 350-355. 
Donath, M., Murray, D. & Short, J. (2005). Homeland security and tracking 
industry. Intellegent transportation systems Institute, Center for 
Transportation Studies, University of Minnesota. 
Downey, L. (2010). RFID Journal. Retrieved September 28, 2006, from 
International Cargo Conundrum: 
www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/2120/1/82 
EPA. (2009). Retrieved May 15, 2009, from US Environmental Protection Agency: 
http://epa.gov/ 
European Express Association. (2009). EEA News No. 14. Retrieved Mai 4, 2009, 
from www.euroexpress.org/documents/uploads/kd00_eea_news_14.pdf 
Field, A. M. (2005). Seals of approval. Journal of Commerce, 6(38), S. 46-48. 
Firestone, J. & Corbett, J. (2003). Maritime transportation: A third way for port 
and environmental security. Widener Law Symposium Journal(9), S. 419-
437. 
Fishman, G. S. (2001). Discrete-event simulation: modeling, programming and 
analysis. New York: Springer. 
  138
Friedlos, D. (2009). Taiwan customs officials adopt RFID-enabled container seals. 
RFID Journal. 
Gate Way Logistics Group, Inc. (2009). Retrieved May 26, 2009, from 
http://www.gateway-group.com/en/ert/29/ 
Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft e. V. (2009). Container 
Handbook. GDV, German Insurance Association. 
Ghiani, G., Laporte, G. & Musmanno, R. (2004). Introduction to logistics systems 
planning and control. Wiley Intersience Series in Systems and Optimization. 
Gilat, A. (2007). MATLAB: an introduction with applications. New York, USA: 
John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Giuliano, G. & O'Brien, T. (2007). Reducing port-related truck emission: The 
terminal gate appointment system at the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 12(7), 
S. 460-473. 
Gould, J. (2008). Supply chain security: an overview of theoretical applications. 
Bremen: International Graduate School for Dynamics in Logistics. 
GovTrack.U.S. (2005, November 15). 109th Congress: GreenLane Maritime 
Cargo Security Act. Retrieved April 28, 2009, from GovTrack.U.S.: 
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-2008 
Graybeal, M. & Pooch, U. W. (1980). Simulation: Principles and Methods. 
Cambridge: Mass.:Winthrop Publishers, Inc. 
Hadow, R. (2005). E-Seals and RFID. Journal of Commerce, 6(43), S. 58. 
Heideloff, C. & Stockmann, D. (2006). ISL Short Comments. Report by Institute of 
Shipping Economics and Logistics, Bremen. 
Hellström, D. (2009). The cost and process of implementing RFID technology to 
manage and control returnable transport items. International Journal of 
Logistics Research and Apllications: A Leading Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, 12(1), S. 1-21. 
Hickey, K. (2004). Insecurity over E-seals. Traffic World, 268(3), S. 34. 
Higgins, T., Dessouky, M. & Hall, R. (2000). Port operations: A review of 
practices. Los Angeles, U.S.: University of Southern California, Center for 
advanced transportation technologies. 
  139 
Hoffmann, F. (2006). Border security: Closing the ingenuity gap. Homeland 
Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpritations, S. 143-166. 
Horowitz, Z. (2005). Applications of Radio Frequency Identification technology to 
container security and tracking. Portland State University. 
Huang, S.-W., Lee, M.-T. & Gong, D. S. (April 2012). Implementing of passive 
RFID E-Seal system for transit container security: a case study of Kaohsiung 
Port. Advances in Transportation Studies, 26, S. 69-88. 
Hudson, S. (2009). Smart and Secure Tradelanes (SST). The Supply Chain 
Management (SCM) Information Portal. 
IELA. (2009). Retrieved January 25, 2009, from The International Exhibition 
Logistics Associates: http://www.iela.org/ 
ISO. (2005). ISO/DIS 18185 - 1 Freight Containers - Electronic seals - Part 1: 
Communication Protocol .  
ISO. (2006). Freight Containers - Electronic Seals - Part 7: Physical Layer. ISO 
TC 104 SC 4 / WG 2 N0264, ISO 18185-7, ISO / TC 104/ SC 4. 
Jackson, W. (2003, December 2). GCN / DHS plans smart seals for containers. 
Retrieved Oktober 26, 2006, from http://gcn.com/articles/2003/12/02/dhs-
plans-smart-seals-for-containers.aspx 
Johnston, R. G. (2003). Tamper-indicating seals: Practices, problems and 
standards. NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
Kendall, D. (1951). Some problems in the theory of queues. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), 13(2), 151-185. 
Kendall, D. G. (1953). Stochastic processes occurring in the theory of queues and 
their analysis by the method of the imbedded markov chain. The Annals of 
Mathematical Statistics, 24(3), 338-354. 
Kia, M., Shayan, E. & Ghotb, F. (2000). The importance of information 
technology in port terminal operations. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, 30(3), S. 331-344. 
Kleinrock, L. (1975). Queueing Systems. Wiley-Interscience. 
Koch-Menard, S. (2009). Trends in terrorist detection systems. Journal of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 6(1). 
  140
Lee, H. L. & Wolfe, M. (2003). Supply chain security without tears. Harvard 
Business Review, 7(1), S. 12-20. 
Le-Griffin, H. D. & Murphy, M. (2006). Container terminal productivity: 
experiences at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Report by 
Department of Civil Engineering, University of Southern California. 
Le-Pong, C. & Wu, C. (2004). The role of electronic container seal (E-Seal) with 
RFID technology in the container security initiatives. IEEE Computer 
Society / MEMS, NANO and Smart Systems, 2004. ICMENS 2004 
Proceedings., S. 116-120. 
Maps.google. (2009). Retrieved January 22, 2009, from https://maps.google.com/ 
Mayhew, C. (2001). The detection and prevention of cargo theft. Australian 
Institute of Criminalogy. 
McCormack, E., Jensen, M. & Hovde, A. (2010). Evaluating the Use of Electronic 
Door Seals (E-Seals) on Shipping Containers. International Journal of 
Applied Logistics (IJAL), 1(4). 
Meyer-Larsen, N., Lyridis, D., Müller, R. & Zacharioudakis, P. (2012). Improving 
intermodal container logistics and security by RFID. International Journal 
of RF Technologies: Research and Applications, 3(1), S. 15-38. 
Mikuriya, K. (2007). Supply chain security: The customs community's response . 
World Customs Journal, S. 51. 
Min, J. U. & Park, M. (June 2007). Electronic cargo seal for safe and secure supply 
chain traceability. Journal of International Logistics and Trade, 5(1), S. 47-
56. 
Monaco, K. & Grobar, L. (2004). A Study of Drayage at the Ports of Los Angeles 
and Long Beach. California Department of Transportation, University of 
Southern California. Metrans. 
Moskal, M. (2009). Case Study: The Reality of DF Technology Transition for 
Maritime Domain Awareness with a Focus on Container Security. (E. 
Shahbazian, G. Rogova, & M. J. DeWeert, Eds.) Harbour Protection 
Through Data Fusion Technologies, pp. 61-68. 
Mullen, D. (2005). The application of RFID technology in a port. Port Technology. 
Müller, J. (2005). Emerging technology in German port security: electronic 
container seals, U.S. Commercial Service, Germany. Abgerufen am 4. June 
  141 
2009 von 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/scdt/bizmap/interface2.nsf/vDownload/ISA_1962/$file/
X_9445346.PDF 
Müller, R. (2008). Developing a Security Event Management System for 
Intermodal Transport. (H.-J. Kreowski, B. Scholz-Reiter, & H.-D. Haasis, 
Eds.) Dynamics in Logistics / First International Conference, LDIC 2007, 
Bremen, Germany, August 2007, Proceedings, pp. 405-412. 
Ngai, E. W., Cheng, T. C. & Au, S. (2007). Mobile commerce integrated with 
RFID technology in a container depot. Decision Support Systems, 43, S. 62-
76. 
Nguyen, T. (2006, January 13). Fleet Owner. Retrieved July 18, 2007, from Port 
trucks get RFID’d: 
http://fleetowner.com/news/topstory/port_long_beach_los_angeles_rfid_truc
k_pierpass_011306 
Notteboom, T. E. (2004). Container shipping and ports: An overview. In E. J. 
Miravete, J. Panzar, M. Peitz, M. Rysman, & D. L. Weisman, Review of 
Network Economics (Vol. 3, pp. 86-106). 
O. Dahlman, J. M. (2005). Container Security: A Proposal for a Comprehensive 
Code of Conduct. National Defence. 
Panayides, P. M. (2006). Maritime logistics and global supply chains: Towards a 
research agenda. International Journal of Maritime Economics & Logistics, 
8(1), S. 3-18. 
Park, S., Lee, M. K. & Kim, D. K. (2005). Design of an authentication protocol for 
secure electronic seals. Cybernetics, Informatics and Systematics, S. 47-51. 
Plangprasopchoke, U.-K. & Muttitanon, W. (2013, March 8). Intelligent 
Evaluation for E-seal adoption in customs. Office of the Higher Education 
Commission. 
Prokop, D. (2004). Smart and safe borders: The logistics of inbound cargo security. 
The International Journal of Logistics Management, 15(2), S. 65-75. 
Regan, A. & Golob, F. T. (2000). Freight operator' perceptions of congestion 
problems and potential solutions in maritime intermodal operations in 
California. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 34(8), pp. 
587-605. 
  142
Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots. (2009). Retrieved April 
30, 2009, from U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/SFIReport_PublicRelease_FINAL
_Consolidated.pdf 
RFID Journal. (2002, September 3). E-Seals smooth border crossing. RFID 
Journal. Retrieved March 15, 2007, from 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?62 
Roberti, M. (31. Oktober 2005). RFID container seals deliver security, value. The 
RFID Journal. 
Robinson, R. (2002). Ports as elements in value-driven chain systems: the new 
paradigm. Maritime Policy & Management, 29(3), S. 241-255. 
Robinson, S. (2004). Simulation: The practice of model development and use. 
Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Robinson, S. (2005, June). Discrete-event simulation: from the pioneers to the 
present, what the next? Journal of the Operational Research Society, 56(6), 
619-629. 
Rodrigue, J.-P. (1999). Globalization and synchronization of transport terminals. 
Journal of transport Geography, 7(4), S. 255-261. 
S. 2459--109th Congress: GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security. (2006). 
GovTrack.us. Retrieved april 28, 2009, from 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s2459 
Sabbaghi, A. & Vaidyanathan, G. (2008). Effectiveness and efficiency of RFID 
technology in supply chain management: Strategic values and challenges. 
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, 3(2), S. 
71-81. 
Salmela, H., Toivonen, S. & Scholliers, J. (December 2010). Enhancing supply 
chain security with vulnerability management and new technology. 
Intelligent Transport Systems, IET, S. 307-317. 
Savi Technologies. (2002). Active and Passive RFID: Two Distinct, But 
Complementary, Technologies for Real-Time Supply Chain Visibility Active 
and Passive RFID: Two Distinct, But Complementary, Technologies for 
Real-Time Supply Chain Visibility. Savi Technologies. Von 
www.autoid.org/2002_Documents/sc31_wg4/docs_501-520/520_18000-
7_WhitePaper.pdf abgerufen 
  143 
Schwartz, E. (2004). The cost of safe commerce. Info World, 26(45), S. 16. 
Sciomachen, A., Acciaro, M. & Liu, M. (2009). Operations research methods in 
maritime transport and freight logistics. International Journal of Maritime 
Economics & Logistics, 11(1), pp. 1-6. 
Sea-Rates.com. (2009). Retrieved January 22, 2009, from 
http://www.searates.com/ 
Seidelmann, C. (2005). Enhanced security in containerised trade: The contribution 
of standartisation. Workshop: Sicherheit der Internationalen Container-
Versorgungskette, ISO TC 104 SC 4 Freight Containers.  
Seymour, L. F., Lambert-Porter, E. & Willuweit, L. (2008). An RFID Adoption 
Framework: A Container Supply Chain Analysis. In G. M. D. Avison, 
Advances in Information Systems Research, Education and Practice / IFIP 
20th World Computer Congress, TC 8, Information Systems, September 7-
10, 2008, Milano, Italy (S. 175-188). 
Seymour, L., Lambert-Porter, E. & Willuweit, L. (2007). RFID adoption into the 
container supply chain: Proposing a framework. Proceedings of the 6th 
Annual ISOnEworld Conference, (S. 1-15). Las Vegas, NV. 
Silverman, R. B. & Seely, R. F. (September 2007). Global Compliance Readiness. 
The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Inc.(15). Abgerufen am 25. October 
2008 von http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/October/17.pdf 
Simchi-Levi, D., Kaminsky, P. & Simchi-Levi, E. (2007). Designing and 
managing the supply chain. McGraw-Hill. 
(2008). Special Report: Container security: Congress debates the feasibility of 
scanning 100 percent of US-bound container cargo. Representative of 
German Industry and Trade. Retrieved September 25, 2008 
Stahlbock, R. & Voss, S. (2008). Operations research at container terminals: a 
literature update. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer. 
Steenken, D., Voß, S. & Stahlbock, R. (2004). Container terminal opertation and 
operations research - a classification and literature review. (Springer-Verlag, 
Hrsg.) OR Spectrum, S. 3-49. 
Swedberg, C. (2006, July 14). Georgia Cargo Terminals becoming RFID-enabled. 
The RFID Journal. 
  144
Thai, V. V. (2007). Impacts of security improvements on service quality in 
maritime transport: An empirical study of Vietnam. International Journal of 
Maritime Economics & Logistics, 9(4), S. 335-356. 
The Drewry Shipping Consultants. (2006). The Drewry container market 
quarterly.  
Tirschwell, P. (2005). An opportunity from container seals. Journal of Commerce, 
6(6), S. 54. 
Tongzon, J. & Heng, W. (2005). Port privatization, efficiency and competitiveness: 
Some empirical evidence from container ports (terminals). Transportation 
Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 39(5), S. 405-424. 
Transportation Information Service. (2009). Retrieved May 25, 2009, from 
www.tis-gdv.de 
Tsilingiris, P. S., Psaraftis, H. N. & Lyrdis, D. V. (2007a). Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) Technology in ocean container transport. International 
Association of Maritime Economists conference “Challenges and Trends in 
Shipping” (IAME 2007). Athens, Greece. 
Tsilingiris, P., Psaraftis, H. & Lyridis, D. (2007b). RFID-enabled innovative 
solutions promote container security. The Annual International Symposium 
on Maritime Safety, Security and Environmental Protection (SSE07). 
Athens, Greece. 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2004). Securing the global supply chain: 
Customs trade partnership against terrorism (C-TPAT) strategic plan .  
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2007). U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 
Retrieved March 23, 2007, from 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/legacy/2002
/112002/11012002_4.xml#contacts 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2006). Container Security Initiative: 
2006-2011 Strategic Plan. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Von 
Container security initiatives. abgerufen 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008, November 24). Fact Sheet: New 
cargo security requirenments for maritime carriers and importers. USA. 
Retrieved December 15, 2008, from 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1227548591399.shtm 
  145 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2008). Retrieved April 27, 2009, from 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-126T 
UNCTAD. (2003). Transport Newsletter No. 22. United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. 
UNCTAD. (2004). Report: Container Security: Major Initiatives and Related 
International Developments. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Developments. UNCTAD. 
UNCTAD. (2005). Review of Maritime Transport 2005. United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. 
UNCTAD secretariat. (2004). Container security: Major initiatives and related 
international developments. Switzerland: The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
van de Voort, M., O'Brien, K. A. & Rahman, A. (2003). Seacurity: Improving the 
security of the global sea-container shipping system. RAND Europe. 
van Veen-Groot, D. B. & Nijkamp, P. (1999). Globalisation, transport and the 
environment: new perspectives for ecological economics. Ecological 
Economics, 31(3), 331-346. 
Vis, I. F. & de Koster, R. (2003). Transshipment of containers at a container 
terminal: An overview. European Journal of Operational Research, 147(1), 
S. 1-16. 
Wan, T. B., Wah, E. L. & Meng, L. C. (1992). The use of information technology 
by the port of Singapore authority. World Development, 20(12), S. 1785-
1795. 
Werner, S., Schuldt, A. & Daschkovska, K. (2007). Agent-based container security 
systems: an interdisciplinary perspective. Lecture Notes in Informatics. 37th 
Annual Conference of the German Society for Computer Science, (pp. 11-
16). Bremen. 
Willie, H. (2004). Book Reviews.  
Willis, H. H. & Ortiz, D. S. (2004). The technical report: Evaluating the security 
of the global containerized supply chain. The RAND Corporation. 
Winkowski, T. S. (2008). Container seals on maritime cargo. U. S. Customs and 
Border Protection. USA: Federal Register. Retrieved January 11, 2009, from 
www.edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-18174.pdf 
  146
Witt, C. E. (2008). 25,000 E-Seal Shipments and Counting. Logistics Today, 49(3), 
4. Retrieved February 15, 2008, from 
www.morerfid.com/details.php?subdetail=Report&action=details&report_id
=3995 
Wolfe, M. (2002). Technology to enhance freight transportation security and 
productivity. International Freight Security and Productivity Workshop , 
Long Beach. 
World Shipping Council. (2006, July 26). Comments on the "International 
Container Standards Organization" and its effort to propose new standards 
for container security technologies. World Shipping Council, pp. 1-9. 
Zhang, J. & Zhang, C. (2007). Smart Container Security: the E-seal with RFID 
Technology. Modern Applied Science, 1(3), S. 16-18. 
Zhang, J., Liu, Y., Yu, C. & Zhang, C. (March 2008). Smart container security - 
the E-seal with RFID technology. International Journal of Marine 
Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 2(1), S. 99-101. 
 
8 Appendix 
147 
8 Appendix 
8.1 Formulation and Formalization of Supply Network Model 
function[]=supplynet 
%SUPPLYNET() 
% 
%This function is the simulation for a supply network. This network 
%has 4 columns and N1, N2, N3 and N4 rows. The rows are usually less or 
%equal than 4, but the function has no boundaries for the number of rows. 
% 
%SUPPLYNET has no output variables. The results of this function are saved 
%in the global variables NODE12, NODE23, NODE34, NODE43, NODE32 and NODE21 
%of datatypestruct.NODExy save the accumulated client departures to node 
%'y' from a node 'x'. NODExy.queuek1 (NODExy.queuek2) contains the 
%accumulated departure number at the time NODExy.timek1 (NODExy.timek2) for 
%the class k=1 (k=2). 
% 
%There are four families of input matrices: 
% 
%1.)lambdasdk 
% 
%lambda is the name for the input rate. The start column is denoted with 
%'s' the destination column is denoted with 'd'. Each input produces two 
%classes of clients which go through the network. The class is denoted with 
%'k' and either 1 or 2. 
%The row in lambdasdk denotes the row in column s in which the current  
%client starts, the columns denote the row of the destination column. 
% 
%   lambdasdk \in IR^(Ns x Nd) 
% 
% 
%2.)mucn 
% 
%mu is the name for the processing rate at each entry of the next supply 
%node in the network. This entry only occur at the nodes of columns 2 and 3 
%because at 1 and 4 the clients either leave the network or enter it. 'c' 
%denotes the current column (either 2 or 3) and 'n' denotes the next 
%column.mucn has two columns, the first contains the processing rates for 
%class k=1 and the second for the class k=2. 
% 
%   mucn \in IR^(Nc x 2) 
% 
% 
%3.& 4.)shipminst&shipmaxst 
% 
%'s' denotes one end-column, 't' the other end-column of a transport route, 
%e.g. trans23. The time a transport needs is rectangle distributed with the 
%minimum shipmin and the maximum shipmax. The rownumbers of shipmin 
%(shipmax) denotes the row numbers in the 's'-column, the columns of 
%shipmin (shipmax) denote the rows in the 't'-column. 
% 
%   shipminst,shipmaxst \in IR^(Ns x Nt) 
 
 
%All time variables are saved as single floats and all counting variables 
%are saved as int32 to save memory. 
 
%------------------------------input variables----------------------------- 
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%standard variable to ease the definition of N1, N2, N3 and N4 in the case 
%of N1=N2=N3=N4. 
N=3; 
 
%lambda_START_DESTINATION_K 
global lambda14k1 lambda41k1 lambda14k2 lambda41k2; 
 
lambda14k1=[ 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ; 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ; 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ];%... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ;... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ;... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ]; 
 
lambda14k2=[ 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ; 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ; 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ];%... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ;... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ;... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ]; 
 
lambda41k1=[ 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ; 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ; 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ];%... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ; ... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ;... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ]; 
 
lambda41k2=[ 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ; 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ; 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ];%... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ;... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ;... 
%              0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 , 0.1 ]; 
 
%mu_currentcolumn_nextcolmun 
global mu23 mu34 mu21 mu32; 
 
mu23=[ 0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
0.01 , 0.01 ];% ... 
%        0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
%        0.01 , 0.01 ]; 
 
mu34=[ 0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
0.01 , 0.01 ];% ... 
%        0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
%        0.01 , 0.01 ]; 
 
mu21=[ 0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
0.01 , 0.01 ];% ... 
%        0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
%        0.01 , 0.01 ]; 
 
mu32=[ 0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
0.01 , 0.01 ]; %... 
%        0.01 , 0.01 ; ... 
%        0.01 , 0.01 ]; 
 
% shipmin_currentcolumn_nextcolumn 
global shipmin12 shipmin23 shipmin34; 
 
% shipmin12=[ 0.01 , 0.01 ; 0.01 , 0.01 ]; 
shipmin12=[ 0.4 , 0.4 , 0.4 ; 0.4 , 0.4 , 0.4 ; 0.4 , 0.4 , 0.4 ];% ... 
%             0.4 , 0.4 , 0.4 , 0.4 ; ... 
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%             0.4 , 0.4 , 0.4 , 0.4 ; ... 
%             0.4 , 0.4 , 0.4 , 0.4 ]; 
 
shipmin23=[ 0.1 , 0.2 , 0.6 ; ... 
0.2 , 0.4 , 1.2 ; ... 
0.6 , 1.2 , 1.5 ;]; 
 
% shipmin23=[ 5 , 1 , 2 , 7 ; ... 
%             3 , 0.5 , 1 , 5 ; ... 
%             5 , 1 , 0.5 , 3 ; ... 
%             7 , 2 , 1 , 5 ]; 
 
shipmin34=shipmin12; 
% shipmin34=[ 0.01, 0.01 ; 0.01 , 0.01]; 
% shipmin34=[ 0.3 , 0.4 , 0.5 , 0.6 ; ... 
%             0.4 , 0.3 , 0.4 , 0.5 ; ... 
%             0.5 , 0.4 , 0.3 , 0.4 ; ... 
%             0.6 , 0.5 , 0.4 , 0.3 ]; 
 
%shipmax_currentcolumn_nextcolumn 
global shipmax12 shipmax23 shipmax34; 
 
% shipmax12=[ 0.02 , 0.02 ; 0.02 , 0.02]; 
shipmax12=[ 2 , 2 , 2 ; 2, 2 , 2 ; 2 , 2 , 2 ]; %... 
%             2 , 2 , 2 , 2 ; ... 
%             2 , 2 , 2 , 2 ; ... 
%             2 , 2 , 2 , 2 ]; 
 
% shipmax23=shipmax12; 
shipmax23=[ 0.4 , 0.6 ,   1 ; ... 
0.6 , 1.2 , 1.8 ; ... 
1 , 1.8 ,   3 ;]; 
 
% shipmax23=[  , 3 , 4 , 8 ; ... 
%             4 , 2 , 3 , 6 ; ... 
%             6 , 3 , 2 , 4 ; ... 
%             8 , 4 , 3 , 6 ]; 
 
shipmax34=shipmax12; 
% shipmax34=[ 0.02 , 0.02 ; 0.02 , 0.02]; 
% shipmax34=[ 0.5 , 0.6 , 0.7 , 0.8 ; ... 
%             0.6 , 0.5 , 0.7 , 0.8 ; ... 
%             0.7 , 0.6 , 0.5 , 0.6 ; ... 
%             0.8 , 0.7 , 0.6 , 0.5 ]; 
 
%SIMEND defines the end of the simulation: 
global SIMEND; 
SIMEND=30; 
 
%----- 
global N1 N2 N3 N4; 
N1=N; 
N2=N; 
N3=N; 
N4=N; 
 
%----- 
%check whether all declarations are correct: 
errorcheck(N1,N2,N3,N4); 
disp('---'); 
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disp('All input variables are checked, no errors were found.'); 
disp('---'); 
%----- 
 
%----------------define simulation start values---------------------------- 
%The queue saves the times, when the last client at a node will be 
%finished. 
global queue; 
queue=struct('p2d1',zeros(N2,2),'p2d3',zeros(N2,2),'p3d2',zeros(N3,2),'p3d4',
zeros(N3,2)); 
 
%The Q_LENGTH counts the number of clients in the processing queue in the 
%entrance of each harbour. 
global Q_LENGTH21 Q_LENGTH23 Q_LENGTH32 Q_LENGTH34; 
Q_LENGTH21=struct('k1',int32(0),'time1',single(0),'k2',int32(0),'time2',singl
e(0)); 
Q_LENGTH23=struct('k1',int32(0),'time1',single(0),'k2',int32(0),'time2',singl
e(0)); 
Q_LENGTH32=struct('k1',int32(0),'time1',single(0),'k2',int32(0),'time2',singl
e(0)); 
Q_LENGTH34=struct('k1',int32(0),'time1',single(0),'k2',int32(0),'time2',singl
e(0)); 
for two=1:N1 
    Q_LENGTH21(two).k1=int32(0); 
    Q_LENGTH21(two).k2=int32(0); 
    Q_LENGTH23(two).k1=int32(0); 
    Q_LENGTH23(two).k2=int32(0); 
    Q_LENGTH21(two).time1=single(0); 
    Q_LENGTH21(two).time2=single(0); 
    Q_LENGTH23(two).time1=single(0); 
    Q_LENGTH23(two).time2=single(0); 
end 
for three=1:N3 
    Q_LENGTH32(three).k1=int32(0); 
    Q_LENGTH32(three).k2=int32(0); 
    Q_LENGTH34(three).k1=int32(0); 
    Q_LENGTH34(three).k2=int32(0); 
    Q_LENGTH32(three).time1=single(0); 
    Q_LENGTH32(three).time2=single(0); 
    Q_LENGTH34(three).time1=single(0); 
    Q_LENGTH34(three).time2=single(0); 
end 
 
%NODE saves the accumulated clients which have passed each node. 
global NODE12 NODE21 NODE23 NODE32 NODE34 NODE43; 
NODE12=makenode(N1,N2); 
NODE21=makenode(N2,N1); 
NODE23=makenode(N2,N3); 
NODE32=makenode(N3,N2); 
NODE34=makenode(N3,N4); 
NODE43=makenode(N4,N3); 
 
global LENGTH12 LENGTH21 LENGTH23 LENGTH32 LENGTH34 LENGTH43; 
LENGTH12=makenode(N1,N2); 
LENGTH21=makenode(N2,N1); 
LENGTH23=makenode(N2,N3); 
LENGTH32=makenode(N3,N2); 
LENGTH34=makenode(N3,N4); 
LENGTH43=makenode(N4,N3); 
 
%-----make input times: inputtime(start,destination).k----- 
disp('Start making input times.'); 
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%global inputtime14 inputtime41; 
inputtime14=makeinput(lambda14k1,lambda14k2,SIMEND); 
inputtime41=makeinput(lambda41k1,lambda41k2,SIMEND); 
disp('Input times are made.'); 
disp('---'); 
 
%---and make the INPPUTSAVE----- 
global INPUTSAVE14 INPUTSAVE41; 
INPUTSAVE14=struct('k1',0,'time1',0,'k2',0,'time2',0); 
INPUTSAVE41=struct('k1',0,'time1',0,'k2',0,'time2',0); 
for ind1=1:N1 
for ind4=1:N4 
INPUTSAVE14(ind1,ind4).k1=int32(0); 
INPUTSAVE41(ind4,ind1).k1=int32(0); 
INPUTSAVE14(ind1,ind4).k2=int32(0); 
INPUTSAVE41(ind4,ind1).k2=int32(0); 
INPUTSAVE14(ind1,ind4).time1=single(0); 
INPUTSAVE41(ind4,ind1).time1=single(0); 
INPUTSAVE14(ind1,ind4).time2=single(0); 
INPUTSAVE41(ind4,ind1).time2=single(0); 
end%for ind4=1:N4 
end%for ind1=1:N1 
%---and now the OUTPUTSAVE----- 
global OUTPUTSAVE14 OUTPUTSAVE41; 
OUTPUTSAVE14=INPUTSAVE14;%struct('k1',0,'time1',0,'k2',0,'time2',0); 
OUTPUTSAVE41=INPUTSAVE41;%struct('k1',0,'time1',0,'k2',0,'time2',0); 
% for ind1=1:N1 
%     for ind4=1:N4 
%         OUTPUTSAVE14(ind1,ind4).k1=int32(0); 
%         OUTPUTSAVE41(ind4,ind1).k1=int32(0); 
%         OUTPUTSAVE14(ind1,ind4).k2=int32(0); 
%         OUTPUTSAVE41(ind4,ind1).k2=int32(0); 
%         OUTPUTSAVE14(ind1,ind4).time1=single(0); 
%         OUTPUTSAVE41(ind4,ind1).time1=single(0); 
%         OUTPUTSAVE14(ind1,ind4).time2=single(0); 
%         OUTPUTSAVE41(ind4,ind1).time2=single(0); 
%     end %for ind4=1:N4 
% end %for ind1=1:N1 
global DURATION14 DURATION41; 
DURATION14=INPUTSAVE14; 
DURATION41=INPUTSAVE41; 
for ind1=1:N1 
for ind4=1:N4 
DURATION14(ind1,ind4).k1=single(0); 
DURATION41(ind4,ind1).k1=single(0); 
DURATION14(ind1,ind4).k2=single(0); 
DURATION41(ind4,ind1).k2=single(0); 
end%for ind4=1:N4 
end%for ind1=1:N1 
 
 
%transxy contains the times a transport needs from x to y. If the time 
%value is positive the transport goes from x to y, if the time value is 
%negative the transport goes from y to x. 
global trans12 trans23 trans34; 
trans12=struct('arr',zeros(N1,N2),'dep',zeros(N1,N2)); 
trans23=struct('arr',zeros(N2,N3),'dep',zeros(N2,N3)); 
trans34=struct('arr',zeros(N3,N4),'dep',zeros(N3,N4)); 
 
%-----make processing times----- 
%disp('Start making processing times.'); 
%global process; 
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process=makeprocess(mu21,mu23,mu32,mu34); 
%disp('Processing times are made.'); 
%disp('---'); 
 
%---make shipment times--- 
disp('Start making shipment times'); 
global shipment12 shipment23 shipment34; 
shipment12=makeshiptime(shipmin12,shipmax12,SIMEND); 
shipment23=makeshiptime(shipmin23,shipmax23,SIMEND); 
shipment34=makeshiptime(shipmin34,shipmax34,SIMEND); 
disp('Shipment times are made.'); 
disp('---'); 
 
%---define matrices for easy time comparison--- 
prodtime14k1=zeros(N1,N4); 
prodtime14k2=zeros(N1,N4); 
prodtime41k1=zeros(N4,N1); 
prodtime41k2=zeros(N4,N1); 
 
for ind1=1:N1 
for ind4=1:N4 
%transfer values into the matrices: 
prodtime14k1(ind1,ind4)=inputtime14(ind1,ind4).k1(1); 
prodtime14k2(ind1,ind4)=inputtime14(ind1,ind4).k2(1); 
prodtime41k1(ind4,ind1)=inputtime41(ind4,ind1).k1(1); 
prodtime41k2(ind4,ind1)=inputtime41(ind4,ind1).k2(1); 
 
%delete the transfered values: 
inputtime14(ind1,ind4).k1=inputtime14(ind1,ind4).k1(2:end); 
inputtime14(ind1,ind4).k2=inputtime14(ind1,ind4).k2(2:end); 
inputtime41(ind4,ind1).k1=inputtime41(ind4,ind1).k1(2:end); 
inputtime41(ind4,ind1).k2=inputtime41(ind4,ind1).k2(2:end); 
end%for ind4 
end%for ind1 
 
prodtime14k1=single(prodtime14k1); 
prodtime14k2=single(prodtime14k2); 
prodtime41k1=single(prodtime41k1); 
prodtime41k2=single(prodtime41k2); 
%--------------------start values are defined------------------------------ 
 
 
%ontheway=[current col-
umn,currentrow,nextcolumn,nextrow,arrivaltime,destination column, destination 
row,k-type, start column, start row, start time]; 
%if a client is waitin for a transport, the arrival time is set to SIMEND. 
globalontheway; 
ontheway=[0,0,0,0,SIMEND,0,0,0,0,0,0]; 
ontheway=single(ontheway); 
 
%time is just the time 
global time; 
time=0; 
time=single(time); 
 
%theese two variables are for a time output during the simulation 
counter=1; 
factor=5; 
 
disp(['The simulation has a duration of ',int2str(SIMEND),' time units.']); 
disp(' '); 
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disp('Starting the simulation...'); 
 
while time<SIMEND 
 
%This time output is only to be sure that the simulation is still 
%runnig, especially if it needs long time. 
if time>=counter*factor 
counter=counter+1; 
disp(['The current time is ',num2str(time),'.']); 
end 
 
%At the bottom of this main loop the next smallest event-time is chosen 
%to be the new time.Whith this switch the event to time is searched. 
switch time 
 
%put the produced clients in the system 
%first for k==1 
case min(min(prodtime14k1)) 
%search the produced client 
            [start,dest]=get_the_index(time,prodtime14k1,N1,N4); 
 
%send the client: 
            onthe-
way=[[1,start,2,start,SIMEND,4,dest,1,1,start,time];ontheway]; 
 
%set the next prodtime: 
prodtime14k1(start,dest)=inputtime14(start,dest).k1(1); 
 
%and delete that time: 
inputtime14(start,dest).k1=inputtime14(start,dest).k1(2:end); 
 
%increase the QUEUElength 
            
NODE12(start,start).queuek1=[int32(NODE12(start,start).queuek1(1)+1);NODE12(s
tart,start).queuek1]; 
NODE12(start,start).timek1=[time;NODE12(start,start).timek1]; 
            
LENGTH12(start,start).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH12(start,start).queuek1(1)+1);LENG
TH12(start,start).queuek1]; 
LENGTH12(start,start).timek1=[time;LENGTH12(start,start).timek1]; 
 
%save the input clients to compare them with the output clients 
            IN-
PUTSAVE14(start,dest).k1=[int32(INPUTSAVE14(start,dest).k1(1)+1);INPUTSAVE14(
start,dest).k1]; 
INPUTSAVE14(start,dest).time1=[time;INPUTSAVE14(start,dest).time1]; 
 
case min(min(prodtime41k1)) 
%search the produced client 
            [start,dest]=get_the_index(time,prodtime41k1,N4,N1); 
 
%send the client: 
            onthe-
way=[[4,start,3,start,SIMEND,1,dest,1,4,start,time];ontheway]; 
 
%set the next prodtime: 
prodtime41k1(start,dest)=inputtime41(start,dest).k1(1); 
 
%and delete that time: 
inputtime41(start,dest).k1=inputtime41(start,dest).k1(2:end);  
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%increase the QUEUElength 
            
NODE43(start,start).queuek1=[int32(NODE43(start,start).queuek1(1)+1);NODE43(s
tart,start).queuek1]; 
NODE43(start,start).timek1=[time;NODE43(start,start).timek1]; 
            
LENGTH43(start,start).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH43(start,start).queuek1(1)+1);LENG
TH43(start,start).queuek1]; 
LENGTH43(start,start).timek1=[time;LENGTH43(start,start).timek1]; 
 
%save the input clients to compare them with the output clients 
            IN-
PUTSAVE41(start,dest).k1=[int32(INPUTSAVE41(start,dest).k1(1)+1);INPUTSAVE41(
start,dest).k1]; 
INPUTSAVE41(start,dest).time1=[time;INPUTSAVE41(start,dest).time1]; 
 
%then for k==2 
case min(min(prodtime14k2)) 
%search the produced client: 
            [start,dest]=get_the_index(time,prodtime14k2,N1,N4); 
 
%search the fastest route: 
next=best_route(1,start,4,dest); 
 
%send the client: 
            onthe-
way=[[1,start,2,next,SIMEND,4,dest,2,1,start,time];ontheway]; 
 
%set the next prodtime: 
prodtime14k2(start,dest)=inputtime14(start,dest).k2(1); 
 
%and delete that time: 
inputtime14(start,dest).k2=inputtime14(start,dest).k2(2:end); 
 
%increase the QUEUElength 
            
NODE12(start,next).queuek2=[int32(NODE12(start,next).queuek2(1)+1);NODE12(sta
rt,next).queuek2]; 
NODE12(start,next).timek2=[time;NODE12(start,next).timek2]; 
            
LENGTH12(start,next).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH12(start,next).queuek2(1)+1);LENGTH
12(start,next).queuek2]; 
LENGTH12(start,next).timek2=[time;LENGTH12(start,next).timek2]; 
 
%save the input clients to compare them with the output clients 
            IN-
PUTSAVE14(start,dest).k2=[int32(INPUTSAVE14(start,dest).k2(1)+1);INPUTSAVE14(
start,dest).k2]; 
INPUTSAVE14(start,dest).time2=[time;INPUTSAVE14(start,dest).time2]; 
 
case min(min(prodtime41k2)) 
%search the produced client: 
            [start,dest]=get_the_index(time,prodtime41k2,N4,N1); 
 
%search the fastest route: 
next=best_route(4,start,1,dest); 
 
%send the client: 
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            onthe-
way=[[4,start,3,next,SIMEND,1,dest,2,4,start,time];ontheway]; 
 
%set the next prodtime: 
prodtime41k2(start,dest)=inputtime41(start,dest).k2(1); 
 
%and delete that time: 
inputtime41(start,dest).k2=inputtime41(start,dest).k2(2:end); 
 
%increase the QUEUElength 
            
NODE43(start,next).queuek2=[int32(NODE43(start,next).queuek2(1)+1);NODE43(sta
rt,next).queuek2]; 
NODE43(start,next).timek2=[time;NODE43(start,next).timek2]; 
            
LENGTH43(start,next).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH43(start,next).queuek2(1)+1);LENGTH
43(start,next).queuek2]; 
LENGTH43(start,next).timek2=[time;LENGTH43(start,next).timek2]; 
 
%save the input clients to compare them with the output clients 
            IN-
PUTSAVE41(start,dest).k2=[int32(INPUTSAVE41(start,dest).k2(1)+1);INPUTSAVE41(
start,dest).k2]; 
INPUTSAVE41(start,dest).time2=[time;INPUTSAVE41(start,dest).time2]; 
 
%arrival of a transport 
 
case min(min(abs(trans12.arr))) 
%search the arriving transporter 
            [one,two]=get_the_index(time,abs(trans12.arr),N1,N2); 
 
%finding out how much clients are on the way: 
            ALL=size(ontheway); 
            ALL=ALL(1); 
 
if trans12.arr(one,two)>0 %if it started at 1 and is arriving at 2 
 
%checking the queues at that node: 
queue.p2d3(two,1)=max(queue.p2d3(two,1),time); 
queue.p2d3(two,2)=max(queue.p2d3(two,2),time); 
 
 
%processing the arriving clients 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[1,one,2,two,time] 
 
%set the new processing time: 
                        onthe-
way(cl,1:5)=[2,two,2,two,queue.p2d3(two,ontheway(cl,8))+process(two,ontheway(
cl,8)).p2d3(1)]; 
%make a new processing time: 
                        pro-
cess(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d3=single(expval(mu23(two,ontheway(cl,8)))); 
%                         %and delete the old one: 
%                         if size(process(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d3)>=[1,2] 
%                             pro-
cess(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d3=process(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d3(2:end); 
%                         else 
%                             warning('Simulation has run out of processing 
times. New times are being calculated now.'); 
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%                             new-
proc=makeprocess(mu21,mu23,mu32,mu34,0.2*SIMEND); 
%                             pro-
cess(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d3=newproc(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d3; 
%                             newproc=[]; 
%                             disp(['New processing times for pro-
cess(',int2str(two),',',int2str(ontheway(cl,8)),').p2d3 are calculated. time: 
',num2str(time)]); 
%                         end 
 
%do not forget to give the queue a new finishing 
%time: 
queue.p2d3(two,ontheway(cl,8))=ontheway(cl,5); 
 
%and to count it as freshly arrived: 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if Q_LENGTH23(two).time1(1)~=time 
                                
Q_LENGTH23(two).k1=[int32(Q_LENGTH23(two).k1(1)+1);Q_LENGTH23(two).k1]; 
                                
Q_LENGTH23(two).time1=[time;Q_LENGTH23(two).time1]; 
else%i.e. more than one client arrive at the same time 
                                
Q_LENGTH23(two).k1(1)=Q_LENGTH23(two).k1(1)+1; 
end 
 
else%i.e. ontheway(cl,8)==2 
if Q_LENGTH23(two).time2(1)~=time 
                                
Q_LENGTH23(two).k2=[int32(Q_LENGTH23(two).k2(1)+1);Q_LENGTH23(two).k2]; 
                                
Q_LENGTH23(two).time2=[time;Q_LENGTH23(two).time2]; 
else%i.e. more than one client arrive at the same time 
                                
Q_LENGTH23(two).k2(1)=Q_LENGTH23(two).k2(1)+1; 
end 
end 
 
end 
end 
 
 
%new arrival time for the transporter: 
trans12.arr(one,two)=-(time+shipment12(one,two).time(1)); 
trans12.dep(one,two)=time; 
 
%and delete that time: 
shipment12(one,two).time=shipment12(one,two).time(2:end); 
 
%catch the clients which leaves to 1 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[2,two,1,one,SIMEND]; 
ontheway(cl,5)=-trans12.arr(one,two); 
 
%decrease the (LENGTH.)queuelength 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if time~=LENGTH21(two,one).timek1(1) %This if asks whether this event occurs 
on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
                                
LENGTH21(two,one).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH21(two,one).queuek1(1)-
1);LENGTH21(two,one).queuek1]; 
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LENGTH21(two,one).timek1=[time;LENGTH21(two,one).timek1]; 
else 
LENGTH21(two,one).queuek1(1)=LENGTH21(two,one).queuek1(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if sum(size(LENGTH21(two,one).queuek1))~=sum(size(LENGTH21(two,one).timek1)) 
error('Size Matters! line 349'); 
end%if size~=size 
else 
if time~=LENGTH21(two,one).timek2(1) %This if asks whether this event occurs 
on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
                                
LENGTH21(two,one).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH21(two,one).queuek2(1)-
1);LENGTH21(two,one).queuek2]; 
LENGTH21(two,one).timek2=[time;LENGTH21(two,one).timek2]; 
else 
LENGTH21(two,one).queuek2(1)=LENGTH21(two,one).queuek2(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if sum(size(LENGTH21(two,one).queuek2))~=sum(size(LENGTH21(two,one).timek2)) 
error('Size Matters! line 359'); 
end%if size~=size 
end%ontheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
end 
 
 
 
else%then it started at 2 and is arriving at 1 
 
%processing the arriving clients 
for cl=ALL:-1:1 
ifontheway(cl,1:7)==[2,two,1,one,time,1,one] 
%Every deleted client is counted: 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
                            OUT-
PUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k1=[OUTPUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k1(1)+1;
OUTPUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k1]; 
                            OUT-
PUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).time1=[time;OUTPUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).
time1]; 
 
%save the trip duration: 
                            DURATION41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k1=[time-
ontheway(cl,11);DURATION41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k1]; 
                            DURA-
TION41(ontheway(cl,10),one).time1=[time;DURATION41(ontheway(cl,10),one).time1
]; 
 
else 
                            OUT-
PUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k2=[OUTPUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k2(1)+1;
OUTPUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k2]; 
                            OUT-
PUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).time2=[time;OUTPUTSAVE41(ontheway(cl,10),one).
time2]; 
 
%save the trip duration: 
                            DURATION41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k2=[time-
ontheway(cl,11);DURATION41(ontheway(cl,10),one).k2]; 
                            DURA-
TION41(ontheway(cl,10),one).time2=[time;DURATION41(ontheway(cl,10),one).time2
]; 
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end%if ontheway(cl,8)==1 
 
 
 
%deleting the client from 'ontheway', because they 
%are arriving at their final destination 
ontheway=[ontheway(1:cl-1,:);ontheway(cl+1:end,:)]; 
 
end%if 
end%for 
 
%size of 'ontheway' could have changed in the lines above: 
                ALL=size(ontheway); 
                ALL=ALL(1); 
 
%new arrival time for the transporter: 
trans12.arr(one,two)=time+shipment12(one,two).time(1); 
trans12.dep(one,two)=time; 
 
%and delete that damn old time: 
shipment12(one,two).time=shipment12(one,two).time(2:end); 
 
%catch the clients which leaves to 2 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[1,one,2,two,SIMEND]; 
ontheway(cl,5)=trans12.arr(one,two); 
 
%decrease the (LENGTH.)queuelength 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if time~=LENGTH12(one,two).timek1(1) %This if asks whether this event occurs 
on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
                                
LENGTH12(one,two).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH12(one,two).queuek1(1)-
1);LENGTH12(one,two).queuek1]; 
LENGTH12(one,two).timek1=[time;LENGTH12(one,two).timek1]; 
else 
LENGTH12(one,two).queuek1(1)=LENGTH12(one,two).queuek1(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if sum(size(LENGTH12(one,two).queuek1))~=sum(size(LENGTH12(one,two).timek1)) 
error('Size Matters! line 403'); 
end%if size~=size 
else 
if time~=LENGTH12(one,two).timek2(1) %This if asks whether this event occurs 
on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
                                
LENGTH12(one,two).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH12(one,two).queuek2(1)-
1);LENGTH12(one,two).queuek2]; 
LENGTH12(one,two).timek2=[time;LENGTH12(one,two).timek2]; 
else 
LENGTH12(one,two).queuek2(1)=LENGTH12(one,two).queuek2(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if sum(size(LENGTH12(one,two).queuek2))~=sum(size(LENGTH12(one,two).timek2)) 
error('Size Matters! line 413'); 
end%if size~=size 
end%if ontheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
end 
end 
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case min(min(abs(trans23.arr))) 
%search the arriving transporter 
            [two,three]=get_the_index(time,abs(trans23.arr),N2,N3); 
 
%finding out how much clients are on the way: 
            ALL=size(ontheway); 
            ALL=ALL(1); 
 
if trans23.arr(two,three)>0 %if it started at 2 and is arriving at 3 
 
%checking the quenes at that node: 
queue.p3d4(three,1)=max(queue.p3d4(three,1),time); 
queue.p3d4(three,2)=max(queue.p3d4(three,2),time); 
 
%processing the arriving clients 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[2,two,3,three,time] 
%give a processing time two the arriving clients 
                        onthe-
way(cl,1:5)=[3,three,3,three,queue.p3d4(three,ontheway(cl,8))+process(three,o
ntheway(cl,8)).p3d4(1)]; 
%make a new processing time: 
                        pro-
cess(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d4=single(expval(mu34(three,ontheway(cl,8)))); 
%                         %and delete that time from the process stack: 
%                         if size(process(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d4)>=[1,2] 
%                             pro-
cess(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d4=process(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d4(2:end); 
%                         else 
%                             warning('Simulation has run out of processing 
times. New times are being calculated now.'); 
%                             new-
proc=makeprocess(mu21,mu23,mu32,mu34,0.2*SIMEND); 
%                             pro-
cess(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d4=newproc(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d4; 
%                             newproc=[]; 
%                             disp(['New processing times for pro-
cess(',int2str(three),',',int2str(ontheway(cl,8)),').p3d4 are calculated. 
time: ',num2str(time)]); 
%                         end 
%new queue time: 
queue.p3d4(three,ontheway(cl,8))=ontheway(cl,5); 
 
%and to count it as freshly arrived: 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if Q_LENGTH34(three).time1(1)~=time 
                                
Q_LENGTH34(three).k1=[int32(Q_LENGTH34(three).k1(1)+1);Q_LENGTH34(three).k1]; 
                                
Q_LENGTH34(three).time1=[time;Q_LENGTH34(three).time1]; 
else%i.e. more than one client arrive at the same time 
                                
Q_LENGTH34(three).k1(1)=Q_LENGTH34(three).k1(1)+1; 
end 
 
else%i.e. ontheway(cl,8)==2 
if Q_LENGTH34(three).time2(1)~=time 
                                
Q_LENGTH34(three).k2=[int32(Q_LENGTH34(three).k2(1)+1);Q_LENGTH34(three).k2]; 
  160
                                
Q_LENGTH34(three).time2=[time;Q_LENGTH34(three).time2]; 
else%i.e. more than one client arrive at the same time 
                                
Q_LENGTH34(three).k2(1)=Q_LENGTH34(three).k2(1)+1; 
end 
end 
 
end 
end 
 
 
%new arrival time for the transporter: 
trans23.arr(two,three)=-(time+shipment23(two,three).time(1)); 
trans23.dep(two,three)=time; 
 
%and delete ... - you know it, buddy! 
shipment23(two,three).time=shipment23(two,three).time(2:end); 
 
%catch the clients which leaves to 2 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[3,three,2,two,SIMEND]; 
ontheway(cl,5)=-trans23.arr(two,three); 
 
%decrease the (LENGTH.)queuelength 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if time~=LENGTH32(three,two).timek1(1) %This if asks whether this event oc-
curs on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
                                
LENGTH32(three,two).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH32(three,two).queuek1(1)-
1);LENGTH32(three,two).queuek1]; 
LENGTH32(three,two).timek1=[time;LENGTH32(three,two).timek1]; 
else 
LENGTH32(three,two).queuek1(1)=LENGTH32(three,two).queuek1(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if 
sum(size(LENGTH32(three,two).queuek1))~=sum(size(LENGTH32(three,two).timek1)) 
error('Size Matters! line 478'); 
end%if size~=size 
else 
if time~=LENGTH32(three,two).timek2(1) %This if asks whether this event oc-
curs on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
                                
LENGTH32(three,two).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH32(three,two).queuek2(1)-
1);LENGTH32(three,two).queuek2]; 
LENGTH32(three,two).timek2=[time;LENGTH32(three,two).timek2]; 
else 
LENGTH32(three,two).queuek2(1)=LENGTH32(three,two).queuek2(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if 
sum(size(LENGTH32(three,two).queuek2))~=sum(size(LENGTH32(three,two).timek2)) 
error('Size Matters! line 488'); 
end%if size~=size 
end%if ontheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
end 
 
else%then it started at 3 and is arriving at 2 
 
%checking the quenes at that node: 
queue.p2d1(two,1)=max(queue.p2d1(two,1),time); 
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queue.p2d1(two,2)=max(queue.p2d1(two,2),time); 
 
 
%processing the arriving clients 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[3,three,2,two,time] 
%check this out: yeah, like before... 
                        onthe-
way(cl,1:5)=[2,two,2,two,queue.p2d1(two,ontheway(cl,8))+process(two,ontheway(
cl,8)).p2d1(1)]; 
%make a new processing time: 
                        pro-
cess(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d1=single(expval(mu21(two,ontheway(cl,8)))); 
%                         %and delete it: 
%                         if size(process(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d1)>=[1,2] 
%                             pro-
cess(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d1=process(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d1(2:end); 
%                         else 
%                             warning('Simulation has run out of processing 
times. New times are being calculated now.'); 
%                             new-
proc=makeprocess(mu21,mu23,mu32,mu34,0.2*SIMEND); 
%                             pro-
cess(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d1=newproc(two,ontheway(cl,8)).p2d1; 
%                             newproc=[]; 
%                             disp(['New processing times for pro-
cess(',int2str(two),',',int2str(ontheway(cl,8)),').p2d1 are calculated. time: 
',num2str(time)]); 
%                         end 
%the new queue time: 
queue.p2d1(two,ontheway(cl,8))=ontheway(cl,5); 
 
%and to count it as freshly arrived: 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if Q_LENGTH21(two).time1(1)~=time 
                                
Q_LENGTH21(two).k1=[int32(Q_LENGTH21(two).k1(1)+1);Q_LENGTH21(two).k1]; 
                                
Q_LENGTH21(two).time1=[time;Q_LENGTH21(two).time1]; 
else%i.e. more than one client arrive at the same time 
                                
Q_LENGTH21(two).k1(1)=Q_LENGTH21(two).k1(1)+1; 
end 
 
else%i.e. ontheway(cl,8)==2 
if Q_LENGTH21(two).time2(1)~=time 
                                
Q_LENGTH21(two).k2=[int32(Q_LENGTH21(two).k2(1)+1);Q_LENGTH21(two).k2]; 
                                
Q_LENGTH21(two).time2=[time;Q_LENGTH21(two).time2]; 
else%i.e. more than one client arrive at the same time 
                                
Q_LENGTH21(two).k2(1)=Q_LENGTH21(two).k2(1)+1; 
end 
end 
 
end 
end 
 
%new arrival time for the transporter: 
trans23.arr(two,three)=time+shipment23(two,three).time(1); 
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trans23.dep(two,three)=time; 
 
%and delete that time: 
shipment23(two,three).time=shipment23(two,three).time(2:end); 
 
 
%catch the clients which leaves to 3 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[2,two,3,three,SIMEND]; 
ontheway(cl,5)=trans23.arr(two,three); 
 
%decrease the (LENGTH.)queuelength 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if time~=LENGTH23(two,three).timek1(1) %This if asks whether this event oc-
curs on an new time point, otherwise the events are batched to need less 
space 
                                
LENGTH23(two,three).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH23(two,three).queuek1(1)-
1);LENGTH23(two,three).queuek1]; 
LENGTH23(two,three).timek1=[time;LENGTH23(two,three).timek1]; 
else 
LENGTH23(two,three).queuek1(1)=LENGTH23(two,three).queuek1(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if 
sum(size(LENGTH23(two,three).queuek1))~=sum(size(LENGTH23(two,three).timek1)) 
error('Size Matters! line 544'); 
end%if size~=size 
else 
if time~=LENGTH23(two,three).timek2(1) %This if asks whether this event oc-
curs on an new time point, otherwise the events are batched to need less 
space 
                                
LENGTH23(two,three).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH23(two,three).queuek2(1)-
1);LENGTH23(two,three).queuek2]; 
LENGTH23(two,three).timek2=[time;LENGTH23(two,three).timek2]; 
else 
LENGTH23(two,three).queuek2(1)=LENGTH23(two,three).queuek2(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if 
sum(size(LENGTH23(two,three).queuek2))~=sum(size(LENGTH23(two,three).timek2)) 
error('Size Matters! line 554'); 
end%if size~=size 
end%if ontheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
end 
end 
 
 
case min(min(abs(trans34.arr))) 
%search the arriving transporter 
            [three,four]=get_the_index(time,abs(trans34.arr),N3,N4); 
 
%finding out how much clients are on the way: 
            ALL=size(ontheway); 
            ALL=ALL(1); 
 
if trans34.arr(three,four)>0 %if it started at 3 and is arriving at 4 
 
%processing the arriving clients 
for cl=ALL:-1:1 
ifontheway(cl,1:7)==[3,three,4,four,time,4,four] 
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%Every deleted client is counted: 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
                            OUT-
PUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k1=[OUTPUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k1(1)+
1;OUTPUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k1]; 
                            OUT-
PUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four).time1=[time;OUTPUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four
).time1]; 
 
%save the trip duration: 
                            DURATION14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k1=[time-
ontheway(cl,11);DURATION14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k1]; 
                            DURA-
TION14(ontheway(cl,10),four).time1=[time;DURATION14(ontheway(cl,10),four).tim
e1]; 
 
else 
                            OUT-
PUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k2=[OUTPUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k2(1)+
1;OUTPUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k2]; 
                            OUT-
PUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four).time2=[time;OUTPUTSAVE14(ontheway(cl,10),four
).time2]; 
 
%save the trip duration: 
                            DURATION14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k2=[time-
ontheway(cl,11);DURATION14(ontheway(cl,10),four).k2]; 
                            DURA-
TION14(ontheway(cl,10),four).time2=[time;DURATION14(ontheway(cl,10),four).tim
e2]; 
 
end%if ontheway(cl,8)==1 
 
%deleting the client from 'ontheway', because they 
%are arriving at their final destination 
ontheway=[ontheway(1:cl-1,:);ontheway(cl+1:end,:)]; 
end%if 
end%for 
 
%size of 'ontheway' could have changed in the lines above: 
                ALL=size(ontheway); 
                ALL=ALL(1); 
 
%new arrival time for the transporter: 
trans34.arr(three,four)=-(time+shipment34(three,four).time(1)); 
trans34.dep(three,four)=time; 
 
%and delete the old one: 
shipment34(three,four).time=shipment34(three,four).time(2:end); 
 
%catch the clients which leaves to 3 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[4,four,3,three,SIMEND]; 
ontheway(cl,5)=-trans34.arr(three,four); 
 
%decrease the (LENGTH.)queuelength 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if time~=LENGTH43(four,three).timek1(1) %This if asks whether this event oc-
curs on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
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LENGTH43(four,three).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH43(four,three).queuek1(1)-
1);LENGTH43(four,three).queuek1]; 
LENGTH43(four,three).timek1=[time;LENGTH43(four,three).timek1]; 
else 
LENGTH43(four,three).queuek1(1)=LENGTH43(four,three).queuek1(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if 
sum(size(LENGTH43(four,three).queuek1))~=sum(size(LENGTH43(four,three).timek1
)) 
error('Size Matters! line 606'); 
end%if size~=size 
else 
if time~=LENGTH43(four,three).timek2(1) %This if asks whether this event oc-
curs on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
                                
LENGTH43(four,three).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH43(four,three).queuek2(1)-
1);LENGTH43(four,three).queuek2]; 
LENGTH43(four,three).timek2=[time;LENGTH43(four,three).timek2]; 
else 
LENGTH43(four,three).queuek2(1)=LENGTH43(four,three).queuek2(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if 
sum(size(LENGTH43(four,three).queuek2))~=sum(size(LENGTH43(four,three).timek2
)) 
error('Size Matters! line 616'); 
end%if size~=size 
end%if ontheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
end 
 
else%then it started at 4 and is arriving at 3 
 
%checking the queues at that node: 
queue.p3d2(three,1)=max(queue.p3d2(three,1),time); 
queue.p3d2(three,2)=max(queue.p3d2(three,2),time); 
 
%processing the arriving clients 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[4,four,3,three,time] 
%the processing procedure: 
                        onthe-
way(cl,1:5)=[3,three,3,three,queue.p3d2(three,ontheway(cl,8))+process(three,o
ntheway(cl,8)).p3d2(1)]; 
%make a new processing time: 
                        pro-
cess(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d2=single(expval(mu32(three,ontheway(cl,8)))); 
%                         %deleeeeeeete: 
%                         if size(process(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d2)>=[1,2] 
%                             pro-
cess(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d2=process(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d2(2:end); 
%                         else 
%                             warning('Simulation has run out of processing 
times. New times are being calculated now.'); 
%                             new-
proc=makeprocess(mu21,mu23,mu32,mu34,0.2*SIMEND); 
%                             pro-
cess(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d2=newproc(three,ontheway(cl,8)).p3d2; 
%                             newproc=[]; 
%                             disp(['New processing times for pro-
cess(',int2str(three),',',int2str(ontheway(cl,8)),').p3d2 are calculated. 
time: ',num2str(time)]); 
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%                         end 
%the new queue time: 
queue.p3d2(three,ontheway(cl,8))=ontheway(cl,5); 
 
%and to count it as freshly arrived: 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if Q_LENGTH32(three).time1(1)~=time 
                                
Q_LENGTH32(three).k1=[int32(Q_LENGTH32(three).k1(1)+1);Q_LENGTH32(three).k1]; 
                                
Q_LENGTH32(three).time1=[time;Q_LENGTH32(three).time1]; 
else%i.e. more than one client arrive at the same time 
                                
Q_LENGTH32(three).k1(1)=Q_LENGTH32(three).k1(1)+1; 
end 
 
else%i.e. ontheway(cl,8)==2 
if Q_LENGTH32(three).time2(1)~=time 
                                
Q_LENGTH32(three).k2=[int32(Q_LENGTH32(three).k2(1)+1);Q_LENGTH32(three).k2]; 
                                
Q_LENGTH32(three).time2=[time;Q_LENGTH32(three).time2]; 
else%i.e. more than one client arrive at the same time 
                                
Q_LENGTH32(three).k2(1)=Q_LENGTH32(three).k2(1)+1; 
end 
end 
 
end 
end 
 
 
%new arrival time for the transporter: 
trans34.arr(three,four)=time+shipment34(three,four).time(1); 
trans34.dep(three,four)=time; 
 
%You think I am bored? I think you think too much; delete 
%it: 
shipment34(three,four).time=shipment34(three,four).time(2:end); 
 
%catch the clients which leaves to 4 
for cl=1:ALL 
ifontheway(cl,1:5)==[3,three,4,four,SIMEND]; 
ontheway(cl,5)=trans34.arr(three,four); 
 
%decrease the (LENGTH.)queuelength 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
if time~=LENGTH34(three,four).timek1(1) %This if asks whether this event oc-
curs on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
                                
LENGTH34(three,four).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH34(three,four).queuek1(1)-
1);LENGTH34(three,four).queuek1]; 
LENGTH34(three,four).timek1=[time;LENGTH34(three,four).timek1]; 
else 
LENGTH34(three,four).queuek1(1)=LENGTH34(three,four).queuek1(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if 
sum(size(LENGTH34(three,four).queuek1))~=sum(size(LENGTH34(three,four).timek1
)) 
error('Size Matters! line 672'); 
end%if size~=size 
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else 
if time~=LENGTH34(three,four).timek2(1) %This if asks whether this event oc-
curs on an new time point, othwise the events are batched to need less space 
                                
LENGTH34(three,four).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH34(three,four).queuek2(1)-
1);LENGTH34(three,four).queuek2]; 
LENGTH34(three,four).timek2=[time;LENGTH34(three,four).timek2]; 
else 
LENGTH34(three,four).queuek2(1)=LENGTH34(three,four).queuek2(1)-1; 
end%if time~= 
if 
sum(size(LENGTH34(three,four).queuek2))~=sum(size(LENGTH34(three,four).timek2
)) 
error('Size Matters! line 682'); 
end%if size~=size 
end%if ontheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
end 
end 
 
 
case min(ontheway(:,5)) 
%this has to stand at the bottom, to be sure that the algorithm 
%does not work with a client on a transport. (The clients on 
%the transport have also a ontheway(5,*)-time which is proper 
%smaller than SIMEND.) 
 
            ALL=size(ontheway); 
            ALL=ALL(1); 
 
            [cl,two]=get_the_index(time,ontheway(:,5),ALL,1); 
 
ifontheway(cl,1:2)==ontheway(cl,3:4) %only then the client is in a processing 
state 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
%take the simplest route 
next=ontheway(cl,7); 
else%i.e. ontheway==k==2 
%search the fastest route: 
                    
next=best_route(ontheway(cl,1),ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,6),ontheway(cl,7)); 
end%if ontheway(8)==k==1 
 
ifontheway(cl,6)==4 %check the destination 
ontheway(cl,3:5)=[ontheway(cl,3)+1,next,SIMEND]; 
else%i.e. the destination column is 1 
ontheway(cl,3:5)=[ontheway(cl,3)-1,next,SIMEND]; 
end%if ontheway(6)==4 
 
%increase the queuelength 
ifontheway(cl,1)==2 %First distinguish between the current columns 
ifontheway(cl,3)==3 %and then between the next columns, 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 %last, differ between the classes. 
                            
NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1=[int32(NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),on
theway(cl,4)).queuek1(1)+1);NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1]; 
                            
NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek1=[time;NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),onth
eway(cl,4)).timek1]; 
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LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2
),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1(1)+1);LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queue
k1]; 
                            
LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek1=[time;LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2),
ontheway(cl,4)).timek1]; 
 
                            
Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).k1=[int32(Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).k1(1)-
1);Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).k1]; 
                            
Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).time1=[time;Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).time1]; 
else 
                            
NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2=[int32(NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),on
theway(cl,4)).queuek2(1)+1);NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2]; 
                            
NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek2=[time;NODE23(ontheway(cl,2),onth
eway(cl,4)).timek2]; 
 
                            
LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2
),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2(1)+1);LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queue
k2]; 
                            
LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek2=[time;LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2),
ontheway(cl,4)).timek2]; 
 
                            
Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).k2=[int32(Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).k2(1)-
1);Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).k2]; 
                            
Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).time2=[time;Q_LENGTH23(ontheway(cl,2)).time2]; 
end%if otheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
ifontheway(cl,3)==1 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
                            
NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1=[int32(NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),on
theway(cl,4)).queuek1(1)+1);NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1]; 
                            
NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek1=[time;NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),onth
eway(cl,4)).timek1]; 
 
                            
LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2
),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1(1)+1);LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queue
k1]; 
                            
LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek1=[time;LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2),
ontheway(cl,4)).timek1]; 
 
                            
Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).k1=[int32(Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).k1(1)-
1);Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).k1]; 
                            
Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).time1=[time;Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).time1]; 
else 
                            
NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2=[int32(NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),on
theway(cl,4)).queuek2(1)+1);NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2]; 
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NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek2=[time;NODE21(ontheway(cl,2),onth
eway(cl,4)).timek2]; 
 
                            
LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2
),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2(1)+1);LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queue
k2]; 
                            
LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek2=[time;LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2),
ontheway(cl,4)).timek2]; 
 
                            
Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).k2=[int32(Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).k2(1)-
1);Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).k2]; 
                            
Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).time2=[time;Q_LENGTH21(ontheway(cl,2)).time2]; 
end%if otheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
end%if ontheway(cl,1)==2 
ifontheway(cl,1)==3 
ifontheway(cl,3)==2 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
                            
NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1=[int32(NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),on
theway(cl,4)).queuek1(1)+1);NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1]; 
                            
NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek1=[time;NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),onth
eway(cl,4)).timek1]; 
 
                            
LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2
),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1(1)+1);LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queue
k1]; 
                            
LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek1=[time;LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2),
ontheway(cl,4)).timek1]; 
 
                            
Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).k1=[int32(Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).k1(1)-
1);Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).k1]; 
                            
Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).time1=[time;Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).time1]; 
else 
                            
NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2=[int32(NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),on
theway(cl,4)).queuek2(1)+1);NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2]; 
                            
NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek2=[time;NODE32(ontheway(cl,2),onth
eway(cl,4)).timek2]; 
 
                            
LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2
),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2(1)+1);LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queue
k2]; 
                            
LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek2=[time;LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2),
ontheway(cl,4)).timek2]; 
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Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).k2=[int32(Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).k2(1)-
1);Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).k2]; 
                            
Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).time2=[time;Q_LENGTH32(ontheway(cl,2)).time2]; 
end%if otheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
ifontheway(cl,3)==4 
ifontheway(cl,8)==1 
                            
NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1=[int32(NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),on
theway(cl,4)).queuek1(1)+1);NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1]; 
                            
NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek1=[time;NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),onth
eway(cl,4)).timek1]; 
 
                            
LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1=[int32(LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2
),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek1(1)+1);LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queue
k1]; 
                            
LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek1=[time;LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2),
ontheway(cl,4)).timek1]; 
 
                            
Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).k1=[int32(Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).k1(1)-
1);Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).k1]; 
                            
Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).time1=[time;Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).time1]; 
else 
                            
NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2=[int32(NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),on
theway(cl,4)).queuek2(1)+1);NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2]; 
                            
NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek2=[time;NODE34(ontheway(cl,2),onth
eway(cl,4)).timek2]; 
 
                            
LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2=[int32(LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2
),ontheway(cl,4)).queuek2(1)+1);LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).queue
k2]; 
                            
LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2),ontheway(cl,4)).timek2=[time;LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2),
ontheway(cl,4)).timek2]; 
 
                            
Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).k2=[int32(Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).k2(1)-
1);Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).k2]; 
                            
Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).time2=[time;Q_LENGTH34(ontheway(cl,2)).time2]; 
end%if otheway(cl,8)==1 
end 
end%if ontheway(cl,1)==3 
 
else 
warning('A client is out of the supply net!'); 
disp(['current time: ',num2str(time)]); 
disp('current client:'); 
disp(ontheway(cl,:)); 
disp(''); 
ontheway(cl,5)=SIMEND; 
disp('clients processing time has been changed to ''SIMEND''.'); 
  170
end%if ontheway(1:2)==ontheway(3:4) 
 
otherwise 
error('The time does not match to any event! The loop was broken to avoid 
endless loops.'); 
 
end%switch time 
 
%search the next event: 
ti-
me=min([min(min(prodtime14k1)),min(min(prodtime41k1)),min(min(prodtime14k2)),
min(min(prodtime41k2)),min(ontheway(:,5)),min(min(abs(trans12.arr))),min(min(
abs(trans23.arr))),min(min(abs(trans34.arr)))]); 
 
end%while time 
 
disp('Simulation has finished.'); 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%%functions for standard tasks 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
function[val]=expval(para) 
%This function returns exponentially distributed values, where the mean 
%value is (1/para). 
 
val=-para*log(rand(1)); 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
function[val]=unival(paramin,paramax) 
%This function returns uniformly distributed values of the intervall 
%(paramin,paramax). 
 
val=paramin+rand(1)*(paramax-paramin); 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
function[ind1,ind2]=get_the_index(val,matrix,dim1,dim2) 
for ind1=1:dim1 
for ind2=1:dim2 
ifval==matrix(ind1,ind2) 
break;% the ind2 
%The loops are broken to return the indices. 
end%if 
end%for ind2 
ifval==matrix(ind1,ind2) 
break;% the ind1 
end%if 
end%for ind1 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
function[Next]=best_route(cur_col,cur_row,dest_col,dest_row) 
%This function estimates the fastest route from 
%(current_column,current_row) to (dest_column,dest_row). 
 
Next=0; 
 
global N2 N3; 
 
globalontheway; 
global time; 
globalqueue; 
 
global mu21 mu23 mu32 mu34; 
 
global trans12 trans23 trans34; 
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global shipmin12 shipmin23 shipmin34; 
global shipmax12 shipmax23 shipmax34; 
global shipment12 shipment23 shipment34 
 
ifdest_col==4 
switchcur_col 
 
case 3 %In this case you have no choice 
            Next=dest_row; 
 
case 2 %In this case you can choose the row of column 3 
 
min_dur=inf; 
 
for three=1:N3 
%duration=time_to_3 + processing_duration_at_3 + 
%           estimated_time_to_4 
if trans23.arr(cur_row,three)<0 %i.e. the transport is on the way to 2 
                    trans_dur=-trans23.arr(cur_row,three)-
time+shipment23(cur_row,three).time(1); 
else%i.e. the transport is on the way to 3 
                    trans_dur=trans23.arr(cur_row,three)-
time+sum(shipment23(cur_row,three).time(1:2)); 
end 
 
%the client does not know how much clients will arrive, so he 
%just looks at the clients at the harbour. 
duration=trans_dur+queue.p3d4(three,2)-time+1/mu34(three,2); 
 
%Now, the client knows hows it takes to get ready at the 
%next harbour. He now has to find out, when the next ship 
%arrives: 
 
%expected duration until the transport arrives at the next harbour: 
                trans_dur=(time-
trans34.dep(three,dest_row))/(abs(trans34.arr(three,dest_row))-
trans34.dep(three,dest_row))*((shipmax34(three,dest_row)+shipmin34(three,dest
_row))/2); 
if trans34.arr(three,dest_row)>=0 %this harbour is of column 4 and the 
transport has to come back: 
                    
trans_dur=trans_dur+(shipmax34(three,dest_row)+shipmin34(three,dest_row))/2; 
end 
 
%It could be that the client arrives after the transport has 
%left. To use this knowledge, the client takes the 
%estimated time for sure and estimates what happens if he 
%misses a transport in that case: 
while duration>trans_dur 
                    
trans_dur=trans_dur+shipmax34(three,dest_row)+shipmin34(three,dest_row); %The 
division with 2 cancels out, because the ship has to take the way 2 times. 
end 
 
%Thus it he needs 
duration=trans_dur; 
%time to leave the next harbour, and estimately 
duration=duration+(shipmax34(three,dest_row)+shipmin34(three,dest_row))/2; 
%as the time to get to its destination. 
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%See if this duration is smaller than the others 
if duration<min_dur 
min_dur=duration; 
                    Next=three; 
end 
end%for three=1:N3 
 
case 1 
 
min_dur=inf; 
 
for two=1:N2 
%dur_two=time_to_2 + processing_duration_at_2 + 
%           + rest_w.r.t._3 
if trans12.arr(cur_row,two)<0 %i.e. the transport is on the way to 1 
                    trans_dur=-trans12.arr(cur_row,two)-
time+shipment12(cur_row,two).time(1); 
else%i.e. the transport is on the way to 2 
                    trans_dur=trans12.arr(cur_row,two)-
time+sum(shipment12(cur_row,two).time(1:2)); 
end 
 
%the client does not know how much clients will arrive, so he 
%just looks at the clients at the harbour. 
dur_two=trans_dur+queue.p2d3(two,2)-time+1/mu23(two,2); 
 
for three=1:N3 
%duration=dur_two + time_to_3 + processing_duration_at_3 + 
%           estimated_time_to_4 
 
duration=dur_two; 
%Now, the client knows hows it takes to get ready at the 
%next harbour. He now has to find out, when the next ship 
%arrives: 
 
%expected duration until the transport arrives at the next harbour: 
                    trans_dur=(time-
trans23.dep(two,three))/(abs(trans23.arr(two,three))-
trans23.dep(two,three))*((shipmax23(two,three)+shipmin23(two,three))/2); 
if trans23.arr(two,three)>=0 %this harbour is of column 3 and the transport 
has to come back: 
                        
trans_dur=trans_dur+(shipmax23(two,three)+shipmin23(two,three))/2; 
end 
 
%It could be that the client arrives after the transport has 
%left. To use this knowledge, the client takes the 
%estimated time for sure and estimates what happens if he 
%misses a transport in that case: 
while duration>trans_dur 
                        
trans_dur=trans_dur+shipmax23(two,three)+shipmin23(two,three);%The division 
with 2 cancels out, because the ship has to take the way 2 times. 
end 
 
%Thus it he needs 
duration=trans_dur; 
%time to leave the next harbour, and estimately 
duration=duration+(shipmax23(two,three)+shipmin23(two,three))/2; 
%as the time to get to its next aimed harbour. 
 
  173 
%Add the queue time to know when the client is again 
%ready to leave the harbour: 
duration=duration+queue.p3d4(three,2)-time+1/mu34(three,2); 
 
%expected duration until the transport arrives at the next harbour: 
                    trans_dur=(time-
trans34.dep(three,dest_row))/(abs(trans34.arr(three,dest_row))-
trans34.dep(three,dest_row))*((shipmax34(three,dest_row)+shipmin34(three,dest
_row))/2); 
if trans34.arr(three,dest_row)>=0 %this harbour is of column 4 and the 
transport has to come back: 
                        
trans_dur=trans_dur+(shipmax34(three,dest_row)+shipmin34(three,dest_row))/2; 
end 
 
%It could be that the client arrives after the transport has 
%left. To use this knowledge, the client takes the 
%estimated time for sure and estimates what happens if he 
%misses a transport in that case: 
while duration>trans_dur 
                        
trans_dur=trans_dur+shipmax34(three,dest_row)+shipmin34(three,dest_row);%The 
division with 2 cancels out, because the ship has to take the way 2 times. 
end 
 
%Thus it he needs 
duration=trans_dur; 
%time to leave the next harbour, and estimately 
duration=duration+(shipmax34(three,dest_row)+shipmin34(three,dest_row))/2; 
%as the time to get to its destination. 
 
%See if this duration is smaller than the others 
if duration<min_dur 
min_dur=duration; 
                        Next=two; 
end 
end%for three=1:N3 
end%for two=1:N2 
end%switch cur_col 
 
else%i.e. dest_col==1 
 
switchcur_col 
case 2 %In this case you have no choice 
            Next=dest_row; 
 
case 3 
 
min_dur=inf; 
 
for two=1:N2 
%duration=time_to_2 + processing_duration_at_2 + 
%           estimated_time_to_1 
if trans23.arr(two,cur_row)>0 %i.e. the transport is on the way to 3 
                    trans_dur=trans23.arr(two,cur_row)-
time+shipment23(two,cur_row).time(1); 
else%i.e. the transport is on the way to 2 
                    trans_dur=-trans23.arr(two,cur_row)-
time+sum(shipment23(two,cur_row).time(1:2)); 
end 
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%the client does not know how much clients will arrive, so he 
%just looks at the clients at the harbour. 
duration=trans_dur+queue.p2d1(two,2)-time+1/mu21(two,2); 
 
%Now, the client knows hows it takes to get ready at the 
%next harbour. He now has to find out, when the next ship 
%arrives: 
 
%expected duration until the transport arrives at the next harbour: 
                trans_dur=(time-
trans12.dep(dest_row,two))/(abs(trans12.arr(dest_row,two))-
trans12.dep(dest_row,two))*((shipmax12(dest_row,two)+shipmin12(dest_row,two))
/2); 
if trans12.arr(dest_row,two)<=0 %the next harbour is of column 1 and the 
transport has to come back: 
                    
trans_dur=trans_dur+(shipmax12(dest_row,two)+shipmin12(dest_row,two))/2; 
end 
 
%It could be that the client arrives after the transport has 
%left. To use this knowledge, the client takes the 
%estimated time for sure and estimates what happens if he 
%misses a transport in that case: 
while duration>trans_dur 
                    
trans_dur=trans_dur+shipmax12(dest_row,two)+shipmin12(dest_row,two); 
end 
%Thus it he needs 
duration=trans_dur; 
%time to leave the next harbour, and estimately 
duration=duration+(shipmax12(dest_row,two)+shipmin12(dest_row,two))/2; 
%as the time to get to its destination. 
 
%See if this duration is smaller than the others 
if duration<min_dur 
min_dur=duration; 
                    Next=two; 
end 
end%for two=1:N2 
 
case 4 
 
min_dur=inf; 
 
for three=1:N3 
%dur_three=time_to_3 + processing_duration_at_3 + 
%           + rest_w.r.t._2 
if trans34.arr(three,cur_row)>0 %i.e. the transport is on the way to 4 
                    trans_dur=trans34.arr(three,cur_row)-
time+shipment34(three,cur_row).time(1); 
else%i.e. the transport is on the way to 3 
                    trans_dur=-trans34.arr(three,cur_row)-
time+sum(shipment34(three,cur_row).time(1:2)); 
end 
 
%the client does not know how much clients will arrive, so he 
%just looks at the clients at the harbour. 
dur_three=trans_dur+queue.p3d2(three,2)-time+1/mu34(three,2); 
 
for two=1:N2 
%duration=dur_three + estimated_time_to_2 + 
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%           processing_duration_at_2 + estimated_time_to_1 
duration=dur_three;  
%Now, the client knows hows it takes to get ready at the 
%next harbour. He now has to find out, when the next ship 
%arrives: 
 
%expected duration until the transport arrives at the next harbour: 
                    trans_dur=(time-
trans23.dep(two,three))/(abs(trans23.arr(two,three))-
trans23.dep(two,three))*((shipmax23(two,three)+shipmin23(two,three))/2); 
if trans23.arr(two,three)<=0 %this harbour is of column 2 and the transport 
has to come back: 
                        
trans_dur=trans_dur+(shipmax23(two,three)+shipmin23(two,three))/2; 
end 
 
%It could be that the client arrives after the transport has 
%left. To use this knowledge, the client takes the 
%estimated time for sure and estimates what happens if he 
%misses a transport in that case: 
while duration>trans_dur 
trans_dur=trans_dur+shipmax23(two,three)+shipmin23(two,three); 
end 
%Thus it he needs 
duration=trans_dur; 
%time to leave the next harbour, and estimately 
duration=duration+(shipmax23(two,three)+shipmin23(two,three))/2; 
%as the time to get to its next aimed harbour. 
 
%Add the queue time: 
duration=duration+queue.p2d1(two,2)-time+1/mu21(two,2); 
 
%expected duration until the transport arrives at the next harbour: 
                    trans_dur=(time-
trans12.dep(dest_row,two))/(abs(trans12.arr(dest_row,two))-
trans12.dep(dest_row,two))*((shipmax12(dest_row,two)+shipmin12(dest_row,two))
/2); 
if trans12.arr(dest_row,two)<=0 %this harbour is of column 1 and the 
transport has to come back: 
                        
trans_dur=trans_dur+(shipmax12(dest_row,two)+shipmin12(dest_row,two))/2; 
end 
 
%It could be that the client arrives after the transport has 
%left. To use this knowledge, the client takes the 
%estimated time for sure and estimates what happens if he 
%misses a transport in that case: 
while duration>trans_dur 
                        
trans_dur=trans_dur+shipmax12(dest_row,two)+shipmin12(dest_row,two); 
end 
 
%Thus it he needs 
duration=trans_dur; 
%time to leave the next harbour, and estimately 
duration=duration+(shipmax12(dest_row,two)+shipmin12(dest_row,two))/2; 
%as the time to get to its destination. 
 
%See if this duration is smaller than the others 
if duration<min_dur 
min_dur=duration; 
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                        Next=three; 
end 
end%for two=1:N2 
end%for three=1:N3 
 
end% switch cur_col 
end%if dest_col==4 
 
if Next==0 
error('The route search had no result!'); 
end 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%%functions for the simulation start 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
function[val_struct]=makeinput(lambdak1,lambdak2,simend) 
%This function calculates all the input times for both classes for the 
%whole simulation duration. 
 
val_struct=struct('k1',0,'k2',0); 
 
dim=size(lambdak1); 
 
for ind1=1:dim(1) 
for ind2=1:dim(2) 
 
%First values: 
val_struct(ind1,ind2).k1(1)=single(expval(lambdak1(ind1,ind2))); 
val_struct(ind1,ind2).k2(1)=single(expval(lambdak2(ind1,ind2))); 
 
k_ind=1; 
whileval_struct(ind1,ind2).k1(k_ind)<=simend 
k_ind=k_ind+1; 
%To know when the input is sufficient, each entry is a sum of 
%its precessor random inputtime and the own random inputtime. 
            
val_struct(ind1,ind2).k1(k_ind)=single(val_struct(ind1,ind2).k1(k_ind-
1)+expval(lambdak1(ind1,ind2))); 
end%while k1 
 
%to be sure that the simualtion does not run out of input events: 
k_ind=k_ind+1; 
        
val_struct(ind1,ind2).k1(k_ind)=single(val_struct(ind1,ind2).k1(k_ind-
1)+expval(lambdak1(ind1,ind2))); 
 
k_ind=1; 
whileval_struct(ind1,ind2).k2(k_ind)<=simend 
k_ind=k_ind+1; 
            
val_struct(ind1,ind2).k2(k_ind)=single(val_struct(ind1,ind2).k2(k_ind-
1)+expval(lambdak2(ind1,ind2))); 
end%while k2 
 
%to be sure that the simualtion does not run out of input events: 
k_ind=k_ind+1; 
        
val_struct(ind1,ind2).k2(k_ind)=single(val_struct(ind1,ind2).k2(k_ind-
1)+expval(lambdak2(ind1,ind2))); 
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end%for ind2 
end%for ind1 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
function[val_struct]=makeprocess(MU21,MU23,MU32,MU34) 
%This function calculates all the processing times for all nodes and 
%classes in a sufficient number w.r.t SIMEND. 
 
%val_struct.currentposition_destination 
val_struct=struct('p2d1',0,'p2d3',0,'p3d2',0,'p3d4',0); 
 
dim2=size(MU21); 
dim3=size(MU32); 
 
for k=1:dim2(2) 
forind=1:dim2(1) 
val_struct(ind,k).p2d1(1)=single(expval(MU21(ind,k))); 
val_struct(ind,k).p2d3(1)=single(expval(MU23(ind,k))); 
 
%         time_ind=1; 
%         while sum(val_struct(ind,k).p2d1)<=10*simend %there are 10% extra 
times to be sure that the simluation will not run out of processingtimes 
%             time_ind=time_ind+1; 
%             val_struct(ind,k).p2d1(time_ind)=single(expval(MU21(ind,k))); 
%         end %while p2d1 
%          
%         time_ind=1; 
%         while sum(val_struct(ind,k).p2d3)<=10*simend 
%             time_ind=time_ind+1; 
%             val_struct(ind,k).p2d3(time_ind)=single(expval(MU23(ind,k))); 
%         end %while p2d3 
end%for ind=1:dim2(1) 
%      
forind=1:dim3(1) 
val_struct(ind,k).p3d2(1)=single(expval(MU32(ind,k))); 
val_struct(ind,k).p3d4(1)=single(expval(MU34(ind,k))); 
%          
%         time_ind=1; 
%         while sum(val_struct(ind,k).p3d2)<=10*simend 
%             time_ind=time_ind+1; 
%             val_struct(ind,k).p3d2(time_ind)=single(expval(MU32(ind,k))); 
%         end %while p3d2 
%          
%         time_ind=1; 
%         while sum(val_struct(ind,k).p3d4)<=10*simend 
%             time_ind=time_ind+1; 
%             val_struct(ind,k).p3d4(time_ind)=single(expval(MU34(ind,k))); 
%         end %while p3d4 
end%for ind=1:dim3(1) 
end%for k 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
function[val_struct]=makeshiptime(shipmin,shipmax,simend) 
%This function calculates all the shiptment times for the whole simulation 
%duration. 
 
val_struct=struct('time',0); 
 
dim=size(shipmin); 
 
for ind1=1:dim(1) 
for ind2=1:dim(2) 
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time_ind=1; 
        
val_struct(ind1,ind2).time(time_ind)=single(unival(shipmin(ind1,ind2),shipmax
(ind1,ind2))); 
 
while sum(val_struct(ind1,ind2).time)<=simend%while the times are not suffi-
cient for the simulation duration 
time_ind=time_ind+1; 
            
val_struct(ind1,ind2).time(time_ind)=single(unival(shipmin(ind1,ind2),shipmax
(ind1,ind2))); 
end 
 
%The shipment times are used to choose a route, even if there is no 
%time left to pass it. In this case extra shipment times are 
%required, because the estimations go beyond SIMEND. 
        
val_struct(ind1,ind2).time(time_ind+1)=single(unival(shipmin(ind1,ind2),shipm
ax(ind1,ind2))); 
        
val_struct(ind1,ind2).time(time_ind+2)=single(unival(shipmin(ind1,ind2),shipm
ax(ind1,ind2))); 
end 
end 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
function[val_struct]=makenode(n1,n2) 
%This function defines the variables callesNODExy which contain all data 
%about the client behaviour. 
val_struct=struct('queuek1',0,'timek1',0,'queuek2',0,'timek2',0); 
for ind1=1:n1 
for ind2=1:n2 
val_struct(ind1,ind2).queuek1=int32(0); 
val_struct(ind1,ind2).queuek2=int32(0); 
val_struct(ind1,ind2).timek1=single(0); 
val_struct(ind1,ind2).timek2=single(0); 
end 
end 
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
function[]=errorcheck(n1,n2,n3,n4); 
%This function exists to shorten the main function. Its use should be 
%obvious. ;-) 
 
global lambda14k1 lambda41k1 lambda14k2 lambda41k2; 
global mu23 mu34 mu21 mu32; 
global shipmin12 shipmin23 shipmin34; 
global shipmax12 shipmax23 shipmax34; 
 
if size(lambda14k1)~=[n1,n4] 
error('inputrates lambda for N_1 k_1 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
if size(lambda14k2)~=[n1,n4] 
error('inputrates lambda for N_1 k_2 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
if size(lambda41k1)~=[n4,n1] 
error('inputrates lambda for N_4 k_1 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
if size(lambda41k2)~=[n4,n1] 
error('inputrates lambda for N_4 k_2 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
if size(mu23)~=[n2,2] 
error('processing times for column 2 to 3 are not defined correctly!'); 
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end 
if size(mu34)~=[n3,2] 
error('processing times for column 3 to 4 are not defined correctly!'); 
end 
if size(mu21)~=[n2,2] 
error('processing times for column 2 to 1 are not defined correctly!'); 
end 
if size(mu32)~=[n3,2] 
error('processing times for column 3 to 2 are not defined correctly!'); 
end 
if size(shipmin12)~=[n1,n2] 
error('shipment minimum times between N1 and N2 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
if size(shipmin23)~=[n2,n3] 
error('shipment minimum times between N2 and N3 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
if size(shipmin34)~=[n3,n4] 
error('shipment minimum times between N3 and N4 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
if size(shipmax12)~=[n1,n2] 
error('shipment maximum times between N1 and N2 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
if size(shipmax23)~=[n2,n3] 
error('shipment maximum times between N2 and N3 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
if size(shipmax34)~=[n3,n4] 
error('shipment maximum times between N3 and N4 are not correctly defined!'); 
end 
 
 
 
